Government

How much capital investment is being made in new (rural) hospitals?

How much capital investment is being made in new (rural) hospitals?

The New Hospital Programme was set up in 2020 to build 40 new hospitals in England by 2030. The Government allocated £3.7 billion in capital funding for this up to March 2025, with more to be provided for the following five years. How has the Programme been implemented so far, and what does it mean for how health care is delivered in the future? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

The NHS in England has around 1,500 hospitals where most emergency and elective care is carried out. In accordance with the Health and Social Care Act 2008 and the NHS Constitution, NHS providers are required to comply with legal requirements to ‘deliver care in a clean, secure and suitable environment that is properly maintained’. 

Back in September 2019, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) published a 5-year plan setting out a programme of investment in health infrastructure, including a new hospital building programme. Known as the Health Infrastructure Plan (HIP), it described how 6 new large hospital builds would be receiving funding to go ahead (aiming to deliver by 2025), 21 more schemes had been given the green light to go to the next stage of developing their plans (with the aim of being ready to deliver between 2025 and 2030), and how there would be opportunities for other schemes to bid for funding in the future. The HIP focused on 3 areas to make NHS infrastructure fit for the future: 

  1. A new 5-year rolling programme of investment in NHS infrastructure – including waves of investment in new infrastructure and multi-year capital settlements to provide greater certainty to plan effectively and get better value for money. 
  2. A reformed system underpinning capital to ensure funding addresses need – ensuring funding reaches the frontline when and where it is needed, with national infrastructure to support this. 
  3. Strengthening capital funding in wider health and care sectors which support the NHS. 

In July 2020, the Public Accounts Committee (PCA) published a report on NHS capital expenditure and financial management. This highlighted how some NHS trusts had been using their capital budgets to sustain day-to-day services, estimating that they had a backlog of maintenance costs of £6.5 billion to restore their estates to an appropriate standard, of which £1.1 billion was high-risk, indicating an increased risk of harm to patients. The Committee called on the DHSC and NHS England to identify a capital strategy to support the NHS Long Term Plan, including expectations on how backlog maintenance costs would be addressed. 

In line with the HIP, in October 2020 the then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, confirmed funding to rebuild 40 hospitals, with a further 8 schemes invited to bid for future funding, leading to the expected delivery of 48 hospitals by 2030. 

“The dedication and tireless efforts of our nurses, doctors and all healthcare workers have kept the NHS open throughout this pandemic. But no matter what this virus throws at us, we are determined to build back better and deliver the biggest hospital building programme in a generation. From Morpeth to Milton Keynes, we are building 40 new hospitals across England to level up our NHS so more people have top-class healthcare services in their local area”, Boris Johnson, 2 October 2020. 

Alongside a £3.7 billion capital investment, the Prime Minister also announced the development of work to standardise the design of new hospitals including making use of modern construction methods to speed up builds. 

Figures from 2021-2022 highlighted how 43% of the NHS estate had been built before 1985, and that the maintenance backlog at the time had reached some £10.2 billion. Seven hospitals were also found to be structurally unsound and in need of urgent replacement because of the use of reinforced autoclaved aerated concrete (RAAC). Surveys also found a further 41 buildings at 23 hospital trusts to contain the material.     

In 2020 the DHSC set up a New Hospital Programme (NHP) to deliver the Government’s commitment to the NHS estate.  The NHP was tasked with contracting and improving efficiency, quality, and standardisation in hospital construction. The NHP intended to allocate the 48 schemes across 5 cohorts: 

  • Cohort 1 – 1 new hospital (Dyson Cancer Centre in Bath) and completion of 7 schemes under construction or pending full approval prior to the NHP. 
  • Cohort 2 – 10 schemes entering construction up to 2024-2025, of which 9 were new hospitals and 1 a pre-existing scheme.  
  • Cohort 3 – 8 schemes for most or entire construction from 2025-2026 onwards. 
  • Cohort 4 – 14 schemes for construction from 2025-2026 onwards. 
  • Cohort 5 – 8 further schemes not yet selected to be constructed in the late 2020s.  

What progress has been made by the NHP since 2020, how might the Programme operate to 2030, and what might this mean for rural communities?  

How has the NHP been implemented to date? In July 2023, the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report examining whether NHP was being managed in a way that is likely to achieve value for money. The report covered the need for new hospitals, the progress made by the NHP between 2020 and 2023, and the issues, risks and opportunities for the NHP going forward.  

  • Initial funding and selecting schemes for the NHP: the NAO found Government had only allocated capital funding up to 2024-2025 and had not made funding and scoping decisions about later cohorts because the DHSC had not yet developed a new centralised, standardised approach to build them. This has resulted in uncertainty for schemes in cohorts 3, 4 and 5. After the DHSC received less funding than it assessed it needed for the NHP’s first 4-years, the DHSC decided to start with smaller schemes first and leave most construction for the final 6-years. The NAO found this increased the risk that in later years many schemes would need to be under construction at once, meaning it could be harder to find construction companies willing or able to build them at a good price. The NAO found the DHSC was not able to fully document the process it had used for selecting the 32 schemes that were announced in October 2020. Officials told the NAO that the final selection of schemes involved choices and judgements for which no further documentation was available. The NAO found that the DHSC had adopted a board definition of ‘new hospital’ encompassing completely new hospitals, complete rebuilds of existing hospitals, major new buildings at existing sites and major refurbishments of existing hospital buildings. Excluding the 8 pre-existing schemes in the NHP, the NAO estimates that of the remaining 32 schemes 11 represented new hospitals and 20 others elements of the DHSC’s definition. 
  • Progress with cohorts 1 and 2: the NAO found in its first 3-years, the NHP had made slow progress constructing hospitals in cohorts 1 and 2. By June 2023, 3 of the 8 schemes in cohort 1 had part-opened against an expectation of 5. The other 5 schemes in cohort 1 had been delayed between 1 month and 16 months. As of May 2023, none of the 10 schemes in cohort 2 had entered construction, though some pre-construction site works valued at £11 million had commenced. The NHP attributed these delays to the approval of individual business cases. The NAO found forecast costs for schemes in cohorts 1 and 2 had increased by 41% between 2020 and 2023. The causes of the cost increases have been ascribed to higher-than-expected inflation and an under-estimation of costs by some NHS Trusts. Where these costs fall in the period up to 2024-2025 they must be meet from the NHP’s existing £3.7 billion capital funding. 
  • Progress with cohorts 3, 4 and 5: the NHP has been planning for schemes in later cohorts to use standardised hospital design and modern methods of construction to reduce costs and timescales and to improve the quality of new hospitals. Estimates suggest this will lead hospital construction to be 25% cheaper and 20% quicker compared to traditional approaches. The NHP’s central team has been working on a standardised design, known as ‘Hospital 2.0’, since 2021 and has assessed that it will take until May 2024 to complete this task. Until Hospital 2.0 is complete there are limits to the NHP’s ability to progress with planning schemes in cohort 3 and later. The NAO’s review of the minimum viable product (MVP) of Hospital 2.0 suggests it may result in smaller hospitals with lower initial building costs and lower running costs than other potential specifications. This may result in hospitals that are not big enough for future needs. The NAO also flagged bed occupancy data in suggesting that running hospitals very full in the future would reduce the amount of spare capacity for coping with normal variations in demand, unexpected shocks, and health crises. The NHP had only identified 4 contractors able to consider building a complex, large, new hospital leading to further concerns about their demands and capacity to deliver the Hospital 2.0 pipeline. 
  • The NHP team’s capacity and skills: the NAO found the NHP had experienced difficulties staffing its team and had depended more than it had wanted to on consultancy services. By February 2023 the NHP team had filled 361 posts but the remaining 165 posts were still vacant. Of the 361 posts that had been filled, 30% were with permanent employees and 62% through consultancy services. Between April 2021 and March 2023, the NHP used £70 million of its £89 million resource expenditure on consultancy services. The NHP is estimating £842 million of consultancy spend between 2023-2024 and 2030-2031. The NAO highlighted the risk of a lack of continuity and loss of knowledge on a long-term programme. 
  • Agreeing funding for the NHP: during 2022 it was not possible to set an indicative budget for later years because of issues with the scope of the programme, delivery capacity and the programme plan. In March 2023 HM Treasury agreed a funding envelope, indicating that spend on new hospitals between 2025-2026 and 2030-2031 would be £18.5 billion.  

