What more can we do to tackle Serious and Organised Crime in rural areas? 

Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) is criminal activity that is planned, coordinated and committed by people working individually, or in groups, for money, profit, influence and power. These offences are often carried out by Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) who use violence, corruption and intimidation to commit and protect their criminal activities. How much of a problem is SOC; and amid a focus on ‘place based harm’, what can be done to tackle SOC in rural areas? Jessica Sellick investigates. 

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According to the Government, crime destroys lives and devastates communities; and Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) brings harm on a scale that can threaten national security and foster a self-reinforcing environment of criminality. What is SOC, what does the data tell us about the scale and nature of SOC, what is the Government doing to tackle it, and what does this all mean for rural communities? 

What is Serious and Organised Crime? The concept of ‘organised crime’ originated in the United States in the 1920s. Italian American organised crime initially centred around the mafia, which was rooted in family ties. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, it expanded to Europe and eventually spread worldwide. According to His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) is ‘serious crime that is planned, co-ordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis’. HMICFRS examples of SOC include: drug trafficking and supply; organised illegal immigration; counterfeiting; organised theft; burglary or robbery; and cybercrime. 

The Government’s latest definition defines SOC as ‘individuals planning, coordinating and committing serious offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of transnational networks’. The main categories of serious offences covered by the term are: child sexual exploitation and abuse; illegal drugs; illegal firearms; fraud; money laundering and other economic crime; bribery and other forms of corruption; organised immigration crime; modern slavery and human trafficking; and cybercrime. Crimestoppers also references business crime and car crime. Historically the Government has also included counterfeiting, organised acquisitive crime and sanctions evasion. 

SOCs are committed by organised crime groups (OCGs) who use violence, corruption and/or intimidation to protect their criminal activities. Part 3 of the of the Serious Crime Act (SCA) 2015 defines an OCG as a group that ‘has as its purpose, or one of its purposes, the carrying on of criminal activities, and consists of three or more persons who act, or agree to act, together to further that purpose’. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines an ‘organized criminal group’ according to four criteria: 

1. A structured group of three or more persons – such a group does not need a formal hierarchy or continuity of its membership. 
2. The group exists for a period of time. 
3. It acts in concert with the aim of committing at least one serious crime; and 
4. to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. 

For the purposes of the Convention, serious crime means ‘an offence punishable by a maximum penalty of incarceration of at least four years’. This time period was selected by international consensus. 

These definitions and examples are important because they are the basis on which Governments set policies and strategies, and law enforcement bodies identify OCGs and offence types. In England and Wales the emphasis within these definitions has changed over time – from the distribution of illegal drugs through to modern day slavery and human trafficking. These definitions lead a number of often disparate activities to be aggregated up into a single national (international or transnational) threat. Interestingly, none of these definitions take into account the victims of organised crime and the impact of crime on them and society. 

How prevalent is SOC? The National Crime Agency (NCA) is the UK’s leading agency for tackling SOC. Established in 2013, the NCA is a national law enforcement agency with a strategic role in analysing and disrupting serious crime across the UK and internationally: 

‘We lead the UK’s fight to cut serious and organised crime. NCA officers work at the forefront of law enforcement, building the best possible intelligence picture of serious and organised crime threats, relentlessly pursuing the most serious and dangerous offenders and developing and delivering specialist capabilities on behalf of law enforcement and other partners’. 

The NCA’s investigations are divided into the following areas: border vulnerabilities; fraud; modern slavery and human trafficking; child sexual abuse and exploitation; illegal firearms; drug trafficking; organised immigration crime; bribery / corruption / sanctions evasion; cybercrime; money laundering and illicit finance; and kidnap and extortion. Between 2013 and 2023 the NCA reported that its response to SOC had resulted in: 

• More than 23,000 disruptions – these are actions that reduced or removed a crime threat. 
• Over 12,500 arrests. 
• More than 4,900 convictions.
• Jail terms totalling over 21,100 years. 
• Seizures of over 2,000 tonnes of cocaine, heroin and cannabis. 
• The seizure of 3,100 firearms. 

