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Arctic

Beyond the ice – what (rural) engagement do we want to have in the ‘High North’? 

Back in November 2023 the House of Lords Committee on International Relations and Defence published a report on the Arctic and the UK’s approach to the region. The Committee described how the Arctic was experiencing significant change and critical to UK interests. On 9 January 2025 the House of Lords debated the UK’s strategy towards the Arctic. Where is the Arctic region, what is the UK Government’s Arctic strategy and what does this mean for rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. 

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In March 2023 the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee launched an Inquiry into the Arctic and the UK’s approach to the region. The Committee described the UK as the Arctic’s ‘nearest neighbour’ and indicated how developments in  the region are critical to UK interests. In citing the rapidly evolving diplomatic and security context in the Arctic, and global warming and a reduction in ice coverage, the Committee looked at the Government’s current policy approach and provided recommendations on how the UK could best advance its interests and those of its allies in the region. Where is the Arctic and why is it of critical importance to the UK? 

Where is the Arctic region? The Arctic (from the Greek word ἄρκτος, meaning ‘bear’) is a polar region located at the northernmost part of Earth. It is typically defined as the area above the Arctic Circle. The Arctic region consists of parts of northern Norway (Nordland, Troms, Finnmark, Svalbard and Jan Mayen), northern Sweden (Västerbotten, Norrbotten and Lappland), northern Finland (North Ostrobothnia, Kainuu and Lappi), Russia (Murmansk, Siberia, Nenets Okrug, Novaya Zemlya), the United States (Alaska), Canada (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut), Denmark (Greenland), and northern Iceland (Grímsey and Kolbeinsey), along with the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas. The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee describes the Arctic as a physically, economically and socially diverse region which, nonetheless, shares common features and challenges. 

In 1996 The Arctic Council was established as an intergovernmental forum to facilitate multilateral cooperation, coordination and interaction on issues relating to the Arctic, particularly on sustainable development and environmental protection issues. The founding document of the Arctic Council, the Ottawa Declaration, lists the following countries as Members of the Council: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark including Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States. Six organisations representing Arctic Nations Indigenous Peoples have Permanent Participant status, providing them with full consultation rights in connection with the Council’s negotiations and decision-making. The Council has six working groups comprising (1) Arctic contaminants action programme, (2) Arctic monitoring and assessment programme, (3) conservation of Arctic flora and fauna, (4) emergency prevention, preparedness and response, (5) protection of the Arctic marine environment, and (6) sustainable development – there is also an Expert Group that covers black carbon and methane. The Council is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the state holding the chairmanship (at the time of publication: Norway). Each Arctic state appoints a Senior Arctic Official (SAO) to manage its interests in the Arctic Council. 

Observer status is open to non-Arctic nations along with intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations that the Council determines can contribute to its working groups. This currently comprises thirteen non-Arctic states – including the UK, thirteen intergovernmental organisations and twelve non-governmental organisations.

The standing Arctic Council Secretariat began in 2013 in Tromso, Norway and provides administrative support and general capacity to the Council. The Arctic Council Strategic Plan 2021-2030 reflects the shared values and joint aspirations of the Arctic states and the Permanent Participants to advance sustainable development, environmental protection and good governance. The document contains seven strategic goals around climate, ecosystems, the marine environment, sustainable social development, sustainable economic development, knowledge and communications, and a stronger Arctic Council. These goals are underpinned by strategic actions. As the Council is a forum it has no central programming budget. All projects or initiatives are sponsored by one or more Arctic states, and its work excludes military security. 

What is the UK’s Arctic strategy? The Government has set out its approach in two principal documents. Firstly, in ‘Looking North: the UK and the Artic’, known as the Arctic policy framework. Published in 2023 by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the document sets out the Government’s aim of helping to ensure the Arctic remains peaceful. This involves the Government taking a ‘whole Government response’ to be ‘dynamic and responsive to changes’ in the region. It contains four priority areas for action: (i) partnering and collaborating – including a commitment to remaining a State Observer on the Arctic Council; (ii) protecting the climate, people and environment; (iii) preserving security and stability; and (iv) promoting shared prosperity in the region, where economic and regional development is achieved in a safe and responsible way. The document builds on two earlier iterations of the Arctic Policy Framework – the original framework that was published in 2013, ‘Adapting to Change’ and revised in 2018: ‘Beyond the Ice’.  Back in 2016, the UK, Norwegian and Canadian Governments jointly funded a Wilton Park roundtable discussion. The roundtable explored alternative scenarios for the environmental, political, economic and social challenges faced by the Arctic, looking ahead to 2045. This found that while the Arctic region consists of many different geographies it is not about to become a national park and needs to continue as a lived in, managed, environment. 

Secondly, ‘The UK’s defence contribution in the High North’ published by the Ministry of Defence in March 2022. Intended to guide the Government’s defence efforts in the region over a 10-year period, the document focuses on protecting the UK’s critical national infrastructure, ensuring the UK’s freedom to navigate and operate across the wider region, reinforcing the rules-based international system and contesting malign and destabilising behaviours.

On 30 March 2023, the International Relations and Defence Committee launched an inquiry into the UK Government’s approach to the Arctic. The Committee considered the UK’s strategic and diplomatic interests in the Arctic, and whether the Government has set appropriate priorities. The Committee’s work also included scrutiny of the Arctic Policy Framework and the UK’s defence contribution in the High North. 

“The UK is the Arctic’s nearest neighbour and developments in the region are critical to UK interests. The strategic and environmental context in the Arctic is changing rapidly and the UK needs to be ready to respond to the diplomatic and security challenges this poses,” Chair’s comment. 

The Inquiry included a call for evidence, written evidence and oral evidence. The Committee published its report on 29 November 2023. This highlighted issues including reduced sea ice coverage, geopolitical developments and the (uncertain) future of the Arctic Council. While reaffirming its belief that developments in the Arctic are of ‘critical importance’ to the UK’s security, environment and energy supply, the report made recommendations in five key areas – (a) the UK’s Arctic strategy, (b) Russia and deterrence, (c) internationalisation of the region, (d) growing economic activity in the Arctic, and (e) cooperation and governance. Around the Government’s strategy, the Committee recommended that it reflect how the region is an area of competition and potential confrontation. Around growing economic activity, the Committee highlighted how the region is becoming vulnerable to large-scale commercial fishing and how the UK Government should take a leading role in negotiating a new polar code. The Committee called for increased ministerial focus, including an Arctic ambassador or envoy to assist the Government minister responsible for coordinating a cross-government approach to the Arctic, and to prepare for any future possibility of the Arctic Council ceasing to function.  

The Government published its response to the Committee’s report on 26 January 2024. Here the Government set out its commitment to working with partners to contribute to the ongoing critical work of the Arctic, and how it has committed funding so that UK researchers can engage on Arctic Council working groups. Similarly, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to playing its role in the sustainable management of fisheries in the Arctic, advocating for the highest possible shipping standards and adherence to the polar code. 

“The Arctic matters to the United Kingdom. We are its nearest neighbour and its climate, environment, security and prosperity are crucial to our own…most of what happens in the Arctic takes place within the territory of sovereign states, most of whom are our close partners and allies. That activity falls within their national jurisdiction, and our respect for their territorial sovereignty is a key principle of the UK’s engagement in, and with, the region…The UK has a lot to offer the Arctic…we have an excellent reputation for Arctic science and contributing to the global understanding of climate change, while London is a global centre for shipping and the financial expertise that underpins much of the new commercial activity in the Arctic…What matters for the UK is the expertise and capabilities we have to offer: that is why our partners value the UK’s contribution in the region, and that enhances our ability to influence what happens in the Arctic” (pages 5-6)…A Minister for the Polar Regions has been established within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to provide a clear point of focus for HMG [His Majesty’s Government] engagement in the Arctic (page 14) Government response.  

The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for the Polar Regions was formed in 2015 to ensure that UK parliamentarians are informed about issues impacting polar regions and how they affect the UK. This includes the publication of Polar Regions News to promote better awareness of the Arctic and Antarctic. The APPG chaired the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee’s inquiry into the UK’s relationship with the Arctic. In October 2023 the Committee published its inquiry report. This described UK Government policy on the region as ‘disjointed’ and emphasised the need for an envoy to bolster Government collaboration in addressing the combined challenges of climate and geopolitics in the Arctic. While highlighting how UK Arctic researchers ‘punch well about their weight in terms of reputation and influence’ – the UK is the fourth largest producer of Arctic research papers in the world and operates an Arctic research station in Ny-Ålesund (Svalbard) – the Committee called for a UK National Arctic Research Policy backed by increased funding. 

“The Arctic is seeing an increased level of strategic competition as melting Arctic ice unlocks vast resources and commercial potential. This cannot be at the cost of the Arctic’s Indigenous Peoples or the environment. The UK has a responsibility to ensure that commercial opportunities in the Arctic are guided by the principles of sustainable development”, The UK and the Arctic environment report summary.   

In October 2024 the UK Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories outlined the UK’s commitment to the Arctic in a speech to the Arctic Council Assembly. Stephen Doughty confirmed that the Arctic Policy Framework would continue to guide the Government’s approach and that it would be updated and developed to respond to scientific evidence and strategic challenges: 

“…let me confirm to you that the new UK Government is putting internationalism and multilateralism at the heart of all that we do…we are committed to the Arctic Council in our role as State Observer, recognising that it has been at the heart of a stable and peaceful region for much of the past three decades. And indeed, the Council has an important role to play in articulating a strong voice and delivering effective governance. It has the potential to act as a multilateral ‘glue’, with the strength to bind together a fragmented world…we have already invested over £135 million pounds in Arctic research over the last decade, including through UK centres of expertise…and we are committing further funds to collaborations with Arctic Council working groups, helping to enhance understanding of climate impacts on the livelihoods of Arctic indigenous people, including many other things…the future of the Arctic depends on every one of us, working together, in a spirit of strong collaboration and cooperation. I hope that when we look back, 25-years from now, it’ll be from the perspective of a more secure, peaceful and indeed sustainable era”, Stephen Doughty MP, speech delivered on 18 October 2024 in Reykjavik.   

On 9 January 2025 the House of Lords held a debate on the House of Lord’s International Relations and Defence Committee’s 2023 report. The debate focused on geopolitical developments and the implications of Russia’s military investment and climate change; the UK’s defence commitments to the Arctic and the importance of the Government’s Strategic Defence Review in setting out our operational posture; as well as China’s growing interest and influence in the region.  During the debate, there was a sense that the UK needs to do more to articulate its priorities and increase its diplomatic activity. 

“The Arctic Circle is only 380 miles north of British waters, which is only 64 miles less than the distance by road between my home in the west of Scotland and London. As the report reminds us, although the Arctic is a byword for remoteness, it is in fact extraordinarily close to our country, in terms of both geography and, much more importantly, our strategic interests… there are real challenges of capacity if the UK is to maintain and increase its relationships operability in the High North…The Arctic states and the UK will need to consider their response to an Arctic that presents new commercial opportunities, as well as a different range of security threats”, Lord Browne of Ladyton. 

“I welcome this excellent and timely report. It confirms an urgent reality: the Arctic is no longer a frozen wilderness; it is the new frontier where climate change meets great power competition…The Arctic is not someone else’s problem; it is ours too…The United Kingdom must remain not only present but relevant…This demands proactive engagement, investment in polar capabilities and support for our allies,” Baroness Helic. 

What does this mean for rural communities in the UK? Scotland is the northernmost non-Arctic nation, with the Scottish Archipelago just four hundred miles south of the Arctic circle. Back in 2019 as part of its commitment to becoming a ‘European Gateway to the High North’, the Scottish Government published ‘Arctic connections: Scotland’s Arctic policy framework’, a prospectus for cooperation, knowledge-exchange and policy partnerships. The prospectus covers four principal areas: (i) connectivity – enhancing transport and digital links between Scotland and the Arctic, (ii) rural economies – promoting sustainable economic development in rural and remote areas, (iii) marine resources – collaborating on marine science and marine resources and (iv) cultural heritage – preserving and promoting the cultural heritage shared between Scotland and the Arctic. 

“Scotland is among the Arctic region’s closest neighbours; we share many features and outlooks and have long looked to each other for inspiration, solutions and ideas. To this day, connections forged through history continue to spur new academic partnerships, trade exchanges, artistic projects and joint cooperation improving our daily lives…from improving connectivity and invigorating rural economies, to making sustainable use of marine resources and cultivating cultural heritage…this [Arctic policy framework] puts people back at the heart of the Scottish-Arctic dialogue… By building a new platform for policy and knowledge exchange, the Scottish Government intends to strengthen the foundations of a long-standing two-way discussion with its Arctic partners”, (page 4) Arctic policy framework. 

Between October 2020 and March 2021 the Scottish Government organised a webinar series, ‘Arctic connections’, to encourage dialogue and knowledge exchange between Scotland and Arctic stakeholders. The series covered the themes set out in the policy framework and included sessions on access to mental health support and reversing depopulation. Between 2021 and 2023 the Scottish Government also provided an Arctic Connections Fund to support Scottish organisations and communities to collaborate with partners in the Arctic. In March 2024 Edinburgh hosted Arctic Summit Week. 

What can we translate from the UK and Scottish Governments commitment to the Arctic? I offer three points. 

Firstly, can we collate data on all of the research and initiatives in the Arctic that involve UK charities, UK businesses and other UK bodies? Through applying a rural lens, can we build a comprehensive picture of where this work engages with rural and remote communities in the Arctic? This could then be reviewed to see if/where it resonates with rural communities in the UK. Similarly, there will be learning and good practice from rural initiatives in the UK that could be shared with the Arctic Council and Arctic Indigenous People. Are there common issues (e.g. access to services, connectivity and transport) that rural communities in the UK could collaborate and partner with Arctic region partners on to develop solutions, and how could this be facilitated (e.g. through the Arctic Council working groups, UK research centres of expertise)? 

Secondly, it is estimated that four million people live in the Arctic region, of which approximately 10% are Indigenous peoples. The involvement of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council is not tokenistic but provides a model for how Indigenous rights can be represented in international fora. Around 10 million people in England live in rural areas, with the rural population growing at a slower rate than the urban population. Is there learning and good practice in the way the Arctic Council is operates that could assist rural communities in the UK to have a greater voice and stake in national issues that affect them? 

Thirdly, how can we gear up our contribution to the Arctic region? Notwithstanding there is not a common technical definition of what constitutes the Arctic or the Arctic region, the new Minister for the Polar Regions has established a cross-governmental ministerial group involving Ministers from nine departments. The group is due to meet for the first time in February 2025 and is seen as playing a key role in coordinating Arctic policy. How can we ensure this approach is inclusive and takes account of rural needs and opportunities? 

When we think of the Arctic many of us will have a view of pristine wilderness or an area covered entirely by ice and snow, but it is not empty. Successive Arctic Policy Frameworks have contained few if any references to rural communities in the UK. In addition to focusing on areas such as science, climate change, energy, fisheries and finance, what more can we do to ensure the implementation of the current policy framework has applicability to rural communities here? And to what extent do those of us living and working in rural areas wish to look to the High North? 

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently measuring the impact of a service that supports patients living with and beyond cancer; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

bank of england

What more can we do to encourage people to make a difference to public life? 

Public appointees guide some of the most important institutions in the country – from the Bank of England and NHS England, through to the Ministry of Justice and Homes England. What is a public appointee, how are these roles advertised, what does the application process entail and, crucially, what do these appointments mean for rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. 

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According to the National Audit Office (NAO) there are approximately 4,476 public appointees. These are people in board level roles on public bodies – from the NHS and National Parks through to museums, galleries and national regulators. The public bodies which these appointees steer collectively spend more than £200 billion a year across the UK. With Government encouraging applications from people from all backgrounds, what is a public appointment and what do these roles mean for rural communities?

What are public appointments? According to the Government there is no exact definition of a public appointment –  typically it could cover a chair or a non-executive director, for a board of a public body, or a member of an advisory committee or an office holder. Similarly, the Institute for Government (IfG) describes how the term is commonly applied to a whole range of appointments to public bodies – from chairs of high profile public bodies through to board members of small, technical advisory groups. The term can also be applied to include appointments to publicly funded bodies like museums or NHS boards, however, it does not cover civil service appointments.   

Who can apply for a public appointment, and who makes appointments? The Government describes how most people can apply for a public appointment and how applicants who can ‘bring new talent and fresh perspectives to the services we all care about’ are actively encouraged to apply. You need the right to work in the UK to be eligible to apply. You cannot be considered if you are disqualified from acting as a company director, have an unspent conviction on your criminal record and/or your estate has been sequestrated in Scotland or you have entered into a debt arrangement programme under Part 1 of the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002. 

While the responsibilities of a public appointee can vary, they provide leadership and guidance to the body they sit on, with the role typically involving:  

  • Setting the organisation’s strategy. 
  • Agreeing business plans. 
  • Recruiting key staff. 
  • Holding senior staff to account on how the body is managed.
  • Scrutinising the delivery of business plans. 
  • Monitoring how budgets are spent. 
  • Representing the work and views of the body to Ministers, parliamentarians, stakeholders and the public.  

The Governance Code on Public Appointments sets out the process and principles that should underpin all public appointments made to bodies listed in the Public Appointments Order in Council. The Governance Code was first published on 16 December 2016, with an amended version released on 8 February 2024. The following eight principles apply to all those involved with public appointments processes: 

A. Ministerial responsibility – the ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions. 

B. Selflessness – Ministers, when making appointments, should act solely in terms of the public interest.

C. Integrity – Ministers, when making appointments, must avoid placing themselves under any obligation to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to influence them in their work. They should not act or take decisions in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends. They must declare and resolve any interests and relationships.

D. Merit – all public appointments should be governed by the principle of appointment on merit. This means providing Ministers with a choice of high-quality candidates, drawn from a strong, diverse field, whose skills, experiences and qualities have been judged to meet the needs of the public body or statutory office in question.