The Government’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) has been monitoring NHP delivery. Over the last 3-years it has categorised this delivery between amber (where successful delivery appears feasible but significant issues exist) through to red (where successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable). The NAO has indicated that 2023-2024 is a critical period ‘during which the NHP needs to consolidate its scope, timetable, funding and approach to construction’ (page 16).    

In July 2022, NHS Providers published the findings of a survey it had carried out into trusts’ experiences and progress to date with the NHP. Representatives from 26 out of the 35 Trusts engaged in the NHP responded. On funding: 96% of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ and 19% ‘agreed’ that the Government should confirm the funding envelope beyond 2024-2025. Half of all the trusts that responded were ‘not confident’ or ‘not at all confident’ that their funding allocation would be sufficient to deliver their project. On delays: completion dates were behind schedule for 39% of schemes in the trusts surveyed – and all reported that costs would increase because of the delay. 62% of respondents said the delays somewhat affected their ability to deliver safe and effective patient care. 

In November 2022, the NHS Confederation cited 4 reasons why NHS capital investment had fallen behind the times. Firstly, successive Governments have failed to invest enough in capital. Secondly, the impact of inflation, which has hit the construction industry particularly hard. Thirdly, a reduction in the amount of capital investment per worker by 17% between 2010-2011 and 2017-2018. Fourthly, accessing capital remains difficult, and the business case sign-off process is opaque. In a survey of its members in June 2022, 9 out of 10 respondents said their efforts to reduce the size of their waiting lists was being hindered by a lack of investment in buildings and estate. More recently, in its response to the NAO’s report, Matthew Taylor, chief executive of the NHS Confederation described how “members will be concerned by the delays to many part of the New Hospitals Programme…especially as some trusts are having to find additional money to tackle ongoing maintenance issues such as new roofs, when they were led to believe they would be moving to a new site or given funds to build something new…a comprehensive and long-term capital investment plan is needed, and work needs to start ahead of what is likely to be another tough winter for the NHS”.    

How will the NHP be delivered to 2030? On 25 May 2023, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care announced a reset of the NHP. The reset includes: 

  • Rebuilding all 7 RAAC hospitals by 2030, 5 more than the DHSC included in the original programme back in 2020. Building works on the first hospital site are planned from 2025. 
  • The completion of 8 cohort four schemes will be delayed until the 2030s when they will form part of a new 5-year rolling programme of planned hospital upgrades. 
  • Plans for 8 new hospitals to come forward and form cohort 5 have been replaced by the 5 additional RAAC hospitals.
  • HM Treasury has indicated that capital funding between 2025-2026 and 2030-2031 will be up to £18.5 billion (subject to future spending reviews). 
  • Government has given approval to the NHP to build all of the hospitals from cohort 3 onwards. This is less than the NHP requested in its business case and it will be developing a further business case to find more savings. 

In addition, three mental health schemes in Surrey and Borders NHS Foundation Trust, Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, and Mersey Care Foundation Trust will be delivered. While these hospitals are not part of the NHP, they do meet the DHSC’s definition of a new hospital and part of a commitment to eradicate dormitory accommodation from mental health facilities across the country and put mental health on equal footing to physical health.  

In the longer term, the DHSC says it recognises the need for continuous investment in healthcare infrastructure. It intends for the NHP to become part of a rolling programme of investment in new health capital infrastructure to deliver new hospitals up to 2030 and beyond. 

Following the NAO’s report, the Public Accounts Commitment launched an inquiry to examine national programme management, support for and challenges to local projects within the NHP, progress compared with expectations, and the management of programme-level risks.  The Committee accepted written evidence up to 25 August and held an oral evidence session on 7 September.  While recognising the need to prioritise the eradication of RAAC from the NHS estate, in the evidence it submitted, NHS Providers flagged that each of the 100 trusts who had applied for the final 8 places on the NHP are still in need of vital capital investment. NHS Providers also highlighted a lack of parity in funding in overlooking the capital needs of mental health, ambulance, and community trusts.  In its evidence the NHS Confederation argued that the NHP should not be considered in isolation, but part of a wider dialogue on infrastructure and digital. They highlighted the knock-on effect of underinvestment in capital on workforce productivity, staff vacancies and patients on waiting lists for treatment. They argue there has been a tendency to provide short-term funding stipulated for specific projects which does not reflect the wider reality of the challenges the NHS is currently facing and that a systems wide approach is needed.  

What does the NHP mean for rural areas? The evidence suggests that up-to-date facilities and equipment can lead to improvements in the recruitment and retention of health care staff, patient safety, and the development of existing and new services. 

On an annual basis all NHS Trusts, including Ambulance Trusts, submit an estates return to NHS Digital [known as ERIC]. This contains information relating to the costs of providing and maintaining the NHS estate, including buildings, maintaining and equipping hospitals, the provision of services (e.g. laundry, food), and utilities. This shows, for the period 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2022: 

  • The total costs of running the NHS estate were £11.1 billion – this is an 8% increase since 2020-2021. 
  • The total cost to eradicate backlog maintenance was £10.2 billion – this is an increase of 11% since 2020-2021. 

While the data reports for ERIC provide a breakdown per Trust of capital investment for new build, capital investment for changing/improving existing buildings and capital investment for maintaining existing buildings, this information is not collated to show rural level data within or across Trusts. However, the site level data for each Trust does contain postcode data so it may be possible, for existing sites, to see if/how the quality of the buildings, age profile and safety varies in rural areas. 

Back in 2019, the National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC) commissioned the Nuffield Trust to explore the impact of rurality and sparsity on the costs of delivering health care. The review looked at the key factors for calculating health allocations to local areas: with adjustments in funding made for population need, unmet need/inequalities, costs and financial stability. The key determinant here is population and demographic needs within a given area. A further adjustment is made for the higher costs of running hospitals with 24-hour A&E departments in remote areas. Funding from what was then Clinical Commissioning Groups to rural areas made adjustments for (i) the extra cost of ambulance provision and (ii) an allowance for remoteness. However, these two factors are outweighed by a further two factors (iii) market forces and (iv) health inequalities. The impact of iii and iv sees the total budget for core services move around £600 million of funding from predominantly rural areas to urban and less rural areas. 

Nuffield’s analysis revealed how six rural hospital trusts were carrying a quarter of England’s health service’s funding deficit. Furthermore, data provided to the Nuffield Trust by then NHS Improvement suggested that, to November 2018, 17 trusts had applied for local modifications. Of these applications, the majority (11 applications) were for rurality (or sparsity/economies of scale); with the remainder consisting of rationale relating to case-mix complications (2), Private Finance Initiatives or estates (2), A&E services (2), and clinical negligence scheme costs (1). Only one trust, Morecambe Bay, had been successful in its request for formal compensation for higher costs due to rurality. This analysis suggests that the way the NHS allocates and distributes funding does not fully compensate remote and rural areas for the extra costs they face.  