Despite these figures, the NCA describes a trend wherein while overall crime has reduced over the last decade, the scale and threat from SOC, and the associated level of harm, has increased. In 2023, for example, the NCA estimated there to be at least 59,000 people in the UK involved in SOC and that it cost the UK at least £47 billion annually. 

The NCA’s latest National Strategic Assessment of SOC highlights how: 

• The threat from SOC has increased, driven by factors such as more people living their lives online, global insecurities, and increasing interconnectivity. This has led to a rise in cybercrime, fraud, and online child sexual abuse. 
• The threat from drugs has grown, with drugs becoming cheaper, more potent, and more dangerous. This has contributed to an increase in SOC-related offending. 
• The majority of crime now occurs online or is enabled by online resources. Technology has made it easier for OCGs to diversify, collaborate, and reach a global pool of victims while providing anonymity and security. 
• Organised crime has become more international, better networked, and technically adept. This has made the response to SOC more complex and challenging. 

Between 2023 and 2024 the threats around child sexual abuse, cyber, drugs, illicit finance and organised acquisitive crime all increased: 

• The NCA estimates that there are between 710,000 and 840,000 UK-based adult offenders who pose varying degrees of risk to children, equivalent to 1.3-1.6% of the UK adult population. The hidden nature of both online and offline child sexual abuse means it is hard to detect and underreported. 
• The deployment of ransomware remains the greatest serious and organised cybercrime threat, and also poses a risk to the UK’s national security. The NCA reported that in 2023, ransomware incidents impacting UK victims were double those of 2022. Similar trends were also present in global figures. Again, ransomware incidents remain under-reported. 
• In the UK, drug misuse deaths per capita have increased by 60% over the last 10-years and are amongst the highest in Europe. Heroin continues to be associated with the largest number of deaths, followed by cocaine, and then benzodiazepines. The NCA describes how nearly early every town and city across England and Wales is affected by county lines supplying a variety of drugs. Most drugs are sourced from major cities, with about 600 active lines operating.
• The NCA estimates that more than £12 billion of criminal cash is generated each year in the UK. The NCA believes it is a realistic possibility that over £100 billion is laundered through and within the UK or by UK-registered corporate structures each year.

Organised acquisitive crime focuses on high-harm and cross-border burglary, vehicle crime, robbery, business crime, heritage and cultural property crime, plant and agricultural thefts, and metal and infrastructure crime. Drawing on data from Opal [a national intelligence unit focused on serious organised acquisitive crime], the NCA describes how, in 2023, there was an overall increase in organised acquisitive crime reporting, reflecting increased costs of living, fluctuations in market prices, and supply chain pressures caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, there was a 22% increase in Global Positioning Systems (GPS) thefts from tractors. The NCA describes how organised criminal networks involved in acquisitive crime are likely to be geographically widespread, highly organised, and capable of crossing international borders with stolen equipment.

Every year, thousands of people take part in the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). This information can be used to measure the amount of crime taking place and track the changing levels of crime from one year to the next. The latest survey results were published in July 2024, revealing how: 

• Fraud decreased by 10%, with reductions in bank and credit account fraud (12%), advance fee fraud (23%), and other fraud (39%). 
• Offences involving firearms (excluding figures from Devon and Cornwall Police) increased by 6% (to 6,268 offences) compared to the year ending March 2023 (5,917 offences), attributed mainly to an increase in imitation firearms. 

While the CSEW includes crimes that are not reported to the police, it is limited to crimes against people resident in households and does not cover all types of crime. 

The national website for policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Police.uk, publishes data about crime and policing. Here you can download data for individual police forces and neighbourhood teams, as well as information about street-level crime and stop and search. The statistics for each area includes information about crime levels over the last 12-months and 3-years; the different types of crime over the last month, 12-months and 3-years; and the outcomes for the last month, 12-months and 3-years. The site also enables you to compare crime in your area with other, similar areas. Additionally, the Home Office releases data annually about crime outcomes.    