E. Openness – processes for making public appointments should be open and transparent.

F. Diversity – public appointments should reflect the diversity of the society in which we live and appointments should be made taking account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds.

G. Assurance – there should be established assurance processes with appropriate checks and balances. The Commissioner for Public Appointments has an important role in providing independent assurance that public appointments are made in accordance with the eight principles and the Governance Code.

H. Fairness – selection processes should be fair, impartial and each candidate must be assessed against the same criteria for the role in question.

The Governance Code recommends that Ministers should be assisted in their decision making by Advisory Assessment Panels. The Panel should include a departmental official and an independent member. For competitions recruiting non-executive, non-chair members of a board, the panel should also include a representative from the public body concerned. It is Ministers who must agree the composition of the Panel and the Panel Chair. On undertaking their assessment of candidates, it is the role of the Panel to decide (objectively) who meets the published criteria for the role and is appointable to the role. The names of all appointable candidates are then submitted to Ministers and it is for them to determine merit and make the final appointment.  

It is also up to Ministers to decide on the length of tenure subject to any statutory provisions relating to the body to which the appointment is being made. The Code references a strong presumption that no individual should serve more than two terms or serve in any one post for more than ten years. Reappointments and extensions require the agreement of Ministers. There is no automatic presumption of reappointment and each case should be considered on its own merits – with any reappointment also taking account of the current board and its balance of skills and experience. In cases of exceptional reappointments or extensions the Commissioner for Public Appointments should be notified ahead of the announcement. It is the Commissioner for Public Appointments that provides overall independent assurance that public appointments are made in accordance with the principles set out in the Governance Code. 

What is the process for making public appointments? You can search for public appointments online. The process on how to apply is set out in the role advertisement and usually involves submitting your CV and a supporting statement explaining how you meet the requirements the role. The application process will also involve answering some diversity information questions. When you apply you also have the opportunities to select if you would like your application considered under the Disability Confident Scheme and/or to request reasonable adjustments to the application process. 

After you have submitted your application the following process is followed: 

  • The application is sifted: an Advisory Assessment Panel reviews all of the applications and decides who will go through to the next stage. Details of the Panel members will be set out in the role advert. Feedback is not usually available to those who do not progress to interview.
  • Attend an interview: this will be with the Panel and will usually last between 30 and 60 minutes. Here you will be asked to provide evidence of how your experience, knowledge and skills demonstrate the essential criteria for the role that were set out in the advertisement. You may also be asked to do a presentation on a particular topic. After the interview, the Panel will submit their assessment of whether each candidate met the criteria (and is therefore “appointable” to  the role), or not, to the appointing Minister.
  • A Minister makes the decision: the Minister may choose to meet all candidates before making a final decision on who to appoint. For a small number of roles, you may also need to attend a hearing with a Parliamentary Select Committee for pre-appointment scrutiny before your appointment is confirmed. 
  • Announcement: if you are successful, the sponsor department will contact you to discuss next steps. Your appointment will usually be announced publicly on gov.uk. If you are unsuccessful, you can ask for feedback.

For key public appointments, House of Commons Select Committees may hold evidence sessions with the Minister’s preferred candidate before the appointment is made. This system was introduced back in 2008 and since then approximately 258 pre-appointment hearings have taken place to the end of the 2019-2024 Parliamentary session. This pre-appointment scrutiny enables the Committee to endorse or raise concerns about the appointment. Following the evidence session the Committee prepares a report containing its view on the suitability of the candidate for appointment. It is then for the Minister to decide whether or not to accept the Committee’s recommendation. There have been a small number of occasions between 2008 and 2024 when a Committee has made a negative assessment of the Government’s preferred candidate. In the majority of these cases the appointment went ahead and was approved by Ministers. These cases include the appointment of Maggie Atkinson as Children’s Commissioner for England (2009), Les Ebdon as Director of Office for Fair Access (2012), Amanda Spielman as Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Ofsted (2016), Tina Stowell as Chair of the Charity Commission for England and Wales (2018), David Neal as Independent Chief Inspector for Borders and Immigration (2020) and Orlando Fraser as Chair of the Charity Commission (2022). There have also been cases where a candidate has withdrawn their application (e.g. Dominic Dodd for the post of Chair of Monitor in 2013). While Liz Calerbank was not endorsed as HM Chief Inspector of Probation in June 2011, the Minister subsequently appointed her to the role on a temporary basis in September 2011.   

Is the appointments process in need of reform? In August 2022 the Institute for Government (IfG) published a paper on reforming public appointments which examined the appointments process and offered recommendations for how it could be improved. The report highlighted some of the problems that have beset the appointments system in recent years, including the length of time it takes for Government to choose and appoint candidates, and the process of reconciling merit-based assessment with political input and independent regulation. Fifty recommendations for reform were made, focused around regulating all appointments made by Ministers, appointing a chief talent officer to improve candidate care and outreach; and to collect and publish data on appointment timescales including the causes of appointment delays. 

In November 2023, the IfG reflected on several changes the Government had made to the public appointments system – including commitments to appoint departmental non-executive directors through the public appointments system; to publish a full list of direct appointments (e.g. temporary roles such as the head of the vaccine taskforce during the COVID-19 pandemic), as well as several changes made to the Governance Code. 

In February 2024 the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report on non-executive appointments. The NAO found, despite the Governance Code specifying a 90-day period between a campaign closing and an appointment being announced, the average number of days that elapsed in 2022-2023 was 203 days. While highlighting the role of NEDs in providing strategic leadership, scrutinising performance, promoting transparency and taking a long-term perspective; the process for appointing NEDs varies significantly depending on the body they are being appointed to. 

Until April 2023 the Cabinet Office collected data on non-executive appointments through a manual exercise carried out once-a-year. This has now been replaced with an applicant-tracking system so that data can be gathered in real-time – monitoring the quality and diversity of the candidates, and the length of time taken to appointment. Alongside this, data on existing NEDs serving on boards is being collated manually.    

In May 2024 the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) published a report highlighting how not all Departments and arms-length bodies are using the applicant tracking system. This means the Cabinet Office does not have all the data it needs. Data on unregulated appointments is not currently required. The PAC describes how “we still do not have confidence that the public appointments process is efficient, transparent and fair. The Cabinet Office does not publish clear information about NEDs or the panels which select them. It launched a diversity action plan in 2019, with the ambition for 50% of all public appointees to be female and 14% of yearly appointments to be from ethnic minority backgrounds by 2022. It did not meet these targets by 2022 and has no plans to put in place a new diversity action plan or updated targets. While government has sought to strengthen its outreach activities, it cannot yet demonstrate how effective these have been in recruiting the best candidates for NED roles” (page 3). 

What does this all mean for rural communities? Appointments include senior roles across a wide range of bodies – including delivery or policy advisory bodies, regulators, funders and departmental NEDS. These range from NED positions at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and some of the 34 agencies and public bodies it works with (e.g. Rural Payments Agency, the Office for Environmental Protection and ofwat) through to positions in national bodies (e.g. National Highways, Money & Pensions Service, Crown Commercial Estate, Homes England). Public appointees sit on boards whose policies, interventions and funding affect rural communities, businesses and places. 

Rural proofing is a systematic process designed to ensure that policies, programmes and initiatives are suitable for rural areas. It requires policy and decision makers to consider rurality in the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives. If appointees are stewards of taxpayer resources, how are we ‘thinking rural’ in the public appointments process? For example, are there some boards where some public appointees should have knowledge or experience of living and working in the countryside? In recognising how rural factors such as sparsity, distance and connectivity need to be acknowledged in funding formulae, strategies, policies and delivery; how do we ensure that these specific challenges as well as the potential of rurality are considered at a board – governance level – as well as at operational and senior management and leadership levels? 

The PAC emphasises how public appointments should be made on the basis of merit rather than patronage, given the scale and importance of the roles of many of those appointed. Do we need to review which public appointments have a rural context? What more can we do to improve the support given to applicants, Advisory Assessment Panels, Select Committees and Ministers to ensure the process is thorough, fair and results in the selection of the best candidate(s) for the role? And what further monitoring, evaluation and oversight needs to be put in place to better understand the (rural) outcomes of the appointments process for the appointee, public body and taxpayers? 

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently measuring the impact of a service that supports patients living with and beyond cancer; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

What impact will demographic trends have on rural populations? 

What impact will demographic trends have on rural populations? 

2.1 is a key number: it is the replacement rate, or the number of children women need to have (on average) to maintain a given population when you consider mortality. Anything below 2.1 indicates a falling population. In October 2024, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published births data for England and Wales in 2023. The figures reveal that the total fertility rate has dropped to 1.44 children per woman, the lowest values since records began in 1938. What demographic trends and process are affecting rural populations, and what can we do to unlock the demographic potential of rural areas? Jessica Sellick investigates. 

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While demographic studies such as Censuses were carried out more than 6,000 years ago, demography as a discipline can be traced back to the 17th century and the statistician John Graunt (1620-1674) who, using ratios obtained by comparing years in the Bills of Mortality and calculating using the Rule of Three, was able to estimate the size of the population of London and England, as well as birth rates, mortality rates, and the rise and spread of certain diseases. He subsequently published five editions of his analysis which contained a series of life tables and causes of death. Gaunt was followed by William Petty (1623-1687) who applied methods of estimation to the population – starting with London and then multiplying this by 8 to obtain an estimated population for all of England. 

Edmond Halley (1656-1742) obtained demographic data for Breslau [now Wrocław] covering the period 1687-1691 which, unlike Gaunt’s work in London, included the ages of deceased people. His analysis revealed that annual births were equal to deaths, that there was little migration in or out of the city, and that the city had a population of 34,000 people. He also calculated that there were 15,000 persons aged 16-45 years of whom at least 7,000 were women capable to bear children (estimated at 1,238 births). 

Richard Price (1723-1791) developed a theory of contrasting depopulation, calculating that England and Wales’s populations had dropped by 25% since 1688. Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) observed that as a country’s food supply improved the wellbeing of the population this improvement was only temporary because it led to population growth requiring increased food production (an idea that became known as the ‘Malthusian trap’ where population growth outpaces agricultural production). 

Taken as a collective, all five commentators used analytical reasoning, arithmetical records, and numerical problem solving to study the (changing) numbers and structures of human societies. The purpose of this body of work was often related to setting life insurance rates or estimating the number of men of military age or women of childbearing age. While they initially concentrated their efforts on mortality rates, they eventually began to study birth and fertility rates too. Today, the discipline of demography is concerned with the statistical study of human populations.

Why does demography matter? Data collection and analysis can tell us about the structure of a population according to the number of births, deaths, and migration in and outside of an area. It builds a picture of how a population has changed, is changing, and to make predictions about what might happen in the future. 

  • Knowing the size of the working age population is important for economies and public finances – from estimating tax receipts and social security expenditure through to assessments of Government borrowing. Comparing the number of people aged under 16 years of age and those of pensionable age to the working age population, for example, provides an assessment of the number of people able to pay taxes (and the ‘dependency ratio’). 
  • Knowing the size of the older population is important for  providing infrastructure and services (particularly health, social care, transport, housing) – and to ensure older people are supported to remain as healthy and independent as possible for as long as possible. 
  • Knowing the size of the younger population is important – from understanding how many school places are needed through to youth services, training and skills and employment provision. 
  • Knowing about mortality rates is important in telling us about the general health of a population – and whether we can identify and make improvements within societies to reduce deaths. 
  • Knowing patterns of migration is important in telling us about the flow of people into and out of an area – i.e., the net migration [the difference between the number of people arriving (immigration) and leaving (emigration)].   

The data and statistics underpinning these measures are all shaped by individual, household, socio-economic and environmental factors. In this way, the numbers themselves do not always tell us about people’s circumstances, motivations, or the impacts they have (positive and negative). But this information is important in ensuring a given population is sustainable. For example, globally the fertility rate is 2.3 births per woman – above the replacement rate of 2.1 necessary to keep the population stable – but a decline from 2.7 in 2000. While in England and Wales, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published data in October 2024 revealing that the fertility rate is at its lowest level on record at 1.44 children per woman. The number of children born in England and Wales has been falling for the last decade and is at its lowest since 1977, while the average age of first-time mothers is at an all-time high. 

What are the demographic trends in rural areas? The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) collates and publishes statistics on rural England. As of July 2023, the findings reveal: 

  • Around ten million people live in rural areas, however the rural population is growing at a slower rate than the urban population.
  • In rural areas, more people are aged 50-59 years compared to any other age group whereas in urban areas the age range is 30-39 years. One in four people living in rural areas is 65 years of age or older. The average age of a resident in a rural area is over 40 years of age, compared to under 40 years of age in urban areas. 
  • The more rural the area the older the average age and the faster this average age is increasing.
  • Net internal migration within tends to be towards Predominantly Rural areas, and the rate of this migration has grown since 2011; the exception to this is amongst those aged 17-20 years of age who are leaving Predominantly Rural areas in search of education and training opportunities. Net migration to rural areas is largest amongst those people in their thirties. 
  • Twelve million people lived in a Predominantly Rural Local Authority in 2020; this is 21.3% of the England population. North Norfolk is the only Local Authority where more than one-third of the population are aged 65 years and over. 

In Scotland, approximately 17% of the population live in rural areas, with 6% living in ‘remote rural’ [more than 30 minutes’ drive away from a settlement with a population of 10,000 or more].  Between 2011 and 2019 the population increased by 0.1% in remote rural areas, 8% in accessible rural areas and 3% in the rest of Scotland; 26% of the population in remote rural areas is aged 65 years or over, compared with 21% in accessible rural areas and 3% in the rest of the country. In Wales, 12% of the population lives outside of a settlement – with 21% living in small villages or hamlets with a population of less than 5,000 people. In Northern Ireland, 36% of the population live in a rural area, with the number of people living in rural areas increasing by 20% between 2001 and 2020 compared to 7% growth in urban areas.

Within the European Union, the number of people living in predominantly rural regions was 20.8% – with working age people (aged 20-64 years of age) and young people (under the age of 20 years) accounting for relatively low shares of the total population. Between January 2015 and January 2021, while the population of predominantly rural regions fell by 0.1% per year, the population of predominantly urban regions increased by 9.4% each year. Rural regions in the far north, south and east of the EU have experienced a greater exodus of people to cities. While in the United States, the number of people residing in nonmetropolitan areas in July 2022 was 46 million people, or 13.8% of the total population. After declining or negligible growth rates between 2010 and 2020, the population in nonmetropolitan areas grew by a quarter percent between mid-2020 to mid-2022 (attributed to gains in net domestic migration). 

Even though some rural populations are growing it is at a slower rate than their urban counterparts. The average age of residents in rural areas is higher and increasing faster than in urban areas and there is a net outward migration of young people. 

What is depopulation – where is it happening and why is it important? Depopulation occurs when an area experiences substantial population loss over a protracted period resulting in significant population decline. In a rural context, depopulation is the result of outmigration and fewer births. 

On 11 September 2024, a debate on depopulation in rural areas took place in Westminster Hall. Chaired by Valerie Vaz it included contributions from MPs representing Na h-Eileanan an Iar, Orkney and Shetland, Perth and Kinross-shire, Morecambe and Lunesdale, Strangford, Dumfries and Galloway, Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire, Ceredigion Preseli, Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross, Stockton West, and Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr. 

According to John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) “Depopulation is the curse of rural areas – a blight that creeps up and strangles the lifeblood. It can precipitate a crisis, after which shops and schools close, and so communities wither and die. It is a multiheaded hydra of a problem, and we are hearing that today. There is no one course, therefore, there is no one solution. There is no magic wand here. Bright lights and big cities will always have their charms…but we need to make moving away from a rural area a choice not a necessity.” 

The debate centred around the out-migration of young people and/or economically active families, access to services (e.g. public transport, health, childcare, schools, banks, digital infrastructure, training, and skills development), jobs, affordable housing, and immigration. 

Rural depopulation is not universal, with the prevalence, timing, and magnitude of depopulation varying: while some rural areas are experiencing depopulation, other rural areas are experiencing population growth. Within the UK, for example, while the data suggests people are moving into rural areas in some parts (e.g. Northern Ireland), other areas are running out of people to take up key public, private or voluntary sector posts to keep communities going (e.g. Scotland – particularly across the islands and in the West). For areas experiencing depopulation a reduced working age population impacts on labour supply and the economic viability of an area and the availability of public services and the deterioration or loss of local community facilities and services.

In England, for example, the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown periods led many to rethink their homes and where they lived – with an increase in the number of buyers looking for rural properties, and more people wanting to be able to continue to work from home and spend less time commuting. This interest in living and working in the countryside was not sustained by all those who migrated from urban areas during the pandemic, with some people prioritising being closer to work over having more space. 

The findings of a survey published by Virgin Media 02 in July 2024 found over a third of rural residents said they were ‘likely to consider moving away to an urban area in the next 12 months’, with 66% of respondents aged 16-24 years considering leaving. Overall, 57% of respondents were concerned that the number of residents planning to leave rural areas risks a rural-urban brain drain. 

There was a suggestion during the debate that when the Cabinet Office looks at the range of risks it monitors as part of its remit, it should look at demographic trends in rural, coastal and island communities.  

How can we respond to the demographic trends shaping rural areas? 

The data and evidence show that there are significant challenges and opportunities on the horizon for rural areas – with some rural communities growing (albeit at a slower rate than they previously were, or in comparison to urban areas) while others are experiencing significant loss. What can we do to ensure the sustainability of rural communities? 

Firstly, we need to review our data collection and monitoring to see if/how we can better understand the demographic changes taking place in rural areas in recent and real-time. While the Census gives us an understanding of our population at a certain point in time, it typically only happens once every ten-years. Back in November 2021, the ONS announced a series of measures it would be implementing to provide regular and timely population and migration statistics at both national and local levels. This was intended to reduce the under-coverage or over-coverage of certain population groups at local levels by moving away from information from the Census to admin-based household estimates (ABHEs). This enables ONS to publish provisional population estimates six months earlier than using current methods. How can we build on the official statistics in development to ensure we can infer information about rural communities more generally, and different kinds of rural areas using the Rural Urban Classification? The rural evidence base we build also needs to include qualitative research to provide us with rich insights into what is driving demographic changes in rural communities.       