The NHS Long Term Plan commits to developing a ‘standard model of delivery in smaller acute hospitals who serve rural populations. Smaller hospitals have significant challenges around a number of areas’ (page 23). The Government publishes a map and a list of projects where hospital builds, hospital upgrades and investments in equipment and technology are being made. Similarly, a map of the location of the NHP by cohorts was produced (page 27). While the displays show national and regional distribution, to what extent each of these new investments is taking place in a rural area and/or to what extent rural patients will benefit is not shown. It is also unclear to what extent the NHP has been rural proofed.   

The Parliamentary Inquiry into Rural Health and Care identified five distinctive health and care needs in rural communities based on the evidence given by witnesses: 

  1. Ageing population: rural areas have a disproportionate number of older people leading to higher levels of demand. 
  2. Mental health: isolation and loneliness can heighten mental health issues in rural areas and there is limited data available on rural mental health. 
  3. Distance from services: people in rural areas need to travel further to access treatment and often have less access to specialist provision and to emergency services. 
  4. Housing: the cost of housing, prevalence of older properties, fuel poverty and older populations living alone can increase the vulnerability of poor health and chronic illness. 
  5. Cultural and attitudinal differences: rural patients often seek medical help later; and rural poverty and deprivation is linked to a lack of confidence and aspiration. 

The Inquiry highlighted examples of how investment in smaller rural buildings is not as attractive to funders who prefer larger scale urban estates. 

In a short debate on Healthcare in Rural Areas in the House of Lords on 23 February 2023, Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle highlighted how “We see repeated attacks on the whole concept of community hospitals, and we have seen cutbacks and further cutbacks, but there needs to be a vision for such hospitals—that is, a strategy of how they can best be used for local people and the local healthcare system, taking medium acuity patients to relieve some of the enormous pressures that the acute hospitals are experiencing and, of course, making sure that people can visit patients and that patients can remain in and be part of their communities”.

We do not know enough about the current and future health care needs of rural communities – and the people, physical and digital infrastructure required to meet these needs.  

The NHS is one of the largest landowners in England. While the main function of the NHS is to provide health services, NHS bodies are also anchor institutions, in that they play an active role in supporting local communities and other organisations to address the physical, social and environmental factors that can cause ill health. According to NHS providers, this role is more pertinent in a rural community where there are few other public service institutions and key employers playing a similar role. NHS England has developed guidance for estates and facilities managers on the 10 Building Blocks for Building for Health – this document also references the role of the NHS in facilitating economic development and regeneration in rural areas.  At the same time, the NHP’s work suggests there will be ‘model of care shift’ where patient care will increasingly shift out of hospitals and into adult social care, outpatient services, community care and digital healthcare. Within and outside of the NHP, is there a strategy and funding to support the delivery of this shift – and the increased costs of providing these services in rural areas?  

10% of the NHS estate is owned by NHS Property Services. Alongside the formation of Integrated Care Systems (ICS) they have been developing community spaces for social prescribing programmes. A report from The Health Creation Alliance for NHS Property Services back in October 2022 aimed to get a better understanding of what matters to ten different communities, both in terms of the kinds of spaces that support wellbeing and the processes involved in making them available. The report included a case study of people from rural communities. This identified 7 themes that matter to rural residents in overcoming physical, social and economic isolation:  

  1. Transport is frustrating. 
  2. Physical meetings are preferable to digital ones. 
  3. Become problem solvers. 
  4. Create an environment of comfort and warmth. 
  5. Be opening and welcoming. 
  6. Harness the whole community for longevity. 
  7. Work with partners to develop a sense of shared ownership. 

By connecting and using the community, community organisations and partners as resources, the authors of the report suggests some of these barriers can be overcome and opportunities harnessed. 

Where next?The NHP was launched at time when the hospital estate had experienced a period of underinvestment and had a maintenance backlog. Over the last 3-years the NHP has struggled with funding, staffing, and developing a standard approach to construction.Following the recent reset of the NHP, the NAO estimates that the DHSC’s plan will lead to 32 hospitals by 2030 according to the definition it used in 2020; with another 8 hospitals following after 2030. Some schemes publicly announced back in 2020 may now face delays, inevitably having implications for NHS staff and patients. However, the Government believes it is on track to deliver its commitment to build 40 new hospitals in England by 2030. While it is admirable to want to build new hospitals, a much broader discussion is needed about capital investment in the NHS, adult social care and community estates. For while big can be beautiful, we owe it to our rural communities to develop health and care provision that matches their needs both now and in the future.  

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Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating hospital discharge and hospital avoidance schemes, and a service that supports older people to maintain their independence. Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

Do we need a new framework for managing land?

Do we need a new framework for managing land?

While land is one of our greatest assets, it is a finite resource. A number of commentators have suggested a land use framework would help tackle increasing pressures on land. It is also seen as a way of giving local communities and landowners greater security in making long-term decisions about land. But there are also concerns that a land use framework would have unintended consequences, such as placing limitations on land use. With Defra due to publish a Land Use Framework in 2023; how can we make better use of land, and what does a good land use framework look like? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Back in 2010 the Government Office for Science published a report on ‘Land Use Futures: Making the most of land in the 21st century’. This followed a 2-year Foresight project on the future of land use in the UK. This independent study looked at how land is used and managed, the benefits it delivers, and the impact of change. If a land system is to deliver best value for the country in a sustainable way, the project team suggested that we need to estimate the value of land in alternative possible users (including for future generations). With conflicting needs of individual households, communities, regions and the country as a whole, they argued it is important to ensure that economic and regulatory mechanisms are in place to deliver best value. The authors identified an important issue around whether a central body would be necessary to oversee all aspects of land use policy and implementation, or whether a decentralised approach would be sufficient.  

[This project] demonstrates that there is a strong case to develop a much more strategic approach: to guide incremental land use change, incentivise sustainable behaviours, and to unlock value from land…a reappraisal is vital to help address major challenges ahead – for example, relating to demographic shifts, climate change, and rising demand for commercial and residential development…The challenge…is to deliver a wider range of sustainable benefits from land. In particular, a more coherent and consistent approach is needed for managing growing demands on land – at different levels of Government, and across the wider community of stakeholders involved in the many land use sectors (page 9)…The essential requirement is that sufficient oversight should be established so that greater coherence and consistency is achieved’ (page 35).  

More recently, in 2019, a report published by the House of Lords Rural Economy Committee called on the Government to develop a ‘spatial plan’ for land use in England, describing how this would “help ensure that the right type of development is brought forward in the right places, enabling sustainable and growing rural economies and communities. Government must carefully consider how such a plan may be developed at a local and regional level, focusing on how groups of local authorities may be encouraged or required to work together to develop and implement the plans” (page 171).   

In 2021, the National Food Strategy proposed a rural land use framework. This called on Defra to work with Local Nature Recovery Networks to prepare a National Rural Land Map. Such a map would show the productivity of agricultural land, priority areas for the environment, and areas where there are significant levels of pollution. It would also display information from the England Tree Strategy, England Peat Action Plan and Local Nature Recovery Strategies. 

In June 2022 Defra published the Government’s food strategy. This contained a commitment to ‘publish a land use framework in 2023 to ensure we meet our net zero and biodiversity targets, and help our farmers adapt to a changing climate, whilst continuing to produce high quality, affordable produce that supports a healthier diet’. 