Within all of this data I wonder if there are common indicators that may lead criminals from low level criminal offences to become involved in SOC? For example, previous research found that offenders who committed robbery, burglary or vehicle theft as their debut offence were most likely to become chronic offenders. While the profile and prevalence of SOC will differ from area-to-area and community-to-community, how can we test and model the links between low level criminal activity and its escalation to more serious and organised criminality? 

What are the Government and other agencies doing to tackle SOC? In England and Wales, the Home Office has overall responsibility for SOC policy, strategy and funding, including the publication of a Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. In its latest strategy, covering the period 2023 to 2028, the Home Office highlighted the significant threat that SOC poses to the UK, describing how: 

“SOC is a major threat to national security and prosperity. It costs lives, blights communities, hampers economic growth, causes financial loss to individuals, businesses, and the state, and corrodes the global reputation of the UK and its institutions”. 

The strategy highlights the importance of taking a collaborative approach to combat SOC. In this regard, the NCA works with Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs), police forces and other agencies to combat SOC. 

The Home Office increased the NCA’s budget by 21% to £860 million in 2023-2024, and it remained at this level in 2024-2025. Alongside this, the Home Office set strategic priorities for the NCA to reduce SOC. This has centred around improving coordination with policing and other partners to tackle OCGs in the UK; dismantling the highest harm OCGs and individuals; reducing organised immigration crime; reducing fraud and economic crime; enhancing the security of borders and ports; and responding to national security threats. 

At a local level, between 2020 and 2021 West Yorkshire Police conducted a pilot project in Bradford Moor. The area was experiencing high levels of crime, antisocial behaviour, violence and drugs supply. There was also high unemployment, low levels of community trust in policing and several OCGs operating in the area. To understand the threat from SOC, the Police prepared a profile of the ward using Police and partner data. This led to the targeted arrest of people associated with OCGs; a range of voluntary sector interventions to divert vulnerable individuals from criminal exploitation; and the reclaiming of housing and other community assets being used for criminal activity. During the pilot, the area saw a 57% reduction in burglary, a 38% reduction in antisocial behaviour, and a 27% reduction in drug offences. 

Over the same period, 2020-2021, Great Manchester Police launched a multi-agency operation in Cheetham Hill to tackle SOC which resulted in 56 multi-agency warrants being executed, 96 arrests and the seizure of 298 tonnes of counterfeit goods worth an estimated £39 million. 191 counterfeit shops were closed down and community groups established to regenerate the area. Seven other forces ran similar pilots throughout 2021 and 2022: Bedfordshire, Hampshire, Merseyside, North Wales, Northumbria, South Yorkshire and Suffolk. 

All of these pilots followed what has become known as ‘Clear, Hold, Build’ (CHB). This has a three-phase operating model: 

1. Clear – interventions that target OCG members, their networks, business interests, criminality and spheres of influence (e.g. through arrests and relentless disruption). Police forces are expected to use all powers and levers to impede the ability of OCGs to operate and begin restoring community confidence. 
2. Hold – interventions, counter-measures and contingency plans to consolidate and stabilise the Clear phase. This is intended to stop remaining or other OCG members from capitalising on the vacuum created. It leads to an improvement in community confidence by ensuring spaces remain safe. This phase includes visible neighbourhood policing in hotspot areas. 
3. Build – a whole-system approach to delivering community interventions to tackle the drivers of crime, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and geographic places where crime occurs. Police forces work with residents and stakeholders to build a safer community. 

According to the College of Policing, “these phases of activity need to be deployed flexibly. Although they may initially happen in succession, they should afterwards be repeated as required. They may be implemented at the same time and recur continually but with different intensity through the life of the project. The [CHB] model relies on connectivity between the three phases as part of a coherent, place-based response. Each phase is designed to motivate and empower communities, so they have greater confidence and agency”. The pilots were focused on small areas (i.e., less than 4,000 homes), with areas selected according to the location of OCGs, local crime profiles including MoRILE, the views of local policing leads, critical incidents, evidence of lack of reporting of crime, community asset mapping and the identification of service gaps. 