Secondly, public bodies, businesses and communities have been undertaking a range of actions to ensure population sustainability. What can we learn from these initiatives – which work well in encouraging sustainable communities and which work less well (and why)? 

In Scotland, for example, 1 of the 81 indicators in the National Performance Framework (NPF) covers depopulation and this sits alongside a Population Programme Dashboard. In Uist, a community consultation and research project was set up to inform the work of the Uist Repopulation Action Zone Working Group. This identified six critical areas for action: (1) housing – including new developments, serviced plots, key worker accommodation, empty home repurposing and new entrant croft; (2) jobs – business support, skills packages and business hubs; (3) infrastructure – improved roads, ferries and broadband; (4) access to services; (5) talent attraction – encouraging people to return or move to the island; and (6) Gaelic language and culture. 

Grow Remote in Ireland was founded in 2018 by volunteers who wanted to prevent young people from having to move to urban areas. Remote working is seen as an essential key to enabling people to live, work and participate locally. The organisation supports employers to provide remote job opportunities, trains people in remote work ready skills, and facilitates the recruitment of people living in Ireland to remote job positions. While the Rock the Cotswolds campaign seeks to change perceptions about the Cotswolds, retain and attract the best talent, drive investment, and encourage visitors to see and do unique things. 

More widely, some countries have been investing in family planning (e.g. providing generous childcare provision, tax breaks and fully paid maternity leave). Since the mid-2010s, the Hungarian Government has introduced a range of policies offering grants and loans to parents and would-be parents. Families choosing to have three or more children can access generous tax breaks and heavily subsidised mortgages. Mothers with four or more children are exempt from paying income taxes. While Hungary’s TFR has increased from 1.23 in 2010 to 1.51 in 2023, it is still below the 2.1 needed to sustain its population, and it is unclear if the increase can be attributed to Government policies. 

Some countries are looking at how they can keep their populations healthier and employed for longer. Singapore, for example, has raised the retirement age and is encouraging companies to hire older workers; and in Western Australia the Government is investing in infrastructure, workforce and service delivery to meet the needs of ageing populations. Other countries are looking at increasing immigration. Germany, for example, has a job-search visa scheme which enables skilled workers from non-EU member states to come for six months to look for work; a Skilled Immigration Act (FEG) to make it easier for skilled workers to immigrate, and an opportunity card work visa scheme for skilled workers. Back in the UK, the Scottish Government has called for a Scottish Rural Community Immigration Pilot (SRCIP).  

Thirdly, while populations are not fixed things – indeed every rural area will experience demographic issues differently – what is our vision for the future of rural communities and what building blocks do we need to put in place to work towards achieving this at local, regional, and national levels? What infrastructure needs to be in place to support current and future rural populations? For example, should we be concerned with bringing together a number of different policy areas (e.g. health, social care, work, pensions, transport, connectivity etc) to develop cross-cutting solutions? Or do we take a place-based approach – perhaps looking at who/where our anchor institutions are and how we can harness these to assist people to grow, live, work and age in rural communities? 

“…ask a simple question: will this make it more or less likely for people to want to live here? Without a healthy and growing population, we risk losing the critical mass, and within that critical mass, we do not have the mix. Every population – every community – needs to have a mix of the professional, the technical, the skilled and the semi-skilled, and the unskilled”, Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland).  

“We need to do better at some things if we are to encourage more people to take up rural living and to bring their skills and qualities to rural life. We need to ensure that there is adequate broadband for home working and small businesses. We have to move with the times”, Jim Shannon (Strangford). 

Where next? According to ONS projections, the UK population will increase by 6.6 million people between 2021 and 2036, with net migration expected to contribute more than 90% towards this growth. Professor Sarah Harper at the Oxford Institute of Population Ageing describes how the UK has not replaced itself by births alone since 1976, drawing on a healthy migration policy instead. 

This all leaves us with three key issues: (1) how to maintain a sizeable total population size; (2) how to maintain sustainable age structures within a population; and (3) how to maintain spatial balance of population across urban and rural areas. 

“If depopulation is one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse for rural Britain, then indifference is coming up on the rail, and that is something that we as politicians can tackle…We need to lift the profile of rural Britain. We can rail against the urban-centric policies of those who do not understand what rural life, with all its challenges and all its benefits, is truly about. Most importantly, we must fight for the 3 j’s: jobs, jobs, jobs”, John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway). 

“We know that an ageing population pattern is part of a Europe-wide trend, and somehow we kid ourselves that this is an over-the-horizon event that we will deal with later, but for us in the islands, it is an urgent reality, and our breakfast will become everyone else’s lunch; if we do not address these issues on the edge of Europe, they will become structural problems for the rest of the country and the rest of the continent”, Torcuil Crichton 

(Na h-Eileanan an Iar).   

While none of us has a crystal ball, demography needs to be at the forefront of policy and decision making: will birth rates keep falling? How might new inventions and innovations drive efficiency and productivity (e.g. Artificial Intelligence)? If future generations fail to arrive in the numbers we need how can we do more with fewer people? What does this all mean for the future of rural communities – will this lead to the abandonment of some settlements and growth in others? Watch this space. 

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently measuring the impact of a service that supports patients living with and beyond cancer; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

crown estate

What is the Crown Estate and why is the Government bringing forward legislation to reform it? 

The Crown Estate is an independent commercial business. It manages a portfolio of land and property that are hereditary possessions of the Sovereign held in right of the Crown. In acquiring, managing, investing and developing its assets the Crown Estate seeks to create prosperity for the nation. How does it do this, and what does this mean for rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. 

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The Crown Estate is tasked with focusing on the nation’s long-term, structural challenges. What is it, what does it do, why is the Government reforming it, and what does this all mean for rural communities?  

What is the Crown Estate? It is an independent, commercial business that manages a portfolio of land and property in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Its assets are hereditary possessions of the Sovereign held ‘in right of the crown’. While they belong to the Sovereign for the duration of their reign, currently His Majesty King Charles III, they cannot be sold by him and nor do the revenues from the assets belong to him. The Crown Estate can be traced back to 1760 when King George III handed land and property over to the Government, with the revenue going to the Treasury in exchange for a fixed salary. Present day arrangements are set out in the Crown Estate Act 1961. This established the Crown Estate as a trust estate independent of its two beneficiaries – the Monarch and the Government. 

What does it do? Section 1 of the 1961 Act sets out the purpose of the Crown Estate: ‘managing and turning to account land and other property, rights and interests, and of holding such of the property, rights and interests under their management as for any reason cannot be vested in the Crown or can more conveniently be vested in the Commissioners’. The 1961 Act sets out a general duty for the Crown Estate to ‘maintain and enhance the value of its estate and the return obtained from it with due regard to the requirements of good management’, and to ‘pay its net revenue profit each year to the Consolidated Fund’. 

The Crown Estate pays its net revenue profit into a consolidated fund at HM Treasury each year [akin to the UK Government having a current account]. HM Treasury is the Crown Estate’s sponsor department and a Framework Document  (published in June 2023) sets out the relationship between the two bodies. The Crown Estate generated £1.1 billion net revenue profit for the public finances in the 2023-2024 financial year, and it has paid more than £4 billion into HM Treasury over the last 10-years. 

The Crown Estate’s net revenue profit is linked to the Sovereign Grant, money that is paid from the public finances to the King to support him in discharging his duties as Head of State. The size of the Sovereign Grant is usually equal to a prescribed proportion of the Crown Estate’s profit in the financial year two years prior to the year in question. Should the Crown Estate’s profits fall in the reference year, the Sovereign Grant is set at the same level as the previous year. The percentage used to allocate the Sovereign Grant is regularly reviewed – from an initial 15%, it increased to 25% from 2017-2018, and then from April 2024 reduced to 12%. The Crown Estate does not pay the Sovereign Grant directly, the payments it makes into the Consolidated Fund are then used by HM Treasury to pay the Sovereign Grant to the Monarch. 

The Crown Estate is managed by a board of Crown Estate Commissioners; and the Crown Estate’s strategy provides the framework that ensures Commissioners are discharging their responsibilities under the Act. The Crown Estate’s strategic objectives are to: 

  • Be a leader in supporting the UK towards a net zero carbon and energy-secure future. 
  • Create inclusive communities and through our activities support economic growth and productivity. 
  • Take a leading role in stewarding the UK’s natural environment and biodiversity. 

Today, the Crown Estate property portfolio has an estimated worth of £14 billion, and its net assets are valued at £15.5 billion. 

Where does it operate – and how much rural property and land does it manage? The Crown Estate describes itself as ‘a company for the country with land, property and seabed across England, Wales and Northern Ireland’. Its assets include: 

  • 10 million square foot of prime London real estate. 
  • 8 million square foot of commercial development space in the regions. 
  • 200,000 acres of land. 
  • More than 12,000 kilometres of coastline. 
  • 2 seabed areas with a combined landmass of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 

‘Spanning urban and rural areas, our portfolio gives us a distinct opportunity to deliver positive outcomes across national priorities such as net zero and nature recovery’, Integrated Annual Report and Accounts 2023/23, page 11. 

The Crown Estate’s core activities are focused around: 

  • Optimising the use of land and capital across its portfolio. 
  • Leveraging scale and diversity. 
  • Aligning its operation with customers’ goals. 
  • Drawing on relationships and unique strengths. 
  • Investing in data and technology. 

The Crown Estate’s strategy is focused on maximising returns to HM Treasury through balancing short-term and long-term financial value; creating greener, healthier places and accelerating renewable technologies; playing a positive role in tackling inequalities and creating inclusive opportunities; and embedding indirect value through activities. 

The ‘Windsor & Rural’ portfolio is valued at £1.4 billion and generates £40.1 million in revenue. This part of the business covers The Windsor Estate with revenue generated from visitors, events, filming and forestry. In March 2024, The Royal Farms and Royal Farm Shop were transferred to the Crown Estate. This transfer is expected to increase income in 2024-2025. The Crown Estate also manages a rural portfolio of 185,000 acres across England and Wales comprising 130,000 acres of agricultural farmland and 55,000 acres of upland and commons interests in Cumbria and Wales. The portfolio also includes strategic land, forestry, renewable energy assets, minerals and quarries. It comprises 700 kilometres of publicly accessible footpaths, 3,000 (direct and indirect) jobs and a further 5,000 people directly or indirectly employed through the Windsor Estate and Great Park, as well as 435 homes and 206 community and tourism sites. The Crown Estate describes how: 

‘As one of the oldest and largest landowners in the UK, our aim is to be a model of large-scale sustainable, diversified and integrated agricultural and environmental best practice…Our rural strategy is designed to support the UK’s green agricultural transition, supporting both food production and nature. And our work on renewable energy, particularly offshore wind, is contributing to the country’s net zero ambitions’.     

The Crown Estate has contracts with managing agents to work with it on its land and property portfolios. Within agriculture, the Crown Estate aims to work closely with farmers to ensure the long-term sustainability of the land they manage. Some examples include:    

  • 200 kilometres of rural hedgerows and 400 acres of woodland were planted in 2023-2024 with support from the Crown Estate’s £10 million Environment Fund. The Fund is targeted at farmers for ‘no regrets’ nature recovery work. The Crown Estate has committed to establishing over 1,000 acres of new woodlands and 100 miles of new hedgerows by 2025.   
  • In 2023-2024 the Crown Estate began trialling a contract farming arrangement in the West Midlands. This is piloting lower-carbon techniques with learned shared across the portfolio.  
  • The Crown Estate is introducing new tenancy agreements to reflect regenerative farming principles to help pivot the rural portfolio to net zero by 2030. This includes the introduction of new Environmental Farm Business Tenancy agreements which are designed to support nature recovery and carbon reduction. These tenancies offer farmers 15-year terms if they adopt a more sustainable farming model. For example, the Crown Estate is working with 20+ farmers on the Devizes Estate to produce an Environmental Plan which will be integral to their new tenancy agreements.  
  • The Crown Estate is scoping projects to restore carbon-rich habitats such as saltmarshes and peatlands. This also involves looking for opportunities to enhance carbon sequestration and restore marine habitats. 
  • The Crown Estate is working with its supply chain to promote a ‘Safety First’ approach, with Managing Agents attending a one-day workshop delivered by the NFU and then talking to farmers about how health and safety can enhance what they do. 
  • Under-used agricultural buildings have been repurposed as offices, workshops and storage facilities. 

Strategically, the Crown Estate is focused on the interconnections between climate, nature and people. This includes broadening the datasets used in Rural and Marine activities to establish an enterprise-wide carbon baseline to give better insight into where the Crown Estate can have the bigger impact and influence. The Crown Estate wants 15% of its rural landholding to be dedicated to nature recovery.  

Why is the Government bringing forward new legislation governing the Crown Estate? The King’s Speech in July 2024 set out a commitment to bring forward legislation to modernise the Crown Estate’s investment powers and to give the company a new ability to borrow. The Crown Estate Bill is now making its way through parliament and would come into force two months after receiving royal assent. The Bill would amend the Crown Estate Act 1961 by extending the Commissioner’s powers to invest and borrow, increasing the maximum number of Commissioners, and changing the way their salaries are paid. According to the Government, the Bill will ‘modernise the Crown Estate by giving it the powers to borrow in order to invest at a faster pace’. The Crown Estate has welcomed this commitment to modernise its investment powers: 

‘These powers will allow us to have an even greater impact across our portfolio and ensure we play our part in supporting the UK’s transition to a decarbonised, energy secure future; nature recovery; regeneration and economic growth; as well as increasing the profit we return to government for the benefit of the nation’s finances’. 

A briefing from the environmental coalition Wildlife and Countryside Link in August 2024 recognises the essential role the Crown Estate plays in facilitating the Government’s plans to tackle climate change but argues the Bill is currently a missed opportunity to ensure the Crown Estate also facilitates the Government’s obligations towards the achievement of nature targets under the Environment Act 2021: 

‘We are calling for The Crown Estate Bill to be given a nature recovery objective, alongside the ability to invest in the technology, infrastructure and research required to further these aims’.  

The coalition also cites the Scottish Crown Estate Act which, since 2019, has placed a duty on the organisation to manage its assets in a way that ‘is likely to contribute to the promotion or the improvement in Scotland of (iv) environmental wellbeing’. In practice it means Crown Estate Scotland must make investment decisions that meet the highest environmental standards.  

As the owner of the seabed of England and Wales, the Crown Estate leases out plots of seabed to offshore wind and other developers such as those wishing to build carbon capture infrastructure. As part of its Marine business, the Crown Estate has 36 wind farms operating across its holdings, with a combined capacity of 11.8GW (enough to power 11 million homes). The Crown Estate also launched Offshore Wind Leasing Round 5, which is set to generate up to a further 4.5GW by putting innovative floating wind farms in the Celtic Sea. 

In July 2024 the Government announced a new partnership between the Crown Estate and Great British Energy. Under the arrangement, the Crown Estate will establish a new division called ‘Great British Energy: The Crown Estate’ which will: 

  • Bring forward new offshore wind developments, with the potential to deliver up to 20-30GW of extra offshore wind seabed leases to the market by 2030. 
  • Stimulate new energy technologies such as floating wind, hydrogen, carbon capture and tidal energy. 
  • Invest in ports and clean energy supply chains. 
  • Ensure that future developments have lower risks for developers and enable faster building from leasing. 

The Government estimates that the partnership could reduce the time needed to get an offshore wind project delivering power to homes by up to 50%. 

There have been calls for the profits from offshore wind projects to be used to improve employment opportunities and supply chains within the energy sector; while others are calling for the profits generated to be devolved. Fishermen in Devon and Cornwall, for example, have expressed concerns that swift policy changes may reduce investment in fisheries management, fleet upgrades and coastal infrastructure and lead the seafood supply chain to potentially collapse. The Cornish Fish Producers Organisation (CFPO) believes that the rush for net zero should not be at the expense of a centuries old industry that plays an equally critical role in the nation’s sustainability. The Crown Estate has confirmed it has already engaged directly with fisheries during its initial consultation period and is seeking views from across the industry and marine stakeholders. 

In September 2024 Great British Energy: The Crown Estate published its Considerations for the future of offshore wind and has called on industry and wider stakeholders to help shape its approach to seabed leasing.  

What role can the Crown Estate play in rural communities? The Crown Estate takes a long-term view to delivering positive change and recognises that change needs to be carefully managed. However, there can be a lack of public awareness of the organisation’s existence and its work. Within and across its Rural portfolio and rural strategy, for example, what role does (and can) the Crown Estate play in a living, working countryside – beyond viewing its activities within a sector (e.g., agriculture, minerals and mining) or site? While its direct drivers are around maximising financial returns, what direct and indirect benefits and impacts does it have on rural communities (e.g. infrastructure, affordable housing, quality job opportunities, training?) And with new legislation on the way, how can its future activities take account of the needs and interests of rural communities? Watch this space.  

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently measuring the impact of a service that supports patients living with and beyond cancer; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Websites: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/ https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

Grape expectations: what does the growth in vineyards mean for rural communities?

Grape expectations: what does the growth in vineyards mean for rural communities?