In December 2022, the House of Lords Land Use Committee published its report ‘Making the most out of England’s land’. The Committee highlighted a number of issues standing in the way of making the best decisions on land use: from siloed working and conflicting priorities, through to policy uncertainty and lack of coordination between different tiers of Government. The Committee recommended that a Land Use Commission be created and be tasked with producing a land use framework – which should consider several factors including food, nature, housing needs and net zero. The Committee’s Chair described how “Throughout this inquiry we repeatedly heard evidence that showcased the need for guidance and clarity in the form of an overarching framework to assist farmers, landowners and land managers to make the most effective use of their land”. The Government responded to the Committee’s report in April 2023. It said it “disagree[d] with the proposal for a separate Land Use Commission. However, we agree that the framework must take a wide range of land uses into account and that it may be necessary to assemble a group of experts to oversee the application of the Land Use Framework once published. We agree that a land use framework should reflect existing planning frameworks and guidance, and that regional and local priorities must be taken into account when making any recommendations on national priorities. We are clear though that we do not intend to prescribe either land sharing or sparing, nor to determine at a national level where individual activities or uses should or should not be occurring. Our focus is on supporting the delivery of resilient, multifunctional landscapes which will be dependent on the local context and needs”.  

In May 2023 the Geospatial Commission published a report recommending the establishment of a new Land Use Analysis Taskforce. This would bring together ‘cutting edge data’ and ‘scientific expertise’ to support land use decision-making. 

In June 2023, Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle submitted a written question to Defra asking ‘whether the forthcoming national land use framework will balance the competing demands for agriculture, development, energy, and infrastructure in a way that actively promotes the installation of solar panels on suitable brownfield land and rooftops’? In his response, Lord Benyon described how “Striking the right balance between different land uses is a challenging task, which will involve trade-offs. There are many uses of our land that we need to anticipate for the future: growing food, planting trees, building homes, natural habitats, energy, land for infrastructure, and leisure and recreation. The Land Use Framework for England, to be published this year, will help to inform how we manage trade-offs and maximise co-benefits on the land, thereby supporting the delivery of multifunctional landscapes that will be dependent on the local context and national needs”.   

What is a Land Use Framework, do we need one in England, and what does a good framework look like? 

What is a Land Use Framework? According to the Food, Farming & Countryside Commission (FFCC) it is ‘an approach to managing land use decisions that mediates competing pressures and encourages multifunctionality, enabling land to provide multiple benefits for public value. It consists of  a set of agreed principles and practices for local and national organisations, businesses and communities, guiding transparent, inclusive, evidence-led decision-making’. 

In academic circles, it is framed around understanding the inputs, system-level impacts, and trade-offs between different land uses. Approaches to do this have focused on understanding land intensity, Land Use Functions (LUF), and/or Land Use Transition (LUT). Similarly, there have been calls to address the issues associated with changing land uses in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary ways.

In policy circles, a land use framework sets out principals and responsibilities that take account of relevant legislation and/or professional standards. This often involves a mix of stakeholders (individuals and organisations), has a spatial and/or organisational context, and sets out what is (or should be) happening or expected to happen. 

England already has a number of land use governance and frameworks in place. Some examples include: 

  • National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF): this sets out the Government’s planning policies for England and provides a framework within which locally prepared plans for housing and other development can be produced, as well as setting guidelines for conserving and enhancing landscapes such as National Parks.
  • National Policy Statements: these set out the Government’s objectives for the development of nationally significant infrastructure projects.
  • Local Plans: Developed by local planning authorities, these set out the vision, growth strategy and strategic policies for a local area.
  • Local Nature Recovery Strategies (LNRS): an emerging system of spatial strategies that will establish priorities and map proposals for specific actions to drive nature’s recovery and provide wider environmental benefits.
  • Environmental Land Management scheme (ELMs): agricultural policy reforms designed for England’s countryside and environment. 

In February 2023 the Royal Society published a report analysing the Government’s policies and targets relating to land use. It found, if existing land-based policy commitments were added together, the UK’s land risks being ‘overpromised’. By 2030, up to 1.4 Mha of additional land [equivalent to the size of Northern Ireland] could be needed to meet current policy targets for net zero and biodiversity, if current agricultural production, diets, and food waste remain static. This rises to 4.4 Mha by 2050: over twice the land area of Wales and 18% of total UK land area. The report contains figures to highlight the increasing pressure on the UK’s land over time and emphasises the importance of a multifunctional framework to maximise synergies and minimise  trade-offs; and of ‘joining up policy development across all departments of government within a land use framework informed by a comprehensive and continually improving evidence base’.  

Does England need a Land Use Framework? Land is fundamental for how we live our lives and recognising land use pressures is increasingly seen as a cross-cutting national challenge. Other UK nations have a range of land use policies and mechanisms in place. The Scottish Government, for example, published its land use strategy in March 2021 – setting out a long-term vision for sustainable land use, its objectives and key policies for delivery. In Scotland, a land use strategy must be produced every five years, with the first such strategy published in 2011. The strategy references Scotland’s National Planning Framework (NPF), which it sees as a platform to take forward conversations about sustainable land use.

In February 2021, the Welsh Government published its National Plan for Wales. The Welsh Government described the document as a ‘development plan’ with a strategy for addressing key national priorities through the planning system, including sustaining and developing a vibrant economy, achieving decarbonisation and climate-resilience, developing strong ecosystems and improving the health and well-being of our communities’. It sets out the Welsh Government’s land use priorities and provides a national land use framework for strategic development plans (SDPs) and local development plans (LDPs). 

In Northern Ireland, the Department for Infrastructure is responsible for the review, monitoring and implementation of the Regional Development Strategy (RDS). The RDS is viewed as a long-term plan for delivering the spatial aspects of the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Programme for Government. This includes addressing the economic, social and environmental issues aimed at achieving sustainable development and social cohesion. It therefore offers a framework which provides the strategic context for where development should happen. 

Increasingly, the UK Government is taking a systems-thinking approach to developing land use policy – with examples including tools that identify and track risks across the net zero portfolio.  The forthcoming Land Use Framework for England is intended ‘to ensure food security is balanced alongside climate and environment outcomes’. 

In its response to the Government’s Environmental Improvement Plan (EIP), the NFU confirmed it shares the Government’s environmental ambitions alongside equally ambitious plans for food production to protect and enhance the UK’s food security. The NFU is calling on the Land Use Framework to recognise the need for the countryside to remain a functional, dynamic space – indicating how greater access to data on land capability will be needed to inform business decisions and maximise land use efficiency.   

Some commentators argue that a Land Use Framework is not needed, or that it may lead to unintended consequences in England. In December 2022, for example, the Country Land and Business Association (CLA) highlighted how ‘if it [the Framework] were to go as far as identifying land parcels it could result in zoning and limitations on land use that could stifle both farming and environmental innovation. It could also be used to prevent rural development and business diversification. Instead, the development of Local Nature Recovery Strategies (LNRSs) will bring data together in a consistent and transparent way’. Combined with meaningful engagement with land holders and local communities, the CLA views LNRSs as a more effective route to bring data together, achieve local buy-in and motivation to deliver than a land use framework.   

What does a good Framework look like? Green Alliance has suggested that given over 70% of the UK’s land surface is farmed, while an ideal framework would cover all conceivable land uses, it should focus on the largest changes first in noting that 2.5% of rural land needs to be converted to native habitat or agroecologically managed farmland to achieve UK nature and climate goals at the least cost. According to Green Alliance the framework and related policy should do five things: 

  1. Map food production in England, showing where farmland is more or less productive. 
  2. Map the potential for land in England to store carbon and support nature through habitat creation and agroecology. Comparing this with the food production map (1) to explore changes and trade-offs. 
  3. Set out the  scale of land use change needed between now and 2050, and the land best suited to delivering environmental goals. 
  4. Explore different pathways for delivering this and the costs of doing so. 
  5. Outline how the target agreed at the COP15 UN biodiversity conference to protect 30% of land for nature by 2030 will be met. 