Following the pilot, in January 2023, the Home Office announced that all Police forces in England and Wales would adopt CHB. They emphasised the importance of deploying new tools to determine the highest harm geographical areas and reducing place-based harm. According to National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) “This approach will see Police Forces and Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) work more closely with local partners to build resilience in communities and prevent those at risk from being drawn into crime. The support for this system-wide approach, alongside significant investment into ROCUs, has enabled us to maximise our efforts and effectiveness against high harm offenders alongside our law enforcement partners. Extending and maintaining this support across the country will help to ensure a strong response across the entirety of policing”.

In January 2025, the Home Office published an evaluation of CHB. This included a list of recommendations to inform its wider rollout. These were focused around ensuring the most appropriate hotspot is selected, establishing co-ownership between Police and partners early-on, consulting with the local community to ensure their concerns are addressed, and how the Government should consider bespoke funding for CHB. Alongside this, the Home Office also published guidance for Police and local partners to develop local profiles to inform their SOC priorities – from preventing crime in the first place, to pursuing OCGs, and helping victims and communities recover from the impact. 

Prior to this, on 4 December 2024, the Government set out a Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee. Under the Guarantee, every neighbourhood will have a named, contactable officer, and residents and businesses will be given a voice to shape local policing priorities. In addition, every police force will have a dedicated anti-social behaviour lead who will work with communities to develop action plans to tackle local concerns. Over this parliament, the Government has committed to having 13,000 additional neighbourhood policing officers, PCSOs and special constables in dedicated neighbourhood policing roles. In September 2024, the Government also announced funding for the College of Policing to rollout dedicated training for officers and staff in neighbourhood policing teams. A trial began in June 2024 and this is being rolled out to all Police forces from 2025. 

The Serious Crime Act 2015 is a UK law that aims to strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to tackle SOC. It includes several key provisions around:

• The Proceeds of Crime: the Act improves the ability to recover criminal assets by amending the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
• Computer Misuse: it amends the Computer Misuse Act 1990 to ensure sentences for attacks on computer systems fully reflect the damage they cause. 
• Organised Crime: the Act creates a new offence targeting people who knowingly participate in an organised crime group. 
• Drug-Cutting Agents: it introduces new powers to seize, detain, and destroy chemical substances suspected of being used as cutting agents for illegal drugs.
• Child Protection: the Act clarifies the offence of child cruelty to include psychological suffering or injury, and introduces new offences related to child sexual exploitation and abuse. 
• Prison Security: the Act strengthens prison security by creating new offences related to the possession of weapons and the use of mobile communication devices in prison. 

The Act was introduced to ensure that the NCA, the Police, and other law enforcement agencies can effectively pursue, disrupt, and bring to justice serious and organised criminals. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) supports the Government’s SOC strategy in seeking to deliver successful criminal justice outcomes. Back in 2022 the CPS reorganised its central casework directorates to launch the Serious Economic and Organised Crime Directorate (SEOCID). In 2025 the CPS is looking to produce a new Serious Economic and Organised Crime (SEOC) strategy. This will set out the work being done to combat fraud, forgery, money laundering, cybercrime, drug and firearm trafficking, modern slavery, child exploitation, human trafficking and organised immigration crime. 

Alongside this, on 30 January 2025, the Government introduced The Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill. The Bill primarily relates to law enforcement and would expand the powers and capabilities of Police Forces and other agencies in relation to both immigration offences specifically and SOC more generally. These changes include new criminal offences of supplying or handling almost any item to be used in connection with illegal immigration, and of collecting information to be used for arranging an unauthorised journey to the UK. There would also be a new offence of endangering another person during an illegal crossing in the English Channel. 