Viticulture – the cultivation and harvesting of grapes – is one of Britain’s fastest-growing agricultural sectors. In 2023 we had our largest ever grape harvest from which it is expected 20-22 million bottles of wine will be produced. Over the last 10-15 years there has been a significant increase in vineyard area in the UK. With the sector ripe for further expansion, what does this mean for rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Viticulture (Latin: vitis cultura, “vine-growing”) and viniculture (vinis cultura, “wine-growing”) involves the cultivation and harvesting of grapes. There are more than 10,000 types of grapes and blends; harnessed through 4 main methods (organic, biodynamic, Lutte raisonnée, natural) and 2 basic systems (cane pruning and spur pruning). Winemakers begin the harvesting process when the grapes reach their desired maturity (i.e., according to colour, size, taste, and sugar level). This typically takes place towards the end of summer and into the autumn. ‘Vinification’ is the transformation of grapes into wine and consists of several steps – destemming, crushing or pressing, settling and racking, and fermentation. Some wines are then matured before bottling (in oak casks, barrels, amphorae or vats). Blending followed by maturation processes is the means through which wine is bottled and finished.       

It was the Romans that formally introduced the vine to Britain in 43 BC. While a Roman vineyard in Northamptonshire covering 11 hectares has been identified, shreds of wine jars have been dated all the way back to the 1st century. Wine drinking was commonplace in roman villas, houses, farms and garrisons. While there is evidence of implements that could have been used for pruning vines, there is little sign that vineyards were actually planted in Britain as the Romans had strong trading links with France and Italy which made importing wine relatively straightforward.

The spread of Christianity towards the end of the Roman period led to renewed interest in vine growing – as churches and monasteries required wine for sacramental purposes they often built vineyards on their land.  But where viticulture was practiced it tended to be on a modest scale, with wine continuing to be imported from the continent. This led Britain, from the mid-1300s onwards, to become renowned for its expertise in selecting, importing, bottling and cellaring wine rather than producing it. The Black Death killed off vast numbers of land workers and saw monasteries and nunneries dissolved along with their associated vineyards. 

In 1860 Lord Palmerston supported the Government to apply free trade principles which led tax on imported wine to be reduced by 83%. English wine was therefore out-competed by producers in France, Spain, Italy and Germany. Consumer tastes also started to change with sweet, heavy, fortified wines from Australia and South Africa becoming more popular. 

During the First World War much of the land used for wine production was converted to crops, and wine production was not seriously taken up again until after the Second World War. The renaissance in viticulture during this period can be traced back to concerted effort of three individuals. Firstly, in 1946, to Ray Barrington Brock who set up a viticultural research station at his own expense at Oxted in Surrey. Secondly, Edward Hyams, who, between 1947 and 1948, planted vines for making wine using some of the sources identified by Barrington Brock. Thirdly, Major-General Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones, who created a tiny vineyard at Hambleton in Hampshire in 1951 – one of the first vineyards planted for producing wine for sale. Collectively, they trialled which grapes would grow and ripen in the British climate. The second commercial vineyard was planted in 1955 by Jack Ward, who owned a wine company in East Sussex. He introduced new varieties to the UK, such as Reichensteiner, Huxelrebe, and Schönburger, and was the first chairman of the English Vineyards Association (now Wines of Great Britain). During the 1960s more vineyards were planted, and new grape varieties introduced.

Researchers from the University of East Anglia (UEA), the London School of Economics, Vinescapes Ltd and Weatherquest Ltd have charted the potential for the sector over the next 20 years. The UK’s warmest years on record have all occurred since 2002, and heatwaves like those seen in the summers of 2018 and 2022 contributed to record UK winegrape yields – with an average of 48 hectolitres per hectare (hL/ha). Warmer growing seasons (between April and October), increased investor confidence and widening variety and geographical suitability are all leading to a growth in UK vineyards. Nevertheless, within a 20-year period, there are projected to be ‘better’ and ‘worse’ grape growing seasons in the UK, and this is in common with other wine-producing regions of the world. With interest in growing grapes and making wine increasing, what does this mean for rural communities?  

How many vines are we growing? Wines of Great Britain (WineGB) undertakes an annual survey to capture industry statistics on production, grape growing, sales, tourism and employment. The latest data, published in July 2024, reveals how: 

  • In 2023, 87 new vineyards were registered, bringing the total number to over 1,000 for the first time. There are currently 1,030 vineyards in the UK – a 9.2% increase since the last annual report. 
  • Winery figures have risen from 209 in 2022 to 221 in 2023. 
  • The total area under vine is 4,209 hectares, representing a growth rate of 123% in the last 10-years. 
  • Production in 2023 totalled 161,960.84 hectolitres, the equivalent of 21.6 million bottles, up 77% on 2022.
  • English and Welsh wine sales grew by 10% from 2022 – reaching 8.8 million bottles in 2023: with sales of sparkling wine rising by 187% since 2018, from 2.2 million bottles to 6.2 million in 2023; and sales of still wine increasing by 117% over the same period, from 1.2 million to 2.6 million bottles. 
  • The wine sector is the fastest growing agricultural sector in the UK. 

WineGB has designated 2024 the ‘year of growth’ and is supporting producers to find new routes to market. This includes providing targeted support for wine tourism, the UK market and exports; and facilitating a series of working groups to harness expertise from across the industry to develop a coherent narrative to support sales. 

Champagne houses from across the world are also increasingly interested in making and selling English wines. Pommery now makes wine in Hampshire and more recently, in September 2024, Tattinger launched wine from Domaine Evremond vineyard in Chilam (Kent) – with construction underway on a new visitor centre and storage facility. Jackson Family Wines from the United States has begun producing wine from vineyards in Kent, Sussex and Essex; and Henkell Freixnet (Spanish) recently purchased Bolney Wine Estate in Sussex.   

Where are the vineyards? Currently the most planted counties in the UK are: 

  1. Kent (26%). 
  2. West Sussex (15%). 
  3. East Sussex (13%). 
  4. Hampshire (10%). 
  5. Essex (8%). 
  6. Surrey (3%). 
  7. Gloucestershire (2%). 
  8. Devon (2%). 
  9. Dorset (2%). 
  10. Suffolk (2%). 

A viticulture report published by Strutt & Parker in 2023 highlights the key planting trends and demand for land on which to establish vines:  

  • The UK’s vine area is growing faster than in any of the top 25 wine-producing countries. 
  • Specialist mapping software to identify land suitable for growing vines finds the best sites have free-draining soils, gentle south-facing slopes that are not susceptible to strong winds and late frosts, are less than 100 metres above sea level, and where average temperate and sunshine hours are at their highest. Many areas now suitable for vines remain undeveloped. 
  • Very little land suitable for vines comes to the open market, with buyers approaching land owners of suitable sites and negotiating with them to sell. The price of land suitable for vines typically ranges from £16,000 to £20,000 per acre, with established vineyards selling for more than £35,000 per planted acre. In 2023 average prices were £1,000 per acre (higher than they were in the previous 12-months). The majority of buyers are people who have had a successful career in business and are looking for a change in direction. Where buyers are looking for a  small plot (10-12 acres) prices can rise to £25,000 per acre – this is because there is more competition for smaller plots of land.  
  • Leasing of land on which to establish vines is becoming increasingly common. Landowners typically need to be willing to grant a lease of 25-40 years, but rental values mean they could generate 2-3 times what they might be offered to rent land for arable production. 
  • £480 million has been invested in vineyards and wineries over the past five-years. The upfront costs of establishing a vineyard are significant and it is takes five-years before the vines reach full productivity.
  • Buyers are increasingly looking for plots in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex which share many of the characteristics of East and West Sussex, Kent, Surrey and Hampshire, but where there is more untapped potential for planting vines. 

WineGB estimates that plantings in the UK will grow to 7,600 hectares by 2032, producing up to 24.7 million bottles of wine. 

CLA members have shared their insights into the reality, challenges and opportunities of running a vineyard: 

  • Find the right site, do your research and get expert advice. Initial set-up costs are high, there is a long time to wait for results, and making changes later will be very difficult. 
  • Running a vineyard is hard work, and you need to look at all the processes: planting, making, selling…Being biodynamic and producing pét-nat and orange wine helps to differentiate us from other vineyards. Both wines are popular with younger people, who also tend to be more aware of sustainability and the environment.  
  • Contract growing can be a good diversification activity for farmers if they have a suitable site, particularly where it can be inter-layered with picking other crops. Contact local wineries to see if grapes are needed and enter into a long-term contract. English wine is only about 1% of all the wine drunk in the UK, so we should aspire to get that up to 5% – although it will not be easy, especially on price.

Vineworks has also published its top tips for farmers looking to diversify into viticulture.

What has Government been doing to help the wine industry? When the UK left the European Union the Government incorporated the existing framework of EU wine legislation into domestic law. It also announced a Smarter Regulation programme of regulatory reform. This has led Government to undertake consultations, implement reforms and/or new legislation aimed at stimulating  increased competition in the domestic marketplace, promoting innovation, and improving sustainable practices without compromising on standards. So far, changes to the regulatory framework have taken place in 3 phases:   

  • Phase 1: the Wine (Revocation and Consequential Provision) Regulations 2023 which introduced simplified labelling rules for the wine trade and which came into effect on 1 January 2024. Packaging requirements for sparkling wine were liberalised to reduce costs and support recycling, and restrictions on hybrid grape varieties removed to give industry the freedom to innovate. 
  • Phase 2: the ‘Wine (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2024’ updated the list of approved oenological practices and introduced a definition for ice wine. The regulations came into force on 15 July 2024. 
  • Phase 3: in April and May 2024 the Government carried out a consultation on further plans to reform assimilated EU laws. This included seeking views on: the carbonation of imported bulk wine; the sweetening and other adaptation of imported wine; producing wine from imported grapes and grape must; amendments to the labelling of ‘British wine’; no and low alcohol wine and changing the minimum alcohol content of wine; and new arrangements for recording approved oenological practices. The Government is currently analysing feedback.  

Individual wine businesses have been able to apply for Government funding, including funds administered by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). This has included applying for support under Environmental Land Management (ELM) schemes and through the Farming Investment Fund. 

The Kent Downs National Landscape team delivered a viticulture Test and Trial project for Defra. This explored how public goods can be delivered within a vineyard setting and how the impact of vineyards on landscape character could be mitigated. While the research found both capability and appetite from vineyards to become involved in schemes that reward environmental land management, there is a deficit of research into UK viticulture, particularly around which native insectary plants are most appropriate for use in UK vineyards. A series of actions were produced around: 

  • Creating land management plans with the assistance of expert help at no or limited cost to growers. 
  • Support for vineyards to take part in research programmes. 
  • Capital grants to support carbon reduction technologies and precision viticulture techniques that reduce pesticide use. 
  • Promoting permissive access and well-interpreted landscapes. 
  • Providing educational access and health and wellbeing opportunities. 

In April 2024, the Government announced it had set aside £1.5 million for a Future Winemakers’ Scheme (FWS) to help develop skills and provide jobs in the sector for the next generation of viticulturists. 

In July 2024, following a General Election, a new Labour Government was elected. The new Government has committed to being ‘mission-driven’ and has set out plans to focus their efforts on five key areas [or missions]: 

  1. Kickstart economic growth.
  2. Make Britain a clean energy superpower. 
  3. Take back our streets. 
  4. Break down barriers to opportunity. 
  5. Build an NHS fit for the future.  

The Wine and Spirit Trade Association (WSTA) has called on Government to work with industry to promote growth, cut red tape, and deliver an environmentally sustainable agenda. WineGB wants to explore how to create a fairer business environment for English and Welsh wine, and revisions to the duty system to allow for a fairer regime for home-grown wines that supports small businesses. More broadly, UK drinks sector representatives are calling on Government to cut taxes on alcohol and address business rates. 

On 30 July 2024 the Government launched a consultation seeking views on a series of proposals to revise the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) in England. The proposals are centred around delivering a headline target of 1.5 million new homes over the next 5-years. In practice, this may result in Local Authorities needing to identify more land which can be released for housing and other uses – resulting diversification opportunities for rural land owners on the one hand (e.g. housing, recreation, tourism) and in the loss of agricultural land on the other hand.

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) enforces wine regulations in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The FSA’s role covers the production and marketing of wine (e.g. wholesalers, warehouses and vineyards). The FSA does this through a team of regional Wine Standards Inspectors and by following a set of procedures outlined in the Manual for Official Controls. The FSA also maintains the UK Vineyards Register which records areas under wine and production returns from producers.  

Retail premises come under the control of Local Authorities and their Trading Standards Teams. In May 2024 the Chartered Trading Standards Institute (CTSI) published research which found 96 of the 137 test purchases made by Trading Standards professionals were short measured. 41 test purchases were at a deficit of 5% or over. When broken down, 43% of wine was found to be short measured which, for the average wine drinker in the UK, equated to a loss of £2.20 per week and £114.40 per year.  Polling from CTSI also found a generational divide with three times as many people aged under 45 years of age supporting bars and pubs being able to pour spirits without using a spirit measure, compared to those over 45 years of age. CTSI is calling on the hospitality sector to ensure consumers get value for money by making sure they are correctly measuring the drinks that they are serving to customers.  

More recently, there is apprehension about whether the Government will increase alcohol duties  at the Budget on 30 October 2024 and if so, whether this will drive people away from pubs and restaurants.  

What are the impacts and benefits of viticulture for rural communities? Viticulture can diversify rural economies and support local employment. It is estimated that vineyards employ 17 times more people per hectare than traditional arable farming, and they offer staff a wide range of skilled roles (e.g. viticulturists, chemists, engineers, computer technicians, marketing and communications, hospitality etc). Data from WineGB suggests the sector will increase from the 2,300 people employed today to an estimated 30,000 by 2040. The majority of this growth will be concentrated in the South East of England. Workers tend to live close to vineyards signalling the need for housing, transport, education, leisure and recreation opportunities and access to other services to facilitate this employment growth.  

There is already a lack of skilled and experienced domestic workers to keep pace with the increasing acreage of vineyards. Plumpton College is the UK’s only wine centre of excellence in education, training and research; offering full-time, part-time and short courses for current and aspiring wine makers as well as producing 40,000 bottles of wine each year from its Rock Lodge Vineyard.  Workforce trends in the UK are replicated more widely, with global shortages of staff – which on the production side are linked to the seasonality of the work involved; and on the trade side in hotels and gastronomy. Research by ProWein found companies unable to pursue new business opportunities or cutting back on planned growth; with some looking to use automation and digitization to replace seasonal workers. We need to look at the skills we need to increase the workforce in the UK to meet the growth potential – this includes a stocktake of current and future workforce needs, looking at education and training provision, and what more can be done to recruit and retain workers.

Vineyards and wine producers draw on rural landscapes, soils, climate and a sense of place (terroir) to craft their wines. In this way ‘drink the view’ can promote the production and consumption of viticulture products that enhance the countryside. Alongside this, WineGB describes how wine tourism is a significant part of the industry, accounting for 25% of total income on average. Tourism increases the visibility of wines, and embeds the vineyard and associated business in the local community. Over 40% of overseas visitors to the UK could be interested in a visit to a vineyard generating a potential market of over 16 million people. 

Vineyards lead to changes in landscape appearance – raised, linear vines are different to arable crops and pastureland – which can lead to the loss of open views.   Back in 2021, the South Downs National Park Authority (SDNPA) undertook a viticulture growth impact assessment. Whilst recognising the South Downs is a working landscape, and a favourable location for viticulture and the production of high-quality wine, it is a nationally protected landscape. The study noted the potential harm that viticulture could do if its scale, location and environmental management are inappropriate. This led the SDNPA to publish a Viticulture Technical Advice Note (TAN) to ensure vineyards make a positive contribution to the overall character and appearance of the area. 

While wine production can deliver environmental benefits (e.g. carbon capture through vines, ground-cover plants), the application of pesticides, and CO2 emissions through vineyard machinery and land use disturbances to soil health and biodiversity can be detrimental.  Similarly, the winemaking process and sale and distribution of wine also has environmental impacts (e.g. high electricity consumption during the harvesting period, packaging, transport). The Sustainable Wines of Great Britain (SWGB) Certification Scheme, launched by WineGB back in 2020, now has 24 certified members through its winery and vineyard audits. SWGB includes a Carbon Calculator to measure the number of tonnes of CO2 generated per hectare of vineyard and/or per bottle of wine produced. In April 2024 Denbies Wine Estate became the first vineyard and winery in the UK to achieve Net Zero certification to the UK Carbon Code of Conduct standard (UKCCC) – sequestering more carbon than it emitted through leaving 4 hectares of vineyard in a natural state, installing solar panels on the winery building, applying environmental best practices to all capital investment. 

There is a plethora of international work looking at hybrid grape varieties, wine tourism, resilience to climate change, the application of technology and Artificial Intelligence, archaeology, heritage, architecture and workforce. Studies have also explored the role of vineyards and wineries in supporting development in disadvantaged rural areas and less favoured areas. Back in the UK, while individual studies have been carried out (e.g. grape varieties, adaptation to climate change, agroecology), more work is needed if we are to build an evidence base to collate the impact and benefits of viticulture on rural communities. 

Where next? While the domestic winemaking sector in the UK is still comparably small compared to other parts of the world, there is growing international awareness and interest in UK-grown grapes and wines. Indeed there has been a boom in winemaking underpinned by climate change making viticulture one of our fastest growing agricultural sectors. But land is a finite resource and deciding how it is used and managed is under discussion. With a new Government in place, and a Budget due at the end of October, how can we ensure the countryside remains a living, working, functional and dynamic space; and what might this mean for the planned and future growth of vineyards and winemaking and the role they can play in rural communities? Watch this space.   

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The title of this blog has been adapted from an article published by Griffiths-Lee et al in the Journal of Agriculture and Sustainability. 

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a service that supports older people to maintain their independence; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

What do the hedgerow regulations mean for future hedge management?

What do the hedgerow regulations mean for future hedge management?