According to the Foresight project on making the most of land, the essential components of a framework should include: 

  • Establishing and cascading UK-wide land use objectives and priorities – aspirational or mandatory. 
  • Ensuring clarity on decision making at national, regional and local levels. 
  • Ensuring decision making is integrated and evidence-based. 
  • Facilitating the collection and dissemination of better date and information. 
  • Ensuring appropriate incentives to guide decisions on land use. 
  • Promoting decisions and policies that are robust in the face of changing circumstances and future uncertainty. 
  • Promoting opportunities for multifunctional land uses and collaboration amongst potential beneficiaries. 
  • Periodic review of outcomes against national and local objectives. 
  • Evaluating the robustness of new policies and interventions against  future uncertainties. 

The Royal Society has been exploring how science can be used to better manage land. In February 2023, the Society published its long-term vision for managing the UK’s land. This includes work around multifunctional landscape analysis – metrics that can be used to assess all the different products and services provided by the land, and that take into account the context within which a service is being measured. This is part of attempts to analyse the trade-offs and synergies between different land uses. The report also includes a recommendation that UK countries should develop and coordinate spatially explicit national land use frameworks to ensure coherence between national and local scales.  

Views vary about the scale or boundary of a land use framework, how it could be used to inform decision making, and how such an approach would be governed, delivered, funded and monitored.  

What does it mean for rural areas? FFCC has worked with Devon and Cambridgeshire to see how different components of a land use framework could be implemented at a county level. In Devon, the approach has been ‘data up’, with in-depth analysis of sub areas and catchments. In Cambridgeshire, the approach has been ‘whole county’, with a layered map approach trialled. In March 2023, FFCC published some initial lessons from the pilots, covering five key areas. 

  1. Scope and scale: a land use framework can be a helpful way of empowering and enabling local leadership to address issues across silos and deliver positive change. 
  2. Leadership: counties and/or Combined Authorities seem to be the right level to integrate national and local considerations. 
  3. Data: a lot of data exists already and the emphasis should be on using this to inform decision making – the process of bringing together data is valuable in considering strategic land use issues. 
  4. Communities: the mechanisms that currently exist for communities to influence land use change largely involve blocking or slowing development. There is an opportunity to bring citizens together to generate a positive vision for their area that goes beyond just the built environment. 
  5. Landowners: their ability to take a long-term view of the issues beyond political cycles is useful.   

FFCC aims to take the learning from the pilots to inform the development of a Land Use Framework for England. In the meantime, Devon County Council has committed to developing a land use framework to inform their food and carbon strategies. In Cambridgeshire, a prototype data decision-support tool is being developed. Pilots have also been taking place in Newcastle and Northern Ireland. Findings from all of the pilots will be shared from autumn 2023. 

Where next? In the words of Mark Twain, ‘buy land, they’re not making it anymore’.Our relationship to land is pivotal, connecting us to nature, culture; it shapes who we are and who we might become. Yet land is a finite resource and much is at stake for rural communities: how are we going to grapple with deciding what land provides now, and in the future; and will Defra’s Land Use Framework for England help us? Watch this space.   …………………………………………………………………………………………………

Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating hospital discharge and hospital avoidance schemes, and a service that supports older people to maintain their independence. Jessica also sits on the board of a charity supporting  rural communities across Cambridgeshire. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

In the borderlands of transatlantic security – where next?

In the borderlands of transatlantic security – where next?

Security in our daily lives is key to our wellbeing. NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. Over more than 70 years NATO has grown to an alliance of 31 members. The recent NATO Summit in Vilnius has been hailed as an historic moment for the future of Europe and the North Atlantic area. What is NATO, what does it do, and what role does it play in rural areas? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

What is NATO? The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. The treaty created an alliance of 10 European and 2 North American states: UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States. It was formed to ensure their collective security and preservation and intended to counter the perceived threat from the then Soviet Union. 

Since then, 19 more countries have joined NATO through 9 rounds of enlargement (in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2017, 2020 and 2023) leading to 31 members. The treaty itself is short – containing just 14 articles. These commit members to share the risk, responsibilities and benefits of collective defence. Article 5 states that an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against them all. It commits allies to assist the party or parties attacked “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”. Article 6 sets out the geographical boundaries of NATO – currently Europe and North America and in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. Article 5 was involved for the first time the day after the 11 September 2001 attacks in America. This saw NATO actively engage in the fight against terrorism, and launch its first operations out the Euro-Atlantic area.  

The articles embody a set of values around individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. They also require members not to enter into any international commitments that conflict with the treaty and that they commit to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). The treaty provides the structure which enables the goals of NATO to be implemented – although some accession protocols have been added as new members have joined, very little has changed.    

What is NATO’s Strategic Concept? This is the official statement of NATO’s values and purpose and its fundamental tasks and roles. Alongside the treaty, the Strategic Concept is viewed as an important document. 

The concept provides an assessment of the international security environment, and the Alliance’s approach to addressing the issues and challenges that it faces. At its summit in Madrid in June 2022, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept. This reaffirms NATO’s key purpose in ensuring collective defence, based on a 360-degree approach. It defines the Alliance’s three core tasks: (i) deterrence and defence, (ii) crisis prevention and management, and (iii) cooperative security. The Strategic Concept emphasises that ensuring national and collective resilience is critical to all of these core tasks and underpins NATO’s efforts to safeguard nations, societies and shared values. It further emphasises the importance of investing in technological innovation and integrating climate change, human security, and the women, peace and security agenda across these core tasks. A vision is set out in the Strategic Concept: “we want to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respective and where each country can choose its own path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion. We work with all who share these goals. We stand together, as Allies, to defend our freedom and contribute to a more peaceful world” (page 3). 

How do countries join NATO – and can they leave? Greece and Turkey were the first to join the founding 12 members in 1952, followed by Germany in 1955. Spain joined in 1982. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland subsequently became members in 1999. 2004 saw the accession of 7 countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, followed by Montenegro in 2017 and the Republic of North Macedonia in 2020. Finland became the latest member, joining in April 2023. 

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty sets out how countries can join the Alliance. This states that NATO membership is open to “any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”. Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s political decision-making body, on the basis of consensus among all Allies. 

The accession process involves seven steps: 

  1. Accession talks confirm the invited countries willingness and ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership. 
  2. The aspiring country’s foreign minister sends a letter of intent to the NATO Secretary General formally accepting the obligations and commitments of membership, and a timetable for the completion of any require reforms (where applicable). 
  3. An Accession Protocol is signed by all NATO members. 
  4. The Protocol is then ratified by each individual member. 
  5. Once all member countries have notified the US Government [the depositary of the treaty] of their acceptance, the Secretary General then invites the potential new member to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
  6. The invited country accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures. 
  7. Upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US Government, the invited country formally becomes a member of NATO. 

In practice, the accession process can often take several years. Bosnia and Herzegovina is participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). This was launched in 1999 to help aspiring countries prepare for future membership. A map is prepared with each prospective county looking at their political, legal, military, defence and security aspects and identifies any areas in need of reform. Notwithstanding this, Finland submitted its letter to join NATO on 18 May 2022 and it deposited its instrument of accession on 4 April 2023. Sweden is expected to become the 32nd Member once Turkey has ratified the Accession Protocol for Sweden.     