Amid these strategies, policies, laws and bill, some commentators have queried whether the NCA can deliver on its mandate – citing underfunding, understaffing and increasing threats including a surge in cybercrime and small boat crossings in the English channel. While other commentators highlight capacity pressures and backlogs in the court system – for while judges and courts have been dealing with the most serious crimes more quickly, the backlog is growing because the Police and prosecutors are charging more crimes than the courts have capacity to deal with. 

Tackling SOC indicates the various public bodies that need to work together. What is less clear from the Home Office is how the work of these bodies aligns strategically and operationally – and how they are linked to funding and resources. For while ‘Clear Hold Build’ may reduce demand on policing, housing, children’s services, adult social care and other services under certain circumstances; law enforcement, public sector and voluntary and community sector organisations all face funding and resourcing pressures – what capacity is there to collectively respond to SOC? 

For me, tackling SOC opens up a discussion about funding for Police Forces. In England and Wales, the main source of income for police forces is Government grant funding made available through an annual Home Office Police Grant Report. Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) can also raise additional revenue funding through council tax precepts. Every December, the Home Office publishes a provisional police grant report which contains allocations for the following year to be paid out under the Police Act 1996. This is subject to a public consultation before a final police grant report is published and voted on by Parliament. 

The Grant Report uses the Police Allocation Formula (PAF) – which was originally introduced in 2006 – to determine how much funding each police force will receive. The calculations are based on the estimated workload of each police force area and cover: demography (i.e., population estimates, characteristics such as household types, number of benefit claimants and number of bars per hectare), crime related activity, non-crime activity (e.g. road traffic accident assistance), policing special events, policing sparsely populated areas, and an area cost adjustment for variation in labour market costs. Built into this are 10 regression analysis calculations that estimate the relationship between these variables. 

Analysis of police funding between 2015 to 2024 shows that following a nominal decline in funding for policing between 2011 and 2015, funding has grown steadily each year since then Council tax precepts have seen the largest growth  – from accounting for 28% of funding to PCCs in the year ending 31 March 2016 increasing to 34% of funding to PCCs in the year ending 31 March 2024. These proportions and variations in income streams varies by police force area. 

In addition to these main sources, PCCs can also generate income through charging for special police services to recover costs (e.g. providing police officers at sporting events, festivals or concerts), providing services such as training, and income from donations and sponsorship. While police forces are expected to include ‘reasonable contingencies and unexpected and exceptional events’ in their budget plans, PCCs can apply to the Home Office for special grant funding to meet additional costs should such events arise within their areas. 

While the funding formula includes an element for ‘sparsity of population’, police officers and PCCs have argued that there is no consideration of the rural/urban nature of a police force – indeed the data used to generate the funding formula itself is based on information from the 2001 Census. Similarly, some police forces receive more funding from local council tax payers than others. 

There have been discussions around reforming PAF and in 2015 the Government consulted on a new model for allocating core Government grant funding to police forces.  A revised model was published and then withdrawn when calculation errors were identified. With a new Government in office, there are renewed calls for a fairer funding model that accounts for the increased costs of rural policing. The formula also needs to take account of public needs and expectations for police services. 

In the meantime, despite the Government’s commitment to neighbourhood policing, initial assessments against forecasts show police forces facing significant deficits. Lincolnshire Police, for example, is facing a deficit of at least £14 million for 2025-2026. Without urgent and significant funding, this will require the force to reduce its size by over 400 officers and staff. This led Chief Constable Paul Gibson to describe how “I have reluctantly cancelled police recruitment and will need to start reducing police staff numbers significantly and immediately. This is no longer about balancing financial spreadsheets; this is about the imminent withdrawal of core services to the communities of Lincolnshire which will be clearly seen and felt by our residents. We will go from being the least funded force in the country to being an extreme outlier at a time when there is the need to improve our services”. Similarly, Essex Police is a facing a budget deficit of £12.5 million in 2025-2026. Even after raising the precept by the maximum allowed and identifying £8 million in efficiency savings, it still faces a £5.3 million shortfall. Proposals include losing all 99 PCSOs, losing 65 staff posts, stopping all non-critical building and technology projects, and every officer experiencing a pay reduction. While the NCA and ROCUs have seen an increase in funding, or stable funding, local Police Forces have a critical role to play in identifying, disrupting, tackling and preventing SOC and needed to adequately funded if they are to do this.  