Hedgerows are a defining feature of the countryside and bustling with life – from the hedgehogs that call them home to the bees butterflies and other wildlife they sustain. They also play an important role in farming, ensuring soils remain healthy and reducing the impacts of flooding or drought. And there is growing evidence that hedgerows are making a real contribution towards meeting the UK’s net zero target. On 23 May 2024, The Management of Hedgerows (England) Regulations 2024 came into force. This provides a consistent approach to their protection across the country. What does this new legislation mean for the management of hedgerows; and how are farmers, growers and land managers already helping? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Hedgerows come in many shapes and sizes. According to the Woodland Trust, a hedgerow ‘includes both the hedge and features such as banks, trees, walls, fences and gates. It may be ancient or newly planted, with a single species or many, and everything in between.’ Hedgerows fall into two principle categories: ‘managed’ so that trees no longer take their natural shape; and ‘relict’ where trees were planted as hedges but are no longer managed. There are approximately 390,000 km of hedgerows (1-6 metres tall) on field boundaries in England – enough to go round the world almost 10 times! Mapping from the UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology (CEH) shows the south-west has the highest hedgerow density, led by Cornwall with an average of 5.1 km per 1km x 1km square. 

The first hedgerows can be traced back to the Bronze Age when farmers cleared woodland to make fields and used strips of woodland to mark the boundaries. The planting of new hedgerows started around Roman times and continued up until the 18th century. From the 1750s enclosure by parliamentary act became the norm. Between 1604 and 1914 over 5,200 enclosure bills were enacted by parliament, dividing the countryside (equating to one-fifth of the total land area of England, amounting to some 6.8 million acres). After the Second World War, Government policy encouraged hedge removal as part of a drive to ensure Britain was self-sufficient in food. Financial incentives were made available to farmers to remove hedgerows. Larger farm machinery and equipment was also developed that was difficult to manoeuvre around small fields. Because of this, the loss of hedgerows has been identified as a key factor in the decline of plant and animal species on farmland. 

An Institute of Terrestrial Ecology [now CEH] survey of hedgerow changes revealed that between 1984 and 1990 hedgerow length in England declined by 20% and in Wales by 25%. While outright removal of hedgerows accounted for 9,500km per year, almost half of the loss was as a result of lack of management. 

Between 1990 and 1993, the removal of hedgerows lessened to about 3,600km per year, and the rate of planting, at 4,400km per year, exceeded the rate of removal. This new planting was largely a result of the Government introducing hedgerow incentive schemes to encourage farmers to restore and manage hedgerows and other boundary features. Indeed, the loss of ‘managed’ hedgerows appears to have been halted since the mid-1990s. Yet across the country many hedgerows remain in poor condition and require active management if they are to survive and thrive – will the latest Hedgerow Regulations help? 

How have hedgerows been legally protected – and what do the new regulations mean? Under the Hedgerows Regulations 1997, certain hedgerows were protected from removal if they met certain characteristics. The regulations protected hedgerows that were over 30-years-old and over 20 metres long (or, if shorter than 20 metres, met another hedge at each end) and which had any feature deemed ‘important’ (e.g. historic and archaeological features, wildlife, and landscape features). Such hedgerows could not be removed with planning consent and to do so was a criminal offence. 

Between June and September 2023, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) consulted on extending these regulations to ‘protect the structure of hedgerows and prevent cutting during the bird-rearing season’. The consultation contained two legislative options:  

  1. Amending the Hedgerows Regulations 1997. This could be followed by a second stage of ‘broader protections once we have a suitable legislative route.’ This option only applied to agricultural land and followed the age and length criteria of existing legislation. It also contained an updated definition of ‘important hedgerow.’ 
  2. New legal protections for hedgerows which would ‘help achieve environmental and net zero outcomes and allow us to consider protecting a broader range of hedgerows, beyond just those on agricultural land.’ This would require primary legislation. 

8,841 consultation responses were received. Generally, those replying from an environmental perspective encouraged Defra to take the opportunity to strengthen the protections on hedgerows and go further than previous measures. Those that responded on behalf of the farming sector asked Defra to balance the need to protect the environment with farm productivity and simplicity. 

In response to the consultation, Government decided to bring forward new legislation to protect hedgerows. This included replicating the requirements that farmers are already familiar with, but with a simpler, fairer, and more proportionate approach to enforcement. 

The Management of Hedgerows (England) Regulations 2024 were passed by parliament in May 2024 and put baseline hedgerow management practices into law, providing a consistent approach across all agricultural land. This includes: 

  • A 2-metre buffer strip, measured from the centre of a hedgerow, where a green cover must be established and maintained. Also, no cultivation or the application of pesticides or fertilisers should take place within this buffer strip. 
  • A hedgerow cutting ban from 1 March to 31 August (inclusive). 

These practices are subject to exemptions and derogations set out in the legislation. 

The new Regulations broadly mirror the previous approach, making it relatively straightforward for farmers and others already familiar with the requirements. 

How can farmers, growers and land managers get involved in protecting hedgerows? Under the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) and Countryside Stewardship Scheme farmers who claimed payments between 2005 and 2023 had to follow what were known as ‘cross compliance’ rules. For hedgerows, this meant land managers had ‘to take all reasonable steps to keep a green cover on land within 2 metres of a hedge’ and were prohibited from cultivating or applying fertilisers or pesticides to land within 2 metres of the centre of a hedge. Hedges could also not be cut or trimmed between 1 March and 31 August to protect nesting birds. 

When the UK exited the European Union (EU), Defra began an agricultural transition period. Taking place between 2021 and 2027, BPS payments are being phased out in England and new schemes to reward farmers for delivering public goods are being rolled out under the ‘Environmental Land Management’ (ELM) schemes. 

Back in April 2023, Defra described how it wanted ‘to increase the length of hedgerows and make the most of the benefits existing hedgerows offer to wildlife, water quality and carbon sequestration’.  ELM has several strands under which farmers can apply for funding. Those strands relating to hedgerows include: 

  • Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI): this includes a hedgerow standard. Farmers can apply for funding to undertake activities to improve hedgerows and hedgerow trees. These cover activities to: assess and record hedgerow condition [HRW1]; manage hedgerows [HRW2]; and maintain or establish hedgerow trees [HRW3]. Farmers currently receive £5, £13 and £10 per hectare per year for HRW1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
  • Countryside Stewardship plus – the follow-on from Countryside Stewardship: this continues previous payments for the management of hedgerows by rotational cutting and for leaving some hedgerows uncut, as well as capital grants to plant and restore hedgerows. The ‘plus’ scheme, however, also includes payments for new actions such as annual incremental cutting, leaving hedgerows uncut for longer, assessing and recording hedgerow condition, and maintaining existing hedgerow trees or establishing new ones. 
  • The Tree Health Pilot (THP) running between 2021 and 2024 is testing different ways of slowing the spread of pests and diseases affecting trees in England. The pilot is running in the south east, north west and west midlands. It includes funding to restock hedgerows with new trees that are more resilient to future threats, as well as capital items and yearly maintenance payments to support new trees to establish. 

Defra has indicated that many farmers and growers already go much further than the rules contained in the new regulations. Indeed, Defra estimates that over 20,000 ELM scheme agreements are contributing to the management of over 60,000 miles of  hedgerows in England. 

Where next? While the new regulations have been broadly welcomed, stakeholders have indicated some gaps and shortcomings. The RSPB, for example, highlights how fields under two hectares and hedgerows under five years are not required to have a protective buffer strip, despite over 70% of consultation respondents saying no to this exemption, including over 50% of farmers who responded. The RSPB argues this leaves significant lengths of hedgerows unprotected, despite evidence that hedgerows in small fields provide high-quality habitat and connectivity for wildlife. 

Respondents to the consultation identified the need to be fair and not overly burdensome towards farmers, and for Defra to be consistent in how it enforces and resources regulation. Under the new regulations The Rural Payments Agency (RPA) is responsible for enforcing the regulations. The RPA intends to hold a public consultation on how to implement and enforce these protections. 

The regulations predominantly apply to hedges on farmland, and we know farmers and growers are already committed to protecting them. Yet hedges in other areas such as parks and gardens are not an integral part of the regulations despite these public and domestic spaces being shop windows for the wider environment. One ecologist, who monitored a hedgerow near his home in Devon, counted 2,070 species visiting or living there. Hedgelink aims to encourage everyone to take action to manage, protect and conserve hedgerows – including in rural areas, gardens and allotments, and towns and city spaces. Hedgelink also collates information about hedgerow surveys and the information they provide about the diversity and state of our hedges and what needs to be done to restore them. In terms of next steps, how can planting hedges be seen as a worthwhile investment in rural areas beyond agricultural landscapes? 

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a service that supports older people to maintain their independence; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

What are Spending Reviews, and do they result in (more) public spending in rural communities? 

What are Spending Reviews, and do they result in (more) public spending in rural communities? 

The Government’s arrangements for planning, budgeting, spending and monitoring involve HM Treasury, departments and the Cabinet Office. HM Treasury allocates funding to departments through annual budgets and multi-year spending reviews. Departments then use those funds to deliver programmes and activities. How are Spending Reviews carried out, and why are they important for rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Spending Reviews are key political and fiscal events that attract widespread public interest. HM Treasury carries out Spending Reviews to allocate funding across Government priorities, to set limits on spending, and to define the main outcomes that the public can expect the Government to achieve with its resources. 

Spending Reviews act as both a ‘spending control’ (by setting limited on departments, known as Departmental Expenditure Limits) and as a way of maximising value-for-money (understanding how much different options cost and which will enable Government to achieve its goals). Spending Reviews tend to develop multi-year plans which are then aligned to annual budgets. 

It is worth noting that not all spending decisions take place at Spending Reviews – with HM Treasury making announcements on issues that need addressing sooner than through regular budget setting processes. In addition, Spending Reviews themselves have no legal basis, rather they are ‘statements of intent’ which are then implemented through an annual ‘estimates’ process.   

When and why were Spending Reviews introduced, how are they carried out, and what do they mean for rural communities?   

When and why were Spending Reviews introduced? Under the strapline ‘modern public services for Britain: investing in reform’, the first Comprehensive Spending Review was carried out back in 1998. A White Paper set out overall plans for each Government department covering the period 1999-2002; and this included public service agreements between departments and HM Treasury about how these overall totals would be spent, with clear objectives, output and efficiency targets set: 

“Our aim is to reallocate money to key priorities; to change policies so that money is well spent; to ensure that departments work better together to improve services; to  weed out unnecessary or wasteful spending…People want more money spent on education, health, crime prevention and transport. They will get it. We have allocated extra resources to these priorities. But is has required tough choices. It has required a clampdown on extra spending outside of health and education for the first two years. Even now some departments are not getting nearly as much money as they would like…Invest and reform are the twin themes of this document. It is the people’s money. It must deliver better services to the people”, Foreword by the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, Prime Minister (pages 506).    

Prior to 1998 successive Chancellors were given responsibility for deciding on tax and spending in response to the economic challenges and opportunities of the day. 

Since 1998, while the main purpose of Spending Reviews in allocating budgets has not changed, they have shifted to consider Government spending in the wider context of taxation and fiscal sustainability. 

While Spending Reviews allocate high level departmental budgets, over the course of a Spending Review Period, other fiscal events such as Budgets allow Governments to make changes to spending plans if and where necessary. Between May 2008 and April 2010, for example, HM Treasury led The Alignment Project. This was set up to align budgets, estimates and accounts in a way that would allow HM Treasury to control what was needed to deliver the fiscal rules and avoid any duplication.   

Some of the changes made to the Government’s financial management included: 

  • Targets for the deficit and Government debt being judged over a fixed period of time, rather than over an economic cycle. 
  • The establishment of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) which has a duty to examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances. 
  • A move away from ‘End Year Flexibility’ wherein departments could carry forward any under-spend from one year to the next, to a system of ‘Budget Exchange’ wherein there is no scope to carry forward under spends unless they are forecast and approved in advance of the Supplementary Estimate. Limits were also introduced in the amount departments can carry forward (e.g. 1% of resource DEL and 2% of capital DEL). 
  • Departments were given structural adjustment priorities [main objectives] and structural adjustment plans [action plans] to achieve outcomes [monitored through Public Service Agreements between the department and HM Treasury]. These all formed part of a department’s overall business plan. Over time, these documents were replaced by Single Departmental Plans (SDPs) and then Outcome Delivery Plans (ODPs).   

Alongside Spending Review 2013, HM Treasury published a Financial Management Review. This sought to improve the tools and techniques available to it to make good decisions during subsequent reviews. The Review considered: 

  • How to develop a better understanding of the costs of activities.  
  • How to define standards for costing and management information. 
  • How to accelerate current initiatives required to support a common framework, including adopting the common chart of accounts. 

If one compares the total spending set out in a Spending Review with the actual spend, over both the 2010 and 2013 Spending Review periods, departments in fact lowered their overall spending to meet agreed spending controls. 

Spending Review 2015 centred on agreeing Government plans for eliminating the deficit and safeguarding Britain’s long-term economic security. While they tend to be multi-year, Governments can introduce shorter reviews. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic the Government conducted a one-year spending review instead of a multi-year review. 

The last Spending Review was carried out in 2021 and combined with the Autumn Budget. This focused on delivering the Government’s ambition to level up and reduce regional inequalities: 

“With the economic recovery underway and emergency support winding down, the Budget and SR [Spending Review] sets out the government’s plans to build back better over the rest of the Parliament. It does so by investing in strong public services, driving economic growth, leading the transition to net zero, and supporting people and businesses…Taxpayers’ money will be spent where it makes the most difference to people’s daily lives: creating high-wage and high-skilled jobs, reducing NHS waiting lists, putting more police on the streets, upgrading roads and railways, and building new homes, hospitals and schools” (page 5). 

The Spending Review set departmental budgets up to 2024-2025. The Spending Review also required departments to save 5% against their day-to-day central budgets in 2024-2025 as part of an action to drive out inefficiency. The strapline of the Spending Review was around ‘recovery, reform and resilience’. The 2023 Budget made some updates by including funding for a package of measures aimed at improving childcare.

On 5 July 2024 the Labour Party won the general election and Sir Keir Starmer became the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The new Government has adopted a new approach of being ‘mission-driven’, with the King’s Speech setting out legislative plans for the Parliament around economic stability and growth, energy, borders and anti-social behaviour, health, and breaking down barriers to opportunity. 

The Institute for Government estimates that the current spending plans set out by the previous Government, plus the additional spending commitments included in the Labour manifesto, indicate that day-to-day departmental spending will increase by 1.2% per annum in real terms between 2025-2026 and 2028-2029. Analysis also suggests real term spending cuts of 2.4% to unprotected areas of day-to-day public spending if spending commitments from the previous Government (i.e., around NHS workforce, increasing aid and defence spending, expanding childcare provision) are kept. While the Government has announced a review of UK Armed Forces, the Chancellor Rachel Reeves has asked HM Treasury to produce an assessment of the state of spending inheritance so she can better understand the scale of the challenge ahead. 

How are Spending Reviews carried out? The Institute for Government describes four key steps in the process: 

  1. The chancellor sends letters to departmental secretaries of state formally inviting submissions to be made for their departments’ spending for the years ahead. These letters usually set out the key priorities that Number 10 and HM Treasury have agreed departments should focus on. 
  2. The Treasury will typically ask the OBR for a forecast ahead of a spending review. This will show the Chancellor and Prime Minister whether they are going to meet their fiscal rules and, if so, how much ‘headroom’ they will have. This forecast, along with the Government’s tax plans, will determine how much the Government will spend over the spending review period [the overall ‘envelope’].
  3. Government will then begin the process of determining how to allocate the envelope. In practice, the size of the envelope and level of taxes may be revisited later down the line to accommodate high-priority spending. Initial bids from departments are sent to the relevant spending team within HM Treasury. Some bids are sent to specialist teams within HM Treasury: there are teams that will look at bids relating to capital expenditure or workforce and pay from all departments, for example. Comments are then fed back in an iterative ‘challenge process’ between HM Treasury and each department.
  4. HM Treasury spending teams then produce briefings and advice for Treasury ministers to prepare them for bilateral negotiations (often led by the chief secretary to the Treasury) with departmental secretaries of state. The outcome of these decisions is then reflected in settlement letters issued by the chancellor to departments.

Typically, Spending Reviews are driven by civil servants from strategy and policy developing ideas that are then evaluated by economists in HM Treasury for their potential costs and benefits. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is looking at its future spending bid from a user-centred perspective. Since September 2023, a small team within the MoJ has been looking at how to deliver digital transformation in the justice system in ways that provide a better experience for users. This includes testing ‘quick and dirty ideas’ with users – to see which have the greatest potential for improving service delivery through to 2030; and working with an economist to understand how a user-centred approach can weave into the more static requirements of a Spending Review bid. 

What do Spending Reviews mean for rural communities? Spending Reviews, while seen as a dense and impervious tool, are an important means for Government to control total expenditure. These decisions translate to priorities and funding decisions which impact upon rural communities.    

Spending Reviews typically allow for representation, this is a written representation that comments on Government policy and/or suggest new policy ideas for the Review. Representations can be made by an interest group, individual or representative body to HM Treasury. During the last Spending Review (2021), for example, representations were made by organisations including the Rural Services Network (RSN), Plunkett UK, the Local Government Association (LGA), the National Association of Local Councils (NALC) and  Wildlife and Countryside Link.  

The RSN made the case for improving outcomes in public services in rural areas which it described as woefully under-resourced by central government compared to urban areas. NALC asked the Government to help places help themselves by supporting the unlocking of parish power to level up and rebuild communities. Levelling up was also a theme in Plunkett UK’s submission which asked for a separate activity and/or the ring fencing of existing resources to support rural areas at risk of being left behind. The LGA’s submission contained proposals for Defra to consider around flooding funding, nature and biodiversity. Similarly, Wildlife and Countryside Link made recommendations for how Government could realise its nature positive ambitions.   

Subsequently, the RSN reviewed the rural impacts of the last Spending Review. While funding for local government as a whole was better than anticipated, the allocation did not result in rural local authorities receiving their fair share. Similarly, levelling up and UK Shared Prosperity funding focused on capital allocations with little evidence of these resources being rural proofed.  