Article 13 of the treaty gives Allies the right to leave NATO should they wish to do so: “any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given”. So far, no country has left NATO. However, in 1966, France decided to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military structure (returning again in 2009) but it remained a member of NATO.  

How is NATO run? Major decisions are approved by heads of governments and at state summits that take place every 1-2 years. In between summits, the foreign and defence ministers of Allies meet regularly. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body at NATO and each member country has a seat on the Council. It normally meets weekly and is chaired by the Secretary General.  The top military post within NATO is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).  

In 1955 NATO formed the Parliamentary Assembly. On 18 July 1955, 158 parliamentarians from 14 NATO nations attended a six-day ‘Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries’ meeting in Paris. In 1966 delegates agreed to rename the organisation the ‘North Atlantic Assembly’. In 1999 it was renamed again to ‘NATO Parliamentary Assembly’ (PA). 

The NATO PA provides a forum for parliamentarians from NATO Member States to promote debate on key security challenges, facilitate mutual understanding, and support national parliamentary oversight of defence matters. It is seen as a platform for strengthening the transatlantic relationship and the values which underpin the Alliance. The PA is institutionally separate from NATO, but it serves as an essential link between NATO and the parliaments of NATO nations. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the Assembly has assumed a new role by integrating into its work parliamentarians from countries seeking a closer association with NATO. Through this form of parliamentary diplomacy, the Assembly contributes to mutual understanding and to the strengthening of parliamentary democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, thereby complementing and reinforcing NATO’s own programme of partnership and cooperation.

The NATO PA consists of 274 delegates from the 31 NATO Member States. Each delegation is based on the country’s size and the UK has 18 seats in the Assembly. The whole Assembly meets twice a year: in the spring and in the autumn. It has a Standing Committee comprising the head of each member delegation, the President and Vice President of NATO PA, the Treasurer and the Secretary General. The Assembly also has five committees: (i) democracy and security, (ii) defence and security, (iii) economics and security, (iv) political, and (v) science and technology. They are supported by sub-committees which can explore policy issues in more detail. The Secretary General leads the International Secretariat, and is responsible for all of the Assembly’s administration, research and analysis. 

How is NATO funded? NATO is resourced through the direct and indirect contributions of its members. Direct contributions are made to collective budgets and programmes on an agreed cost-share formula, based on Gross National Income. This equates to EUR 3.3 billion in 2023 and is used to run the entire organisation and its military commands. NATO has three principal common-funded budgets: the civil budget, for NATO headquarters; (ii) the military budget, for the NATO command structure; and (iii) the security investment programme – for military infrastructure and capabilities. The North Atlantic Council oversees this common funding process, supported by the Resource Policy and Planning Board, the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee. NATO does not have its own armed forces so when the North Atlantic Council unanimously decides to engage in an operation or mission, Allies commit troops, equipment and support on a voluntary basis. Each member covers the costs associated with their deployments. 

In 2006, NATO defence ministers agreed to commit, or work towards committing, a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence spending to continue to ensure the Alliance’s military readiness. NATO publishes an annual compendium of financial, personnel and economic data for all member countries. This includes identifying which countries have reached or surpassed this 2% target. The UK has consistently spent more than 2% of GDP on defence.    

What role does NATO have in rural areas? Much of the defence estate of NATO Members is found in rural areas – this is because of the space required to carry out defence activities such as training soldiers or landing aircraft. Military bases have wider socio-economic impacts on policy areas such as schools, housing, skills, employment, transport and demand on services. Military sites can also be used to deliver environmental goals.  Yet the role the military play in rural areas and its implications are not fully understood or discussed. There is an opportunity to consider what this military presence means (or might mean) for rural communities for individual Members and for the Alliance overall. 

Where next?On 11 and 12 July 2023 NATO held its latest summit in Vilnius. Here leaders made decisions and set out NATO’s strategic direction for the near and longer-term future. 

“We have just concluded an historic NATO Summit. Over the past two days, we took major decisions to adapt our Alliance for the future. We agreed NATO’s most detailed and robust defence plans since the Cold War. We strengthened our commitment to defence investment. We agreed to bring Ukraine closer to the Alliance and step up support for the long haul. And we deepened our partnerships around the world even more”, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General. 

The Summit came with pledges of long-term support to Ukraine, a decision by Turkey to lift its veto on Sweden joining the Alliance (which will now require national ratification), and an increased focus on China in seeing how its ambitions may challenge NATO’s interests, security and values. NATO’s greatest strength is the spirit of solidarity and cohesion that it fosters amongst its Members. And with its continued relevance and enlargement it will continue to play an important role in the borderlands of Europe and more widely.         …………………………………………………………………………………………………

Jessica is a project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating hospital discharge and hospital avoidance schemes, and a service that supports older people to maintain their independence. Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

Pandemic Prep

How can we come together to address future pandemics?

The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response was set up by the World Health Organization (WHO) in September 2020. The Panel published its report, ‘COVID-19: make it the last pandemic’, in May 2021. In March 2021, 20 world leaders and senior figures from across the world called for a more joined-up approach to pandemics in the future. This call was picked up by the Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies (WGPR) who have been drafting a Pandemic Preparedness Treaty. How is the treaty being drafted, what does it propose, and what might it mean for rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response began its work in September 2020. It was established by the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General in response to the World Health Assembly resolution 73.1. The Panel was given a mandate to review the experiences gained and lessons learned from the WHO-coordinated international health response to COVID-19. In October 2020, the Panel published its programme of work. This contained 4 interconnected enquiry themes: 

  1. Build on the past: learn from previous pandemics and the status of the system and actors pre-COVID-19. 
  2. Review the present: analyse the accurate chronology of events and activities in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, the recommendations made by WHO, and the responses by national governments.
  3. Understand the Impacts: review how health systems and communities responded and assess the direct and indirect impacts of both the pandemic and the response measures.
  4. Change for the future: an analysis and vision for a strengthened international system ideally equipped for pandemic preparedness and response.

The Panel provided scheduled briefings and reports to WHO Governing Bodies. This included: a briefing to the WHO Executive Board Special Session in October 2020; presenting its first progress report in November 2020; producing its second progress report in January 2021; and publishing its main report in May 2021. The main report was supported by a companion document describing 13 defining moments which shaped the course of the pandemic; and by 15 background papers including the chronology of the pandemic, and reflecting the voices heard in townhall meetings. The main report contained the following key findings: 

  • Early failings
    • The world had been warned of an inevitable pandemic threat, but many countries were not prepared and had not learnt from the past. 
    • Valuable time was lost as the formal notification and emergency declaration procedures under the International Health Regulations were too slow. 
    • Too many countries took a ‘wait and see’ approach rather than enacting an aggressive containment strategy. 
    • Countries with delayed responses were also characterised by a lack of coordination, inconsistent strategies, and the devaluing of science in decision-making. 
  • Preparedness was under-funded and response funding too slow
    • Financing at the scale required was not available to supply medical equipment, kick-start the search for diagnostics and therapeutics, or ensure vaccines would be available to all. 
    • International financing was too little, too late. 
  • Lack of planning and gaps in social protection resulted in the pandemic widening inequalities, particularly for:
    • Women and vulnerable and marginalised populations, including migrants and workers in the informal sector. 
    • People with underlying health conditions. 
    • The most disadvantaged children whose education was terminated early by the pandemic. 
  • Some successes:
    • Health workers have been stalwart in their efforts. 
    • Open data and open science collaboration were central. 
    • Vaccines were developed at unprecedented speed. 
    • Successful national responses. 
    • Country wealth was not a predicator of success. 