What SOC is happening in rural areas? Back in November 2023, I prepared a briefing on the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act, highlighting not only the facts and figures but also the impact of the theft of farm vehicles on farming families. The NFU Mutual Rural Crime Report 2024 described how rural crime is ‘becoming more organised, sophisticated and determined in its nature’. The cost of rural crime increased by 4.3% year-on-year in 2023, to £52.8 million, as criminal gangs targeted farms. NFU Mutual’s survey of their agents found 91% believed thieves were more organised, with 82% saying they knew farmers who had been impacted by rural crime in their area. 77% of agents knew farmers who had been repeat victims, leaving farmers feeling vulnerable in what is not just their workplace but also their family home. 

In November 2024, the UK Parliament published an horizon scan on issues facing rural communities. This outlined a range of challenges for farming businesses including the impact of agricultural crime on farmer’s mental health and how criminal justice system penalties do not reflect the intricacies of rural crime and the impact these offences have on victims – this also includes cyber and cyber-related criminal activity on farm businesses. 

In March 2024, the National Rural Crime Network (NRCN) published research from Durham University analysing criminal activities targeting rural communities. Dr Kate Tudor, the report’s author, argues that these criminal individuals or groups, are not just engaged in opportunistic crime but are deeply embedded in the fabric of organised crime, with their activities extending from the supply and sale of drugs to international smuggling operations. The report identified 22 OCGs actively operating within the UK’s rural sectors, but noted a gap in the formal recognition and monitoring of these groups by law enforcement. In response, the NRCN proposed a 10-point plan to enhance the response to rural crime. This called on the College of Policing to review and update its Threat, Harm and Investigative Guidelines (THRIVE) to better reflect the serious and organised element of rural criminality.  

A Strategic Threat Risk Assessment on County Lines (April 2023-March 2024) published by the National County Lines Coordination Centre [part of the National Police Chiefs’ Council] found policing’s ability to identify drug lines has improved leading to fewer lines running externally from one force to another (i.e., from a city to a more rural town), but many more internal lines (starting and ending in the same force area). The Centre suggests this represents a clear shift towards a more localised model of supply. According to this Assessment, there are some 1,447 OCGs linked to County Lines, with the numbers of new OCGs and individuals linked remaining steady. 

More broadly, academic research on rural policing has highlighted why the policing of rural spaces is distinctive for police work. This includes studies which describe the job stress faced by officers policing our rural areas such as job demands, isolation and critical decision-making. Around SOC, research has explored the differences between criminal urban and rural markets, and has led to calls for a global approach to SOC, recognising how rural places are connected to and affected by other places. Much of the existing literature concentrates on farm related crime.  

Amid a renewed focus on ‘place-based harm’, there is less policy, practice and academic research on the models needed to prevent and investigate SOC in rural areas. All the way back in 2016, the College of Policing published a menu of tactics for disrupting serious and organised criminals. At the time it was a collation of a range of tactics and powers available to law enforcement and partner agencies to problem-solve and disrupt criminal activity. What was the take-up of these tactics in rural areas and how effective were they? 

The Home Office’s evaluation of CHB indicated that the area needs to ‘have sufficient local assets to develop a comprehensive Build phase’. Evaluators found ‘no statistically significant impacts detected for the rural group’ highlighting that rural sites also tended to be larger so CHB is less effective when covering a larger area, and how police forces covering rural areas tend to have a smaller officer workforce compared to metropolitan forces. How can we take the learning from CHB [and what doesn’t work and why] to develop new models for tackling SOC in rural areas? What more can we do to intervene and protect rural residents at risk of becoming involved in OCGs and the victims of crime through producing SOC local profiles covering rural areas? And how can we evaluate the work of all the different bodies involved in tackling SOC to assess what works and to manage risk and decision making – is it possible to develop a common template that looks at the process, impact and economic effects of interventions? 