As we move towards a new Spending Round, what do we need to do to maximise investment in rural communities? For me, there are four starting points: 

  1. What rural commitments do we want to see from Government?  What do we think about existing policies, and what suggestions do we have for new policies and proposals that would support people to live and work in the countryside? 
  2. Rural communities sit outside the boundaries of single departments – a Spending Review is an opportunity to encourage departments to work together and with stakeholders to achieve cross-departmental outcomes. What cross-departmental work needs to continue, start, or stop, to deliver better outcomes in rural places?  
  3. There have been consistent calls to link spending decisions to outputs, outcomes and value-for-money. How can we improve real-time data collection and monitoring so we better understand which policies and proposals are working in rural areas, which ones are not, and why?  
  4. The Spending Review focuses on the priorities that can be delivered during the period it covers. While budgetary processes cover the short and medium term, public services often have spending implications well beyond this time horizon (e.g. education, transport, health and social care). How can policies and proposals be costed and presented which enable HM Treasury and wider Government to consider the impact of spending decisions in rural communities and places beyond the Spending Review period?

How can we collate this information to make the best possible representation for rural communities?    

Where next? The Institute for Government has indicated the urgency for the new Government to take decisions over spending. In autumn 2024 the NAO is due to report on the Government’s Spending Review planning and framework. This will include work on long-term value-for-money, and key lessons learned based on the outcomes examined from previous spending rounds. With a new Government in place, if we want to maximise public funding for rural residents and businesses, there is work to do on the data/evidence, innovation, costs, delivery and outcomes of the policies and proposals we want to see (now and in the future).  

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a service that supports older people to maintain their independence; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

Extreme weather

How can rural communities become more resilient to extreme weather events?

Back in December 2022 the Government published its Resilience Framework. This took a strategic approach to resilience and led the Cabinet Office to reorganise its resilience functions to create separate capabilities for ‘preparedness & risk reduction’ and ‘crisis response.’ With global temperatures continuing to rise extreme weather events could become more frequent and severe. What has the Government been doing to prepare for extreme weather risks, and how will this increase the resilience of rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

The Government assesses the most serious risks facing the UK and/or interests overseas using the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA). The National Risks Register (NRR) outlines the most serious risks facing the UK and is the external version of the NSRA. The Register contains those risks that would have a ‘substantial impact on the UK’s safety, security and/or critical systems at a national level.’ The latest register (published in August 2023) contains 89 risks under 9 themes: terrorism, cyber, state threats, geographic/diplomatic, accidents/systems failures, natural/environmental hazards, human/plant/animal health, societal, and conflict/instability. The NRR assesses the likelihood and impact of each risk, following a set methodology. This includes a reasonable worst-case scenario for each risk which is intended to represent the worst plausible manifestation of that particular risk, and the capabilities required to respond to and recover from the emergency should the risk materialise. 

The NRR identifies eight extreme weather events as national risks: (i) coastal flooding, (ii) drought, (iii) high temperatures and heatwaves, (iv) low temperatures and snow, (v) fluvial flooding, (vi) severe space weather, (vii) storms and (viii) surface water flooding. Such weather events are extreme because they ‘are significantly different from the average or usual weather pattern.’ The Cabinet Office assigns ownership of acute national risks to Lead Government Departments (LGDs) who then support with risk identification and assessment, prevention, resilience, preparation, emergency response and recovery – although the LGD is subject to change during some or all of these phases. Similarly, some or all of these phases are devolved to the Government administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. In addition to the LGD(s) the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (known as ‘COBR’ or ‘COBRA’) provides a focal point for all Government and local responder advice. 

According to the National Audit Office (NAO) extreme weather events are already having significant impacts: 

  • The impact on the economy (of lost profits) due to the 2012 drought was estimated at £96 million. 
  • 1.4 million properties were left without power during Storm Eunice in 2022. 
  • More than 4,500 deaths were associated with the hottest days in England in 2022, when temperatures passed 40 degrees for the first time since records began. 
  • Out of all the properties at risk of flooding (coastal, fluvial, groundwater and surface), 60% are at risk of surface water flooding. 
  • Extreme weather events are predicted to become more frequent as global temperatures rise – with hot summers in the UK projected to double in frequency, with the chance they will be as hot as the summer of 2018 by 2050. 

How is the country preparing for future extreme weather events – and what more needs to be done to improve local and national resilience, particularly in rural communities? 

What is the Government’s Resilience Framework? The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need to strengthen national resilience and to prepare the UK for future emergencies: 

“The immediate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on our individual lives, wider society, and the entire world, cannot be overestimated. Millions of lives have been lost, millions of people have been infected, and whole countries plunged into lockdown. Nevertheless, it is sobering to realise that, despite its devastation, the COVID-19 pandemic may only be a relatively small upheaval, compared to other catastrophes that we may face in the future. The pandemic is a wake-up call: we now need a drastic overhaul of our approach to resilience and preparedness so that we are more ready to face future disasters”, House of Lords COVID-19 Committee, ‘Living in a COVID world: a long-term approach to resilience and wellbeing’ report, 2021-2022 (page 4). 

Back in 2021 the Cabinet Office set up the ‘National Situation Centre’ to bring data, analysis, and insight together to improve Government’s ability to identify, monitor and manage risks. The Government defines resilience as: ‘The ability to withstand or quickly recover from a difficult situation, but also to get ahead of risks and tackle challenges before they manifest’. The Government’s approach to resilience therefore includes anticipating, assessing, preventing, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from known or unknown, direct or indirect and/or emerging risks. They also established a ‘resilience directorate’ to strengthen the UK’s resilience; a ‘COBR Unit’ (also known as COBRA) to horizon scan and respond to acute emergencies; a resilience subcommittee of the National Security Council (NSC); and a UK Resilience Forum. The Cabinet Office also appointed a ‘Head of Resilience’ to provide leadership and coordination in building resilience across the UK. 

In December 2022 the Government published ‘The UK Government Resilience Framework’. This set out three principles to strengthen resilience: (1) the need for a shared understanding of the risks faced by the UK; (2) prevention rather than cure wherever possible; and (3) developing resilience requires a ‘whole society’ approach. The Framework contains key actions at UK-wide and England levels to strengthen resilience between now and up to 2030. These actions include: 

  • Risk: our understanding of national and local risks will be dynamic, driven by data and insight where appropriate, and informed by the best UK and international expertise and experience. The UK Government will communicate about risk in an accessible, actionable, and transparent way, so that everyone understands the risks they should plan for and how to protect themselves. 
  • Responsibilities and Accountability: in every part of the resilience system responsibilities and accountability will be clear, coordinated, and coherent. The crisis management and resilience capabilities within the UK Government will be overhauled and strengthened. Local Resilience Forums (LRFs)  within England will be strengthened and enhanced. The UK Government will have the emergency powers we need to act decisively in a crisis. 
  • Partnerships: with the private sector and experts will be strengthened to deliver and inform vital work on resilience. The UK Government will provide guidance on risk in order to help the private sector to meet new standards on resilience. These standards will be enforced through regulation only in the highest priority cases. The UK Government will continue to show leadership on resilience through international fora and through strong bilateral relationships. 
  • Communities: a strengthened partnership with the Voluntary and Community Sector will maximise their contribution to resilience at local and national levels. The UK Government will strengthen the standards for statutory responders in England to consider community resilience as an essential part of their work. Support for vulnerable groups will be improved through better guidance for the local tier. 
  • Investment: decisions by the UK Government will be underpinned by a shared understanding of risk and priorities, allowing for a better and more efficient use of our capabilities and resources. Models of funding for LRFs in England will be reviewed to ensure they are appropriate to the expectations placed upon them. Better information on risk will also help communities and households to decide how to invest in their own preparedness. 
  • Skills: a new Resilience Academy built out of the Emergency Planning College, and a skills and training pathway, will ensure that all those who work on resilience have the capability and knowledge to play their part.   

Each of these areas has its own dedicated action plan within the Framework containing a broad and tangible set of actions. The Government describes how: 

“[The Framework]…is the first step in our commitment to develop a wide and strategic approach to resilience. We are committed to working with partners, industry and academia from across the UK to implement this Framework but also as we continue to develop our approach….Working together to build our national resilience will mean we are better equipped to tackle the challenges that come our way, ensuring businesses grow, our communities thrive and citizens can build a brighter future” (The UK Government Resilience Framework, December 2022, page 1).  

Within the Framework extreme weather is categorised as a ‘non-malicious risk’ or ‘hazard’…‘characterised by natural or accidental causes’ (pages 75-76). Weather is also highlighted as being a cascading risk which refers to ‘The knock-on impacts of a risk that cause further physical, social, or economic disruption. For example, severe weather could cause flooding, which then causes damage to electricity infrastructure, resulting in a power outage which then disrupts communications service providers (and so on)” (page 73). The Framework also references the Department for Transport (DfT) review of ‘The resilience of the transport network to extreme weather events’ back in 2014 and the implementation of its recommendations with the private sector since then.    

How has the Framework been implemented? Back in 2021 the Royal Academy of Engineering was commissioned by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat to undertake an external review of the NSRA methodology. Through case studies and interviews with private and public sector risk owners, seven principles of good practice were identified: 

  1. Ensure a joined-up approach: provide opportunities for collaboration so that prevention and mitigation strategies deliver greater resilience than individual actions. 
  2. Encourage participation and communicate clearly: bring stakeholders together to identify interdependencies, groups facing disproportionate impact or cascade consequences that one department alone might not anticipate. 
  3. Focus on impact: decision making should be driven by impact and preparedness. 
  4. Explore interdependencies: bring risk owners from different parts of the system together to uncover and plan for interdependencies that may not be revealed when risks are considered in isolation. 
  5. Consider a range of scenarios: identify a range of different response capabilities and explore the cascading of risks and consequences with systematic impacts. 
  6. Embed new data and metrics: confidence in data must be high and models must be carefully evaluated and paired with real-world information. 
  7. Review based on need: the timeline for assessing risks should be based on need [how sensitive those risks are to technological and societal changes] rather than on a standard time interval. 

“This review has been an opportunity to learn from a diverse range of industry sectors, academia, and government. We are pleased that the review is referenced in the National Resilience Framework…Implementing the lessons learned will not be easy, as risk, resilience and organisational culture are closely intertwined. But with the lived experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, now is the time to foster a resilience-orientated culture that drives action to make the UK a safer, more prepared nation for everyone”, Professor Joan Cordiner FREng FRSE, who led the Academy’s review of the NSRA.

In December 2023, the Government published an Implementation Update on the UK Government Resilience Framework. This set out the progress made by Government in delivering on its objectives to increase the UK’s resilience and preparedness for risks, and excellence in crisis management. The Update highlighted: 

  • The publication of the first event NRR, and bringing actors together from across the resilience community, to take a ‘whole of society’ approach to resilience. 
  • How the Resilience Directorate, under the Head of Resilience at the Cabinet Office, has continued to develop the Government’s strategic approach to resilience. Improvements made to the risk assessment process (e.g. defining chronic and acute risks which are likely to manifest as emergencies) were cited; as well as examples of how Government is working more closely with LDGs to drive action to prevent risks from manifesting in the first place – this includes publishing updated emergency management responsibilities for LGDs in August 2023. 
  • How the COBR Unit, under the Director of COBR, has responded to extreme weather, major water outages, flooding, a breakdown of National Air Traffic Services (NATS) Flight Planning System and evacuations of British Nationals from several crisis hit countries. 
  • How Government is developing capabilities and tools to provide information to citizens. For example, the Government has tested the UK-wide Emergency Alert System and launched the Crisis Management Excellence Programme to upskill Government officials on crisis response. 
  • A focus on delivering prevention rather than cure, with the Resilience Directorate and COBR Unit working closely to bring together the disciplines of resilience, risk, and crisis management, and ensuring Government works together with partners to get ahead of known risks. For example, planning for winter risks – including focusing on those vulnerable to winter conditions. 

“The Implementation Update provides a summary of what has been achieved in driving resilience since we published the UK Resilience Framework…But we must not stand still….we look forward to building further on this work in 2024. There is a lot more to come,” Oliver Dowden, Deputy Prime Minister, and Cabinet Minister with responsibility for risk and resilience (2023, page 4). 

Alongside the publication of the Implementation Update, Oliver Dowden CBE, presented the Annual Resilience Statement to Parliament. The Statement emphasised the need for individuals and households to take more significant steps to raise their resilience at the household level, including advice to prepare for power cuts. 

Also in December 2023, the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report looking at Government resilience to extreme weather. The NAO’s work covered three main areas: (i) Does the UK Government have a clear vision and well-defined roles and responsibilities to manage national risks such as extreme weather events? (ii) Does the Government have a clear understanding of the impacts extreme weather events can have in England? (iii) Has the UK Government taken appropriate action to prepare for, respond to, and prevent the potential impacts of extreme weather events in England? 

The NAO found: 

  • Since 2021, Government has strengthened the arrangements to manage national risks. For example, during a period of extreme heat in July 2022, the Cabinet Office National Situation Centre worked with partners to identify vulnerable groups and locations, helping Government to target support effectively. 
  • Government focuses on common consequences of risks and the ability to respond via generic capabilities, as well as planning for specific risks where this will make the most difference. For example, Government takes lessons from the National Exercising Programme, and has a new chronic risk analysis to provide evidence on future risk trajectories. 
  • But Government has yet to set out how resilient it would like the UK to be, either to all risks in aggregate or to the most specific risks. The three principles underpinning the UK Government Resilience Framework while welcomed do not set out targets or standards for the desired level of national, local, and sectoral resilience. For extreme weather risks Government has not specified (except for drought) the target level of resilience or the amount of risk it is willing to accept –  without these, Government cannot make informed decisions about trade-offs between priorities and resource allocation. 
  • Government is taking steps to address extreme weather risks as whole-system risks but needs to do more to strengthen assurance arrangements. Where multiple LGDs have ownership of an extreme weather risk, coordinated action is also required across Government and beyond. This also means some roles and responsibilities for managing risks are not clear. For example, it is not always clear who the public should contact when surface water flooding occurs. 
  • Government has good forecasting data for droughts, heatwaves, and storms, but less so for surface water flooding. 
  • Government develops its understanding of extreme weather impacts from previous events but lacks information on less common events. While Government has identified lessons from emergencies (e.g. Cabinet Office UK Resilience Lessons Digests), the NAO saw less evidence of Government implementing learning from actual events. 
  • Government does not yet have a good understanding of the interaction between different risks, the further impacts that this can have, and how risks in one system can have knock-on effects in another system. For example, during Storm Arwen, problems with the power network affected communication networks and people’s ability to access emergency services.
  • Government produces ‘reasonable worst-case scenarios’ but some recent events have exceeded planning assumptions. For example, during Storm Arwen customer call volumes exceeded the planning assumptions. 
  • Adaptation action can help to reduce the future costs of extreme weather events. For example, analysis undertaken for the Climate Change Committee (CCC) indicates the average benefit to cost ratios for the following measures were: water efficiency measures (11:1), heat alert and heatwave planning (10.5:1), weather and climate services including early warning (9:1), and flood preparedness and protection (6:1). But the CCC found little evidence that Government is driving adaptation at the pace and scale needed to fully prepare for climate risks facing the UK. 
  • Government is committed to developing a coordinated approach to investment in resilience, but this approach may not be ready until 2030. Indeed, Government does not know how much the public sector is spending to  manage extreme weather risks because action is taken across a wide range of organisations, and because there is no common definition of what constitutes resilience activity. 
  • Government has done less to encourage private sector investment in resilience to extreme weather events and climate change than other long-term challenges such as net zero. 
  • There is limited evidence of Government testing and assuring contingency plans. For example, LRFs produce emergency plans but central Government has no direct oversight of these plans and does not assure them. 
  • The Government’s use of regulation and standards to support the development of resilience to extreme weather events is currently limited – with a commitment to introducing new standards for resilience by 2030. 
  • Government can do more to ensure that alerts reach individuals at risk in good time. While The Met Office issues severe weather warnings, and the public can sign up to flood warnings from the Environment Agency, surveys show that public awareness of the risk of surface water flooding is low and that people do not know who to report these incidents to when they happen. 

The NAO concluded that “for the extreme weather risks we examined, government has yet to set out what outcome it is looking to achieve in managing these risks and the amount of risk that it is willing to accept in the pursuit of those outcomes (risk appetite). Government does not know how much is being spent on managing extreme weather risks. Without this information it is difficult to conclude on whether its current approach represents value for money” (page 16). The report contained six recommendations: 

  1. The Cabinet Office, working with other departments, should strengthen leadership, accountability, and assurance arrangements for the management of extreme weather risks. 
  2. The Cabinet Office should review the current risk and resilience structures and identify any gaps in its system-wide oversight of national risks. 
  3. The Cabinet Office should set out what a resilient UK looks like, a strategy to deliver this, and the specific roles of Government, the private and voluntary sectors, and the public. 
  4. LDGs, working with the Cabinet Office, should develop a set of resilience standards for infrastructure and give regulators consistent climate resilience roles. 
  5. The Cabinet Office, working with HM Treasury and other departments, should develop a coordinated, prioritised approach to investment in climate and wider resilience by 2025, and implement it by 2028. 
  6. LDGs, working with HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office, should encourage greater investment in climate adaptation from the private sector. 

What does this mean for rural communities? In May 2024, the Government unveiled a new website for individuals and households to take some simple steps to ensure they are ready for a range of possible scenarios. In asking, ‘how would you prepare for an emergency?’ the website includes information on how to find out if there are specific emergencies you might be more at risk of than others, depending on where you live, work, or are travelling to. This signposts people to LRFs, how to check your flood risk, check the weather forecast, check the pollution forecast, and check country specific travel advice for your destination. For extreme weather events, the site contains specific sections on hot weather and heatwaves, cold weather, snow and ice, droughts, flooding, and storms. The “Prepare” website has received widespread media coverage amid Government advice to citizens to stock-up on wind-up torches, bottled water (up to 10 litres per day) and food (tinned goods). 