The Panel presented its recommendations in two parts. The first part made immediate recommendations to curb COVID-19 transmission. The second part contained recommendations which if adopted, as a package, are intended to transform the international system for pandemic preparedness and response. Seven recommendations were made in Part two: 

  1. Elevate pandemic preparedness and response to the highest level of political leadership – including the establishment of a Global Health Threats Council and the adoption of a Pandemic Framework Convention. 
  2. Strengthen the independence, authority, and financing of the WHO – including resourcing and equipping WHO Country Offices and prioritise the quality and performance of staff at each WHO level. 
  3. Invest in preparedness now to prevent the next crisis – ask all national governments to update their preparedness plans. 
  4. Establish a new agile and rapid surveillance information and alert system – using state-of-the-art digital tools. 
  5. Establish a pre-negotiated platform for tools and supplies – to deliver global public goods of vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics and essential supplies. 
  6. Raise new international financing for pandemic preparedness and response.
  7. National Pandemic coordinators should have a direct line to the Head of State or Government. 

The main report identified a need for stronger leadership and better coordination at national and international levels. 

What is the Pandemic Preparedness Treaty? On 30 March 2021 the then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, along with 20 other world leaders and senior figures from international organisations, published a joint article calling for a more joined-up approach to pandemics in the future. In noting that the world would face major health emergencies in the future, world leaders emphasised how “we must be better prepared to predict, prevent, detect, assess and effectively respond to pandemics in a highly co-ordinated fashion”. In the article the leaders proposed a Pandemic Preparedness Treaty which would “greatly enhance international co-operation to improve…alert systems, data-sharing, research and local, regional and global production and distribution of medical and public health counter-measures”.   

In October 2021, the Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness for and Response to Health Emergencies (WGPR) published a zero draft report outlining the benefits of developing a new instrument to promote high-level political commitment and strengthen health systems and their resilience. A special session of the World Health Assembly (WHA) was held to discuss the report where it was agreed that the WHA would establish an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) to draft and negotiate “a WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response”. 

How is the Treaty being developed? The INB describes how its work is based on the principles of inclusiveness, transparency, efficiency, Member State leadership and consensus. Following the special session, the INB have held a series of meetings and put a timeline in place with the final outcome of its work to be presented at the 77th World Health Assembly in May 2024. 

While developing a Treaty involves negotiating and seeking consensus amongst the WHO’s 194 member countries, article 3 in the Zero Draft sets out the main objective of having a treaty: “The WHO CA+ aims to comprehensively and effectively address systemic gaps and challenges that exist in these areas, at national, regional and international levels, through substantially reducing the risk of pandemics, increasing pandemic preparedness and response capacities, progressive realisation of universal health coverage and ensuring coordinated, collaborative and evidence-based pandemic response and resilient recovery of health systems”.   

The INB is consulting and negotiating on:

  • The definition, means and procedure for declaring a pandemic, and what this means in practice for states. 
  • How the treaty will work alongside the International Health Regulations. 
  • Key international principles that will guide the treaty (e.g. human rights, equity, accountability). 
  • How states and the WHO should be coordinating and cooperating in pandemic preparedness and response. 
  • How to finance pandemic preparedness and response initiatives. 
  • Setting up a new Governing Body for the treaty. 
  • General legal issues (e.g. amendments, disputes, withdrawal). 

This involves a series of public hearings and informal, focused consultations. The public hearings have explored what substantive elements should be included in a new international instrument, and what can be done at the international level to better protect against future pandemics. At its meeting in July 2022, the INB agreed that the new international instrument on pandemic preparedness should be legally binding.  

How is it being received? The group of Friends of the Treaty argues that “the world cannot wait until the COVID-19 pandemic is over to start planning for better pandemic preparedness and response and implementing the lessons from the crisis…the key to the success of this endeavour will be a collective approach that puts aside business-as-usual”. 

A petition calling on the UK Government not to sign a new treaty without a public referendum received some 156,087 signatures when it closed back in November 2022. The petition led to a parliamentary debate in April 2023. In response, the Government said the UK would “work towards building a consensus on how the global community can better prevent, prepare for, and respond to future pandemics and will actively shape, develop and negotiate the text. The new instrument would only be adopted by the World Health Assembly if the text achieves a two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly…once adopted, the instrument would only become binding on the UK if and when the UK accepts (ratifies) it in accordance with its constitutional process”.   

The European Council is a proponent of the treaty and has identified the following potential incentives and benefits of it: 

  • Better surveillance of pandemic risks – including knowledge sharing on new infectious diseases. 
  • Better alerts – supporting real-time communication and early warnings which would trigger a more rapid response. 
  • The ability to deploy medical equipment and highly-skilled international medical teams on the ground. 
  • The development of timely medical solutions (e.g. vaccines, treatments, diagnostics). 
  • Collective instruments to address global needs equitably in future pandemics. 
  • To improve the flow of reliable and accurate information as well as tackle misinformation globally. 

For some the treaty is rooted in ideals of what perfect pandemic governance should look like and that it has little regard for practical realities where state security and the health of the few has been prioritised. Some commentators argue that it will take years to negotiate the scope and powers of the treaty – citing how previous protocols that took 3-7 years to develop, and 10-11 years to enter into force.  

The German Alliance on Climate Change and Health, King’s College London and the LSE have suggested protocols, guidelines and standards could be used to lay out specific commitments – similar to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change approach. They also acknowledge that there is unlikely to be consensus on all issues, especially those that are seen to infringe on trade or sovereignty.  

Treaty negotiations have focused on preventing pandemics that resemble COVID-19. However, the Global Leaders Group on Antimicrobial Resistance have emphasised that the next pandemic could be caused by bacteria or other microbes. The Leaders Group also want the negotiations to include measures that prevent infections such as better access to safe water, hygiene and sanitation and higher standards of infection prevention and control.  

It is also not clear what would happen if the measures agreed in the treaty were not followed – would there be a peer-review process or a set of sanctions for non-compliance?  Academics have called for an independent body to be responsible for monitoring the alignment of countries’ commitments to pandemic preparedness with their actions.

It is also unclear how the treaty would fit with the 2005 IHR. Indeed, separate talks on reforming the regulations taking place, with some 300+ amendments proposed.  

Since the release of the main report, the Co-Chairs and Panel members have continued to support discussions focussed on implementing their package of recommendations. In November 2021, the former Co-Chairs released a six-month accountability report. This flagged the need for strengthened leadership and accountability through an inclusive leader-level council independent of the WHO. In May 2022, the former Co-Chairs released a one-year assessment report. This called for rapid announcement of a pandemic threat to be made should one arise before legal reform processes are concluded. In May 2023, the former Co-Chairs released A Road Map for a World Protected from Pandemic Threats. This set out how two legal instruments are needed: revised IHR and a new pandemic agreement. Their recommendation is that the revised IHR should focus on surveillance and alert systems; and a new pandemic agreement on addressing the whole prevention, preparedness and response cycle. 

What does it mean for rural communities?In theory, areas with lower and sparser populations should have been at a lower risk of COVID-19 transmission. Yet global analysis from the OECD found while the virus arrived later in rural areas, COVID-19 case rates exceeded those in urban areas. They provide examples of super-spreader events such as wedding parties and religious festivals; and draw attention to meatpacking plants in rural areas of Germany, Ireland and the United States. Similarly, the analysis found rural populations to be at greater risk of COVID-19 complications and mortality. This is because the virus is particularly dangerous for older people and rural areas tend to have higher proportions of older residents. Rural dwellers were also found to have a higher prevalence of pre-existing conditions and co-morbidities (e.g. diabetes, heart disease, obesity). Rural hospitals were found to be less able to cope with an influx of COVID-19 patients because they had fewer specialists and less technology and capacity (i.e., intensive care beds).   