Back in April 2024, Kier Starmer announced that a future Labour Government would introduce the first ever Government-backed rural crime strategy. A speech given by the Minister of Farming in July 2024 reaffirmed the new Labour Government’s commitment to producing a strategy, highlighting how this would cover agricultural theft, fly-tipping and livestock worrying. The crime strategy was referenced again by the Secretary of State for Defra in a debate in October 2024. A Westminster Hall debate on rural crime took place on 27 February 2025. Will the new strategy cover SOC in our rural areas? 

On 27 February 2025, a Westminster Hall debate was held on rural crime. Ben Maguire, Liberal Democrat MP for North Cornwall put forward the debate. In his introductory remarks, he described how: 

“For too long, rural crime has been overlooked and not made a priority by successive Governments, but for those living and working in our rural communities, its impact can be absolutely devastating. Let me be crystal clear: rural crime is rarely random or opportunistic, and successive Governments have not given it the attention it deserves. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that rural crime is now dominated by organised criminal gangs that operate with sophistication across police forces and systematically target farmers, tradesmen and rural businesses. I am not talking just about the occasional theft of a piece of farm equipment; this is large-scale, co-ordinated and organised criminal activity, with criminal networks exploiting gaps in policing resources”. 

During the debate, MPs emphasised that rural crime extends beyond just farms and tractors, highlighting its significant impact on the wellbeing, mental health, and finances of rural residents and businesses. MPs urged the Government to prioritise regulation and secondary legislation to deter organised criminals. Additionally, MPs renewed their calls for police funding reform and the development of a comprehensive rural crime strategy. They also advocated for more police officers operating in rural areas (with appropriate training, equipment and technology), as well as the reopening of smaller rural police stations. In response, the Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention, Dame Diana Johnson, said she would:

“…take away some of the challenges that have been raised in this debate on fly-tipping, but I want to refer to the provisions in the Crime and Policing Bill, which had its First Reading this week. Through that Bill, there will be a power to issue statutory guidance to ensure consistency and robust enforcement of fly-tipping, but I very much hear the concerns about organised criminals who are involved…it is clear that the offending we have been discussing affects the lives and livelihoods of decent, law-abiding people…We will be implementing the new neighbourhood policing guarantee to deliver an additional 13,000 police officers, police community support officers and special constables in neighbourhood policing roles, ensuring that every community has a named officer to turn to. Those policing commitments will not just be about towns and cities; they will also be for rural communities, speeding up response times and building public confidence in all those areas…in the 2025-26 police settlement we have committed to provide funding of up to £19.5 billion for the policing system in England and Wales, which is an overall increase of up to £1 billion compared to this financial year. We have been in government for seven months, and we have made it very clear that we have an agenda around reforming policing to make it fit for the future and to give it the structures and capabilities it needs. That will, of course, involve a conversation about funding, and that will happen as part of our reform agenda…There is clearly much more to do, but we are determined to deliver the safety and security of all our communities, rural and urban”.   

On 4-5 March 2025 the NPCC and Opal will hold their annual conference. This year’s theme is ‘innovation and tackling SOAC together’. It includes a closed session for law enforcement on ‘global organised crime targeting the UK construction and agricultural industry’. We know from the trends and the figures that rural crime is increasingly organised and sophisticated, and that standard models to reduce crime do not neatly map onto rural areas. With the Government’s focus on reducing place-based harm and neighbourhood policing, and indicating their commitment to publishing a rural crime strategy, what more can we do to ensure local profiles of SOC, police funding and whole-system responses to tackling crime benefit rural communities? 

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently assessing the impact of neighbourhood-based initiatives, supporting the establishment of a new Wellbeing Hub, and collecting data to highlight the positive impact of relocating NHS clinical services into community settings. Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

LinkedIn: 🌈Jessica Sellick 

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