The UK Government Resilience Framework, Implementation Update, Annual Statement and Prepare Campaign website contain no direct references on, or advice for, rural communities. Yet according to the Countryside Climate Network, rural communities are at the frontline of climate change impacts, and more extreme weather. Some examples include:  

  • The publication of an academic study in May 2022 which looked at the impact of heatwaves on southeast England and Aberdeenshire. Researchers found more people in rural areas of England to be severely ill from heatwaves today than they were in the 1980s and called on policymakers not to forget the countryside when formulating solutions to climate change: “Heatwaves are getting deadlier, even in Britain. We already knew that the urban heat island effect exacerbates the problem in cities, but now we also have proof that people living in less built-up areas are also threatened…people living in the Southeast of England are now seven per cent more likely to die prematurely when the temperature rises significantly (about 6 degrees Centigrade) above 26.5 degrees Centigrade. In Aberdeenshire, the risk of dying prematurely increases by four per cent, compared to the Southeast of England, when the temperature increases by just two degrees from 24.5 degrees C to 26.7 degrees C.”    
  • Research by the Resolution Foundation highlighted how flood defence funding is skewed towards cities and urban areas and needs to reach deprived neighbourhoods at risk of flooding in rural areas; and low-income families need support to be able to afford contents insurance. 
  • A debate on resilience to extreme weather events in the House of Commons in January 2024. This highlighted the piloting of the River Cam flood warning system with laser depth measuring devices and real-time messaging and alerts to residents when water levels start to rise as part of calls for funding more extreme weather resilience plans for isolated rural communities. 
  • A blog produced by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in May 2024, highlighted how, between October 2023 and March 2024, England experienced the second wettest 6-month period on record [nearly 60% above the 10-year average], leading to devastating and long-term impacts on farming, with soil erosion, crop damage and flooding. In describing how “This disruption not only affects the livelihoods of farmers and land managers but also has wider implications for food security and the economy,” Defra set out a range of support measures, temporary adjustments, and easements in place to support farmers and land managers to deal with the impact of severe weather in England.
  • The NFU’s Farmer Confidence Survey shows that short and mid-term confidence is at its lowest level since records began in 2010. The relentless wet weather has played a big part, with 82% of respondents saying their farm businesses have suffered fairly negative (52%) or very negative impacts (30%), with mixed farms, arable farms and dairy farms having taken the biggest hits. The survey was undertaken in November and December 2023. Since then, farmers have battled relentless heavy rain through January, February, March and much of April. For example, farmer Henry Ward in Lincolnshire has described the impact of three flood events on his land and livelihood.  
  • Back in 2018 Storm Emma caused major disruption in the North of England, particularly snow storms in Cumbria, cutting off many rural communities for several consecutive days. More recently, in May 2022 an independent review of the difficulties suffered by rural communities during Storm Arwen was published.  This recommended that SP Energy Networks should look to equip teams deployed in rural areas after a storm with satellite communications systems to ensure the extent of damage can be established amid loss of mobile connectivity; undergrounding sections of the network shown to be most vulnerable to storm damage in rural locations; remote rural properties would benefit from other sources of power (e.g. small wind turbines); and consider how the resilience of rural networks can best be enhanced.  

Outside of the UK, researchers in the United States have found rural residents may be more vulnerable to extreme weather due to lack of local government capacity, as well as less availability of government funding for prevention and recovery compared to urban settings. The Rural Health Information Hub provides information and advice to help rural community members to prepare for extreme weather. Studies in Australia reveal rural residents to be particularly worried about the financial burden associated with extreme weather events (especially water related extremes in the case of rural Australians) and the lack of government policies aimed at climate mitigation and adaptation. 

Back in the UK what more can be done to support rural communities to prepare for and respond to extreme weather? Applying a rural lens could involve some or all of the following steps: 

  • For the eight extreme weather events identified as national risks, how can we use data, analysis, research, and insights to understand how they manifest (both individually, cumulatively and/or events in succession) in rural communities? What are/would the knock-on impacts be? 
  • Develop a common and shared understanding of the extreme weather events risk faced by rural communities (who/where is the most vulnerable?) – and we need to ensure this feeds into the work of individual LRFs, LGDs and other stakeholders involved in emergency preparedness at the local tier, and then collated and assured nationally by the Cabinet Office. 
  • If prevention is better than cure, what assets are already in rural areas and what investments and resources are needed to prevent, mitigate, or reduce the impact of extreme weather events? Where the resources that would be required cannot be deployed or afforded, there needs to be an open dialogue with rural communities about trade-offs in resource allocation. 
  • How can initiatives like the Prepare campaign communicate with rural residents and businesses – so individuals know how to prepare, what to do during and immediately after an event, including who to contact? What more can be done to support rural communities to plan for and protect themselves from extreme weather events? 

Where next? As part of the Integrated Review Refresh, the Government has established a new process for identifying, assessing and managing ‘chronic risks’ [these are long-term challenges that gradually erode national security and way of life] alongside the ‘acute risks’ highlighted in this article. While recognising the need to do more to build resilience, the Refresh also makes no direct reference to rural communities. If there is more to come from the UK Resilience Framework, how can we ensure it duly considers the needs, vulnerabilities, priorities, assets, and resource allocation of rural communities? 

 …………………………………………………………………………………………………

Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a service that supports older people to maintain their independence; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

Central bank forecasting: do the models work for rural communities?

Central bank forecasting: do the models work for rural communities?

Economic models are quantitative frameworks used by almost all central banks, including the Bank of England (BoE), to test assumptions using economic data. Back in 2013, at his Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences lecture, Lars Peter Hanson said “part of meaningful quantitative analysis is to look at models and try to figure out their deficiencies and the ways in which they can be improved”. In April 2024, the BoE published a review on ‘forecasting for monetary policy’ led by Ben Bernanke, the former Chair of the Federal Reserve. What does this reveal about forecasting, how can it be improved, and why does this matter to rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates.   ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

When you think about a bank, you probably think about the branch where you access financial products and services, or the online system you log into. A central bank, also called a reserve bank, a national bank or a monetary authority, is different: it is an institution responsible for implementing monetary policy, managing currency, and controlling money supply at a country-level. 

Central banks are typically responsible for: 

  • Defining monetary policy: they set macroeconomic objectives such as ensuring price stability and/or economic growth. To do this they have tools they use to set official interest rates – they can opt to increase this rate [to control inflation] or decrease it [to boost economic growth]. 
  • Regulating money in circulation: they have the authority to issue coins and notes. They can inject liquidity into the economy, and ensure exchange rates remain stable. 
  • Overseeing the inter-bank market: they monitor national payment systems and ensure financial laws are being followed. 
  • Loaning liquidity to commercial banks: financial institutions can receive liquidity to cover what they need in the short-term (if/where required) while central banks ensure price stability by mediating in credit fluctuations. 
  • Independent: they are not aligned to any political party or group. 
  • Advisory role: they produce reports that are useful for Government, businesses and the general public. 

In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England (BoE) is responsible for the central banking system. Other central banks include the Federal Reserve in the United States, the Reserve Bank in Australia, and the Swiss National Bank. Central banks can also represent a group of countries, for example, the European System of Central Banks (ESCBs). This is made up of both the European Central Bank (ECB) and all the national central banks of the countries within the European Union, whether they have the Euro as their official currency or not. The Bank of Central African States (BEAC) is a central bank that serves 6 countries which form the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC): Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of the Congo.   

How and why do central banks do forecasting? For central banks, economic forecasts are important for two reasons. Firstly, to inform policy and communicate policy plans and rationales to financial markets and the public. To do this, they need a representation of the economy they are attempting to direct, and a projection that takes account of forces affecting the economy over time (with short, medium, long and variable legs).  

In practice, and simplified, this is analogist to having a core spreadsheet drawn from national accounts (e.g. consumption, investment, exports) which is then linked to other spreadsheets which provide a greater degree of disaggregation. It is also necessary to project items contained in the core spreadsheet (e.g. developments in the macroeconomy, exchange rate movements and taxes levied by a Government). Forecasts can model different scenarios (i.e., modelling something specific such as lower or higher unemployment rate than currently believed, or a 15% increase in energy prices). This scenario analysis can also be used to investigate errors in previous forecasts. 

The construction of economic forecasts at central banks is normally undertaken by internal staff, with some input from policymakers. Central banks use different types of macroeconomic models for forecasting. The BoE, for example, uses a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model called COMPASS. This is built from microeconomic representations of the behaviour of individual households and businesses and includes 18 variables. This can be complemented by sectoral models (which focus on a particular sector of interest such as energy or housing), statistical models (which estimate changes in variables over time in light of changes in the past), and ‘big data’ (such as anonymised credit card records). Staff and policymakers also identify and correct for factors not adequately captured in these models and forecasts. While COMPASS remains the BoE’s benchmark model, over time the BoE has reduced its focus on COMPASS for generating a baseline forecast and placed greater emphasis on sectoral and statistical models.   

The Bank of England Act 1998 gave responsibility for monetary policy to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The MPC has nine voting members, and a non-voting representative from HM Treasury. The nine voting members comprise five internal BoE staff [the Governor, 3 deputy governors and chief economist]; and 4 external voting members appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for renewable three-year terms. Under the 1998 Act the MPC is responsible for producing a quarterly report that contains: 

  • A review of monetary policy decisions published by the BoE. 
  • An assessment of the developments in inflation in the UK. 
  • An indication of the expected approach to meeting the BoE’s objectives of price stability, and supporting the Government’s economic policies. 
  • A series of fan charts to summarise the uncertainty surrounding the forecasts of inflation, GDP growth and unemployment over the next 3-years.  

Five weeks before the report is published staff at the BoE working on the forecasts convene a ‘constraints meeting’ which looks at the current quarter and following quarter to estimate the key variables that will be important. There are also Key Issues and Benchmarking meetings with MPC members to discuss the forecasting and assumptions. One week before the policy meeting an official draft meeting is held to discuss the near-final forecast. Formal policy decisions are discussed at MPC meetings on a Friday, and the following Tuesday, with the official voting on the policy taken on the Wednesday. 

Forecasting is difficult under the best of circumstances, and economies are prone to unexpected shocks (e.g. war, pandemic). There is also a lag in the economic data which means a rough snapshot, subject to revision, is provided. When a forecast proves to be significantly off-target, and this cannot be explained by unexpected shocks, the modelling should be reconsidered and policies modified.  

Back in May 2023 the Bank of England’s (BoE) Court of Directors  decided to commission a review into the Bank’s forecasting during times of significant uncertainty. The purpose of the review was to strengthen the Bank’s approach to supporting the MPC. They asked Ben Bernanke to lead the Review into the BoE’s current approach to forecasting, to compare this approach to other central banks, and to make recommendations for constructing and using forecasts in the future.  

Grading economic forecasts – which ones pass? The Review by Bernanke compared the BoE’s forecasting accuracy since 2015 with six other central banks (the Bank of Canada, the US Federal Reserve, Norway’s Norges Bank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank and the European Central Bank) as well as other external forecasters. This covered forecasts of inflation, GDP growth and unemployment. The Review also looked at ‘one quarter ahead’ forecasts [known as ‘nowcasts’]. Notwithstanding the timing of central bank forecasts are not uniform, and there were also a series of shocks that had different effects on different economies (e.g. COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), the Review found: 

“That the forecasting performance of all the central banks in our study, as well as that of external forecasters, deteriorated significantly with the onset of the pandemic and the subsequent inflation. The Bank of England suffered the common deterioration in forecast accuracy, but we find that, overall, its record is generally in the middle of the pack, and its policy response to recent developments, as indicated by changes in its policy rate, was also qualitatively similar to that of other central banks. There appears therefore to be little basis for singling out the Bank from its peers for criticism. At the same time, the marked decline in forecasting performance by all central banks (and other forecasters) provides strong motivation for reviewing the forecasting processes and the use of forecasts at all these entities, including the Bank [of England]”. 

The Review contains a graph showing actual inflation rates since 2015 faced by the central banks in the set [figure 3], and a further graph showing the one year ahead forecasting errors by them [figure 4]. 

Figure 3: Annual inflation rates, 2015–23

Figure 4: Inflation, one year ahead forecast errors, 2015–23

The Figures highlight how all of the central banks were able to forecast inflation reasonably well one year ahead between 2015 and 2019, and even during 2020 [the first year of the pandemic]. However, the surge in inflation that began in mid-2021 was unanticipated by many central banks. When inflation was at its most extreme (in 2021 Q2 – 2023 Q3 period), the BoE’s forecast were better than those of the European Central Bank and Riksbank, but worse than those of the Bank of Canada, Norges Bank and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 

The BoE publishes comparisons of its own forecast errors with those of outside forecasters provided by Consensus Economics. For inflation, the Review confirmed that the forecast errors made by the BoE and those made by external forecasters were barely distinguishable [Figure 9]. Indeed, external forecasters failed to predict the post-pandemic surge in inflation as much as the central banks did [Figure 10]. 

Figure 9: UK CPI inflation rate, one year ahead forecast errors, 2015–23

Figure 10: UK four-quarter GDP growth, one year ahead forecast errors, 2015–23

While the BoE’s forecasting accuracy was not much different from that of other forecasters, the Review describes how the events of recent years have “nevertheless served as a stress test of forecasting at the Bank, including not only the routine construction of forecasts but also, importantly, the use of forecasts in policymaking and communication”. 

The Review also looked at the quarterly forecast at the BoE, including the people, systems and communication used to develop these. The Review praised the competence and dedication of Bank staff, citing how their presentations of the forecast are professional, how they are responsive to questions and comments from MPC members, and how they revise and write up forecasts on short notice. On systems – the software and models used to produce the forecasts – the findings were less favourable: 

“Some key software used in preparing the forecasts is out of date and lacks important functionality. Moreover, many of the economic and statistical models that support the forecast are not adequately maintained (updated, stress tested, periodically re-estimated). The models are also not smoothly integrated with each other…The incorporation of staff and MPC judgements into the forecast is likewise operationally complex. Makeshift fixes of these and other operational problems over the years have resulted in an unwieldy and inflexible system that limits the ability of staff to undertake potentially useful analyses”. 

The Review describes how the baseline economic model, COMPASS, has significant shortcomings and indicates that an upgrade of the data management system is underway. 

What more can be done to improve models and forecasting? The Review made 12 recommendations organised under three themes: infrastructure, decision making and communication. 

The BoE needs to build and maintain a high-quality infrastructure for forecasting and analysis. The Review made recommendations around: 

  • Continuing the updating and modernisation of software to manage and manipulate data as rapidly as feasible – including ensuring staff can easily search for economic/financial data, can export and transform it, and the inputting of data becomes as automated as possible. 
  • Dedicating staff time and resources to maintain and update the model – and ensuring that models are regularly evaluated and re-estimated when new data becomes available, and stress tested against scenarios. 
  • Thoroughly reviewing and updating the forecasting framework, including replacing or revamping COMPASS – this should take account of the monetary transmission mechanism, short and long-term inflation expectations, key sectoral models (e.g. finance, housing, energy), and supply-side factors (e.g. productivity, labour supply, trade). 

The BOE needs to provide a forecasting process that better supports the MPC’s decision-making. The Review identified a bias towards making incremental changes in successive models together with human judgements, at the expense of recognising structural changes in the economy. The Review made recommendations around: 

  • Charging staff with highlighting significant forecasting errors and their sources, particularly errors around unanticipated shocks. Staff should meet with MPC members to consider if structural change, misspecification of models and/or faulty judgements warrant changes to key assumptions and modelling approaches. 
  • Reviewing personnel policies to see if existing staff can be redeployed in ways that improve the forecasting infrastructure and forecast quality. 
  • Augmenting the central forecast with alternative scenarios, with these decided upon at an early stage during each forecast round by the MPC and staff. 

Relative to other central banks, the Review highlights how the BoE relies heavily on its central economic forecast as a communications device. The recommendations include: 

  • Publishing selective alternative scenarios along with the central forecast to better help the public understand the policy choice. 
  • Giving more attention to published alternative scenarios in discussions about outlook and policy. 
  • Replace or reduce the detailed quantitative discussion of economic conditions in Monetary Policy Statements in favour of a shorter and more qualitative description. 
  • A section of the Monetary Policy Reports should be devoted to uncertainty and the balance of risks in the forecast. 
  • Fan charts suffer from significant analytical weaknesses, have outlived their usefulness and should be eliminated. 

The Review made a final, overarching, recommendation that implementation all of the changes proposed should be phased – with an initial focus on improving the forecasting infrastructure (committing additional resources to do so), followed by adopting changes to policy-making and then communications.   

In April 2024, the BoE responded to the Review and set out its commitment to all 12 of the recommendations: 

“Two broad themes underpin many of the Review’s assessments and recommendations and are likely to guide the design of future changes: [Firstly] substantial investment is needed, beyond that already underway, to develop key parts of the data, modelling, forecasting and evaluation infrastructure and the expert staff to support them…[Secondly] within an overall approach that assigns more prominence to risks and welcomes challenge to underlying assumptions, the role of the central projection and the MPC’s discussions surrounding it should be reconsidered”.  

It is also worth acknowledging that it is difficult for the BoE to implement changes when regular forecasting for the MPC needs to continue and is programmed in – with one commentator comparing this to trying to fix a car while all its parts are moving! 

Why does this all matter to rural communities? The BoE is responsible for keeping inflation [price rises] low and stable – with a Government set target of keeping inflation at 2%. Inflation is measured via a ‘shopping basket’ wherein the Office for National Statistics (ONS) collects around 180,000 prices of about 700 items. Known as the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), it includes datasets relating to 13 principal areas: food/non-alcoholic beverages, alcohol/tobacco, clothing/footwear, housing/household services, owner occupiers’ housing costs, furniture/household goods, health, transport, communication, recreation/culture, education, restaurants/hotels and miscellaneous goods and services. 

Rural residents are likely to have different consumption habits and face different financial pressures compared to their urban counterparts. Examples include: 

  • Transport: while the average number of trips is only marginally higher in rural areas compared to the national average, the total distances travelled are much higher with a higher proportion of these journeys made by car [90% in rural villages, hamlets and isolated dwellings compared to 72% in urban conurbations]. Car ownership in rural areas is essential for getting from place to place whereas urban residents can more easily choose from other options such as public transport, walking or cycling. Longer journeys means rural residents spend more money maintaining, repairing and replacing cars so an increase in automotive inflation may affect them more than their urban counterparts.
  • Housing affordability: housing in predominantly rural areas is, on average, less affordable than in predominantly urban areas (excluding London) – in rural areas 9.2 times the lower quartile average earnings. The stock and quality of housing in rural areas also leaves homeowners and renters vulnerable to rising heating and utility costs, and additional maintenance costs. 

In the United States, researchers have looked at US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Surveys and the Consumer Price Index to highlight the inflation disparities of rural households. They found rural households experienced considerably higher inflation than urban households did, especially relative to what was the case before the 2021 inflationary episode.  

Back in the UK, in 2022 the Welsh Parliament’s Economy, Trade and Rural Affairs Committee conducted an inquiry into the cost-of-living crisis. As part of the inquiry, Parliament published an article summarising the cost of living pressures affecting people living in rural areas. This focused on the additional energy costs faced by rural residents who are off-grid and the lack of insulation/energy efficiency of rural properties. Echoing the findings of researchers in the United States, the article referenced work  undertaken by The Bevan Foundation which found the average rural household spends £641.10 per week on essentials, compared to £572.90 for the average urban household. 

Similarly, in Scotland, in 2023, The Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) and the Young Academy of Scotland (YAS) responded to a Scottish Affairs Committee’s consultation on the impact of the cost of living in rural communities in Scotland. The RSE and YAS working group found major societal events such as the cost of living crisis, the increase in fuel prices, COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war had a greater impact on remote rural areas than on urban areas: 

“The prices in remote rural communities for some essential goods were already higher than those in urban centres. And the recent increases in inflation have further exacerbated living costs pressures for remote rural Scotland. There is general scarcity of quality data regarding rural communities. The RSE recommends that policymakers regularly commission and monitor high-quality, robust statistical evidence. Research is essential to fully comprehend the complex picture of the challenges rural areas in Scotland are grappling with. The key challenges for remote rural communities are related to the ‘rural premium’ whereby communities face higher costs for food, clothes and other household goods, energy bills and transport”. 

While ONS has a personal inflation calculator, there is no overall substantive analysis showing when the cost of living goes up how/whether rural residents across disproportionately affected through their consumption habits. Current analyses of inflation use aggregated data that does not fully account for or represent rurality. 

If some of the data we collect and put into the models better reflects rural circumstances (e.g. supply side, shopping basket), and if central banks can further improve their forecasting performance, we can better prepare rural economies and communities for the outlook and its possible impacts. 

Where next? For me, one of the key findings of the Review was around the career ladder at the BoE. If you want a pay rise you have to move around within the organisation – as it common in civil service jobs. On the one hand, this means staff have well rounded exposure to different operations/parts of the business. On the other hand, it leads to generalists rather than specialists who can undertake and scrutinise key areas that are core to the BoE’s work. 

“Ultimately there’s no alternative to judgment – you can never get the answers out of some model”, Lawrence Summers, What in the world happened to economics? 15 March 1999, page 66. 

The BoE acknowledges that it will need to consider the design and implementation of the recommendations and will be providing an update on proposed changes by the end of 2024. Watch this space! 

 …………………………………………………………………………………………………

Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a service that supports older people to maintain their independence; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

Underground or Overground –should we bury electricity cables?

Underground or Overground –should we bury electricity cables?

The electricity transmission system in England and Wales consists of approximately 7,200 kilometres (4,470 miles) of overhead line and 1,400 kilometres (870 miles) of underground cable operating at 275,000 and 400,000 volts (275kV and 400kV). The term ‘undergrounding’ refers to the replacement of overhead cables with underground cables. When and where is undergrounding currently used – and should it be rolled out in more rural areas? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

It was during the Industrial Revolution, and the work of Benjamin Franklin in 1752, which started the use of human-generated electricity. Coal was used to power tools and machines and, in 1769, James Watt patented the world’s first coal-powered steam engine which was used in factories and mills. The UK’s gas industry was founded in 1812 when Frederick Winsor formed a company to build a public gas works and distribute gas to customers through a network of underground pipes. London’s network provided gas to almost 70,000 streetlights by 1827, and in 1882 the Edison Electric Light Station was built in London to supply light and heat to urban residents.  

In the early 20th century electricity started to be pumped into people’s home using pylons designed by Sir Reginald Blomfield – with electricity being provided across the country. After the First World War the electricity industry wanted cheaper and more reliable energy supplies. In 1925 Lord Weir chaired a committee that proposed the development of the Central Electricity Board (CEB) which would connect power stations in Britain and be called a ‘national gridiron’. The Electricity (Supply) Act 1926 established the CEB as a statutory body with the duty of supplying electricity.  

The world’s first integrated national grid began in 1935, with 7 grid areas established and overseen by control rooms in Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Birmingham, Bristol, London and Glasgow. In 1937 control room engineers combined all seven grid areas for the first time. 

In the post first world war era power stations were being built less frequently, coal was rationed, yet electricity usage was increasing. In 1949 National Grid initiated talks with Électricité de France, a French-based power company, about constructing a cross-Channel power link. Still not able to keep up with supply demands, in 1950 a 12-year project was launched to establish a 275kV ‘supergrid’. 42-metre-high pylons and 4,000 miles of transmission lines were installed as part of this work. In 1957 the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was established – and its structure reduced to five regions to allow for more efficient operations. Between the 1960s and 1980s a new 400kV supergrid was constructed. 

In 1989 the Electricity Act was approved. This led to the privatisation of the electricity industry. Section 9 of the Act gave National Grid a statutory duty to maintain ‘an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of electricity transmission’. National Grid also has to meet minimum standards of quality in terms of voltage and frequency; and is responsible for maintaining its transmission system and managing a programme of asset replacement. 

In 1995 National Grid was listed on the London Stock Exchange and its shares traded publicly. Its seven control centres across Britain were replaced by the Electricity National Control Centre (ENCC) in Wokingham. In practical terms National Grid transmits electricity at high speed (of 275kV and 400kV) across the country, through pylons and overhead lines, and then transports electricity into homes and businesses through its distribution networks. To make the electricity safe for domestic use National Grid must lower the voltage of electricity to up to 132kV– which can be done via smaller pylons or underground cables that carry lower voltage lines. In addition, small-scale electricity generators (e.g. wind farms, solar parks) connect direct to the distribution network through embedded generation. In 2019, for the first time in the UK and the United States, more energy was generated from zero carbon sources than fossil fuels and the National Grid launched ‘The Great Grid Upgrade’, infrastructure projects to connect more renewable energy to homes and businesses.

In England and Wales National Grid owns, builds and maintains pylons and overhead lines (OHL) and underground cables that make up the electricity transmission network. Distribution network operators (DNOs) manage the poles, pylons and cables in a local area – in some local areas these are also run by the National Grid while in other areas other operators manage the network.  

What is undergrounding – and when and where is it used? Undergrounding is a process whereby overhead lines (OHLs) providing electrical power or telecommunications are replaced with underground cables. The technology to do this ranges from direct burial (1.5 metres wide and 1.2 metres deep) through to deep bore tunnels (12 metres wide and 25-30 metres deep). 

Early undergrounding can be traced back to the first submarine communications cables laid in the 1850s which carried telegraphy traffic, with the first transatlantic telegraph cable becoming operational on 16 August 1858. Around 1890 Sebastian Ziani de Ferranti designed high-voltage underground mains cables which he used to connect the Grosvenor Galleries to Deptford substation – he further developed this cabling so they could handle 10,000 volt current to be rolled out more widely. During the 20th century Direct-buried cable (DBC) became commonplace. Unlike standard power cables, which have a thin layer of insulation and a waterproof outer layer, DBC consists of multiple layers of heavy metallic-banded sheathing, reinforced by rubber covers, shock absorbing gel, waterproof tape and stiffened by a heavy metal core. 

The security and reliability of the UK’s current and future energy supply is dependent on having a network and infrastructure to meet electricity demand – this includes above and lower voltage OHL and underground cables of any voltage. The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) publishes planning guidance for developers of nationally significant energy infrastructure projects. Overarching National Policy Statement for energy (EN-1) was presented to parliament in November 2023 and came into force in January 2024. Section 5.10.7 states: 

National Parks, the Broads and AONBs have been confirmed by the government as having the highest status of protection in relation to landscape and natural beauty. Each of these designated areas has specific statutory purposes. Projects should be designed sensitively given the various siting, operational, and other relevant constraints. For development proposals located within designated landscapes, the Secretary of State should be satisfied that measures which seek to further purposes of the designation are sufficient, appropriate, and proportionate to the type and scale of the development. 

Section 5.11.20 states: 

The general policies controlling development in the countryside apply with equal force in Green Belts but there is, in addition, a general presumption against inappropriate development within them. Such development should not be approved except in very special circumstances. Applicants should therefore determine whether their proposal, or any part of it, is within an established Green Belt and if it is, whether their proposal may be inappropriate development within the meaning of Green Belt policy. 

DESNZ’s National Policy Statement for electricity networks infrastructure (EN-5) was published in November 2023. This sets out the Government’s policy on OHL and underground cables. Sections 2.9.11-12 state: 

Landscape and visual benefits may arise through the reconfiguration, rationalisation, or undergrounding of existing electricity network infrastructure. Though mitigation of the landscape and visual impacts arising from overhead lines and their associated infrastructure is usually possible, it may not always be so, and the impossibility of full mitigation in these cases does not countermand the need for overhead lines…However, in nationally designated landscapes (for instance, National Parks, The Broads and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty) even residual impacts may well make an overhead line proposal unacceptable in planning terms. 

Sections 2.9.20-23 state: 

Although it is the government’s position that overhead lines should be the strong starting presumption for electricity networks developments in general, this presumption is reversed when proposed developments will cross part of a nationally designated landscape (i.e. National Park, The Broads, or Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty)… However, undergrounding will not be required where it is infeasible in engineering terms, or where the harm that it causes (see section 2.11.4) is not outweighed by its corresponding landscape, visual amenity and natural beauty benefits…Additionally, cases will arise where – though no part of the proposed development crosses a designated landscape – a high potential for widespread and significant adverse landscape and/or visual impacts along certain sections of its route may result in recommendations to use undergrounding for relevant segments of the line or alternatively consideration of using a route including subsea cabling. 

These documents set out the factors that the Secretary of State should consider in granting development consent, including:

  • The landscape and visual baseline characteristics of the setting of the proposed route. 
  • The additional cost of the proposed underground or subsea alternatives, including their significantly higher lifetime cost of repair and later uprating. 
  • The applicant’s commitment to mitigate the potential detrimental effects of undergrounding works on any relevant agricultural land and soils (including peat soils). 

Overall, OHL is the Government’s strong starting presumption for electricity network infrastructure developments. However, this is reversed in nationally designated landscapes where the strong starting presumption should be that the applicant will underground ‘relevant sections’ of the line. 

The Visual Impact Provision (VIP) is managed by National Grid and administering £465 million of funding from Ofgem to reduce the impact of existing transmission lines in English and Welsh AONBs and National Parks. The National Grid has  assessed 571km of its electricity transmission lines in these protected landscapes to identify which sections have the highest visual impact on their surroundings. Using input from technical experts, local stakeholders, communities and a Stakeholder Advisory Group, 4 individual priority schemes have been selected where replacing the OHL with an underground connection could have a transformative effect on the landscape: (1) Cotswolds, (2) Dorset, (3) Snowdonia, and (4) North Wessex Downs. Alongside this, the VIP project includes the Landscape Enhancement Initiative (LEI) which is a grant scheme which awarded almost £4 million between 2015 and 2021 for localised visual improvement projects. From 2022 National Grid intends to make £11-12 million available over a 5-year period to National Landscapes  and National Parks in England and Wales.  

What are the benefits of undergrounding? Back in 2015 the National Grid published a technical report on undergrounding high voltage electricity transmission lines. This looked at the technical merits and challenges associated with underground lines compared to installing overhead lines. While costs will vary depending upon length, power, voltage, and ground conditions; the operation, maintenance, and energy losses over the life of the connection are broadly the same for undergrounding as for overhead lines. The report found ‘The use of underground cables has a long-term positive visual impact when compared with the use of overhead lines, and in some instances this will be the preferred choice’ (page 8). 

Given the future pipeline for NSIP projects will consist of significant numbers of energy projects coming forward, the Government consulted on an updated suite of energy NPSs. In November 2023, the Government published the consultation response to planning for new energy infrastructure. On the presumption for OHL except in nationally designated landscapes, some environmental organisations commented that this should be expanded to all biodiverse areas, including those adjacent to nationally designated areas. Similarly, a few local government respondents called for the presumption to be expanded to areas of local or historic value. They suggested these areas could equally benefit from the starting presumption and their lack of inclusion risked damaging the local character, biodiversity, and value of these areas. Some members of the public and local authorities expressed concern about the visual impact of OHLs, describing them as ugly and/or a blot on the landscape. Some respondents described: 

  • OHL as being highly damaging to habitats and bird strikes into power lines as being a major killer acknowledged in the national policy statements. 
  • OHL as being less resilient in extreme weather than underground cables or sub-sea grids. 
  • OHL causing significant damage to landscape, archaeology and cultural heritage including the settings of AONB (even when the pylons are outside of the AONB), scheduled monuments and listed buildings. 
  • How forcing pylons upon communities without genuine alternatives is not fair. 

For national landscapes and national parks, the selection criteria for awarding LEI funding takes account of: 

  • The reduction of existing electricity transmission infrastructure on publicly accessible viewpoints, and general visual resource experienced by local communities and/or visitors to the area. 
  • Helping to foster regional and local landscape diversity and distinctiveness (informed by Natural England’s National Character Area profiles).  
  • The other environmental benefits the project will bring – such as protecting or enhancing biodiversity and/or historic features. 
  • The contribution to sustainable social and economic development in the area. 

What are some of the challenges? Underground has other financial, environmental, and socio-economic factors that should also be considered. 

  • Transmission lines intended for open-air use are not suitable for burial underground as they produce heat that cannot dissipate through soil. This means underground lines must be insulated, adding additional expense. Some studies indicate that the cost to install the same length of wire underground can be 10 times more than the equivalent work above-ground. For example, a study from the Institute of Engineering and Technology (IET) and Parsons Brinkerhoff published back in 2012 found OHL was the cheapest transmission technology for any given route length or circuit capacity, with the lifetime cost estimates varying between £2.2m and £4.2m per kilometre. This compares to lifetime cost estimates varying between £10.2m and £24.1m per kilometre for underground cable direct buried; and to £12.9 million to £23.9 million for undergrounding using a deep tunnel. National Grid’s technical report found to match overhead line thermal performance for a 400kV double circuit, as many as 12 separate cables in four separate trenches may be needed if undergrounding, resulting in a work area up to 65 metres wide. 
  • Underground wires have a shorter lifespan than their above-ground counterparts. This is a result of corrosion. Indeed, there are already a limited number of cable manufacturers across the world particularly for cables at the high voltages required by National Grid. 
  • Routine maintenance is more difficult, and service restoration can take longer as it can be harder to pinpoint the exact location of the interruption. 
  • Repairing faults can take longer due to the excavation necessary to make the repair, after which the area must be re-landscaped and restored to its previous state.
  • Environmental impacts result from undergrounding cables – this can pose a threat to sensitive and protected species and habitats and potential damage to archaeological heritage. 

Should more undergrounding take place in rural areas? The Government has not laid down any further rules on the circumstances requiring the use of undergrounding, therefore, the secretary of state must weigh the feasibility, cost, and any harm of the undergrounding against: 

  • The adverse implications of the OHL proposal. 
  • The cost and feasibility of re-routing OHL or mitigation proposals for the relevant line section. 
  • The cost and feasibility of the reconfiguration, rationalisation, and use of underground cabling of proximate existing or proposed electricity networks infrastructure. 

The secretary of state should therefore only grant development consent for underground sections of a proposed line over an overhead alternative if they are satisfied that the benefits accruing from the former proposal clearly outweigh any extra economic, social, or environmental impacts that it presents, the mitigation hierarchy has been followed, and that any technical obstacles associated with it are surmountable. While arguments in favour of undergrounding were seen in response to the Government’s consultation on draft national policy statements for energy infrastructure, the starting presumption remains for OHL with the exception of nationally designated landscapes. 

Where next? The IET and Parsons Brinckerhoff study concluded that ‘no one technology can cover, or is appropriate in, every circumstance, and thus financial cost cannot be used as the only factor in the choice of one technology over another in a given application’. On 22 November 2023, Claire Coutinho, the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero announced a new programme to deliver transformation of the electricity network. This includes plans to halve the time it takes to build new transmission infrastructure, to reduce the time taken for viable projects to connect to the grid, to introduce a community benefits package for communities who host transmission infrastructure, and to run a national communications campaign to improve public understanding of electricity infrastructure and its benefits. The Government is proposing a package whereby local communities will receive around £200,000/km (~£320,000/mile) for overhead lines, £40,000/km (~£60,000/mile) for underground cables, and £200,000 per substation. It will be for the local community to decide in consultation with the developer what projects they would like to support. No specific references were made to undergrounding or to rural communities. How will rural communities be involved in the design, development, and delivery of future electricity infrastructure – and how much undergrounding do we want to see in the countryside? Watch this space. 

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a service that supports older people to maintain their independence; and reviewing neighbourhood-based initiatives (NBI). Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire and is a member of her local Patient Participation Group. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

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