Back in the UK, analysis from the Nuffield Trust highlights how:

  • COVID-19 had a more detrimental effect on hospital waiting times in rural and remote trusts compared to trusts in more urban areas. Activity fell dramatically in emergency medicine and in referrals for talking therapies. 
  • Remote trusts were already struggling to recruit staff, spending more on temporary staff compared to other areas – the pandemic has exacerbated rural workforce issues. 
  • The underlying financial position of rural and remote services was worse than the position of more urban trusts before the pandemic started. In rural areas trust debt is equivalent to 56% of their annual operating income and they typically do not get their fair share of additional funding that goes into the NHS.    

If we know rural communities have nuanced risks and access to health care and infrastructure challenges, how can we ensure the design and implementation of any pandemic treaty would support rural communities in the event of a pandemic? For example, how will we collect data and undertake surveillance? How can we ensure we have sufficient qualified staff who can be flexible in their response and have the resources they need (i.e., PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, beds) to deliver pandemic-related health care – including managing any surges?

Where next?The co-chairs of the Panel highlight how “a new pathogen with pandemic potential could emerge at any time, and then there will be no excuse for a wait and see” approach. There has to be investment in preparedness now, not when the next crisis hits”. Dialogues around whether and/or where an international pandemic treaty or other international framework should sit will continue to take centre stage between now and May 2024. It is worth noting that treaty powers of the WHO have only been used once: for the adoption of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in 2003. So there is still much work to do to design the treaty and its interaction with the IHR. Will governments think beyond national interests? And if we already know the timing and impacts of pandemics differ in rural areas, will they think rurally? Watch this space. 

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Jessica is a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC) and a project manager at Rose Regeneration. She is currently evaluating hospital discharge and hospital avoidance schemes, and a service that supports older people to maintain their independence.  Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

Is the most money spent on the areas which need it?

Is the most money spent on the areas which need it?

The UK Government allocates funding to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in two ways: either by spending UK-wide, or by allocating funding to the relevant devolved administration. The Barnett Formula is the way the UK Government provides the devolved administrations with a share of any additional funding. While intended to ensure each nation receives the same ‘pounds-per-person’ funding, there are calls to introduce a new ‘universal needs-based’ factor into the Formula. How does the Barnett Formula work, and are changes needed? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

What is the Barnett Formula – and where does it come from? The Barnett Formula is named after its founder Joel Barnett – a former Chief Secretary to HM Treasury in the 1970s who devised the formula in 1978. The Barnett Formula was first used in the 1978 Public Expenditure Survey to provide devolved administrations with the same ‘pounds per person’ change in funding as the equivalent UK Government spending. Until 1999 it was used to determine the level of UK Government spending on public services in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Since then it has been used to set the budgets of devolved administrations.  

In practice, it means if spending on health in England increases by £100 per person, the devolved administrations funding will also increase by £100 per person. This is intended to ensure that cash changes in public spending per head will be equal across all 4 nations. The Barnett Formula is only applied to public services that are devolved. 

The devolved administrations are able to spend the increased funding they receive as they wish – i.e., if the additional £100 in England is for health, there are no requirements for devolved administrations to spend their increased allocation on health. Additionally, the UK Government is able to make changes to funding without applying the Barnett Formula (known as a ‘formula bypass’), and it is not a statutory instrument.  

How is it calculated? Under the Barnett Formula, the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive receive a population-based proportion of changes in planned UK Government spending on services in England and Wales, or Great Britain. It therefore determines changes to each devolved administration’s funding with references to changes in departmental expenditure limits (DELs) within UK Government departments. Three variables are multiplied together to determine each devolved administration’s block grant under the Barnett Formula:

(1) The change in planned spending by UK Government departments X (2) the extent to which services delivered by UK Government departments correspond to services delivered by devolved administrations X (3) each nation’s population as a proportion of England, England and Wales, or Great Britain [as appropriate]. 

 Mid-Year population estimates published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) are used, with HM Treasury notifying devolved administrations of the population proportions that will be applied in advance. 

The Barnett Formula is applied slightly differently between spending reviews and budgets. At spending reviews, the Formula is generally applied to relevant changes in overall departmental spending. At Budgets, the Formula is applied to changes in funding for individual spending programmes. 

Is the Barnett Formula in need reform? The Institute for Government (IfG) describes the Barnett Formula as a ‘mechanistic formula’ that helps depoliticise the process of setting devolved budgets; and removes the need for annual negotiations between the UK Government and devolved administrations. The IfG cites the stability and predictability of the approach as each year’s budget uses the previous year’s budget as a starting point. The lack of ringfencing also means devolved administrations can use the funding to meet their own spending priorities. 

In practice, the application of the Formula results in higher spending per person in the devolved nations compared to England. This is because using the previous year’s devolved budget as a starting point preserves historic differences in spending between nations. This results in devolved nations starting from a higher base of public spending per head. Yet devolved administrations have argued that their populations are sparser (making the cost of providing the same level of public services as in England higher); the size of the public sector varies across all 4 nations; and in some areas there are higher levels of demand and need for public services. According to the IfG, for example, Scotland receives funding for public services that is 29% above the level in England in per capita terms. Spending per person in Northern Ireland is also 29% above England; and in Wales the figure is 23%. 

The Welsh Government published two reports back in 2009 and 2010 [as part of the Holtham Commission] highlighting what it called the “Barnett Squeeze”. The Commission concluded that “the Barnett Formula lacked any objective justification and had survived for 30 years solely for reasons of political and administrative convenience. As a direct result of the formula, the relative funding per capita for devolved activities in Wales has converged markedly towards the average level of funding in England over the past decade for reasons that have nothing to do with the relative needs of Wales”.  

The Holtham Commission recommended a funding floor be introduced to prevent the gap widening. It was estimated that Wales’s additional needs would mean its relative block grant funding per head would need to be around 114% to 117% of equivalent funding per head in England. The Commission’s work resulted in the introduction of a ‘needs-based’ factor into Wales’s block grant.

The UK government introduced the block grant floor for Wales in the 2015 spending review. In December 2016, the UK and Welsh governments agreed to implement a new funding floor that would apply from 2018-2019. This funding floor added a needs-based factor to Wales’s Barnett formula. Currently the needs-based factor is set at 105% of comparable funding per head in England, but the UK and Welsh governments have agreed that it will rise to 115% in the long term. The factor is currently lower (105%) as Wales’s relative block grant per head is greater than 115% at around 120% of England’s. Once Wales’s relative block grant funding reaches 115% of England’s, the multiplier will be set at 115%.

In another instance, Northern Ireland’s budget determined by the Barnett Formula is reduced by 2.5%. This is because the Northern Ireland Executive does not require funding for VAT expenditure because it is refunded by HM Revenue and Customs.

The UK Government only releases additional funds when it spends more in England. During COVID-19 devolved administrations argued it was harder to plan their own pandemic responses or recovery planning as they had to wait for confirmation of additional funding from the UK Government.  

In 2022, the Constitution Committee said it “continue[d] to believe” the Barnett formula required reform “to introduce a fairer allocation of funding among the four nations”. And it said that the Treasury’s statement of funding policy “merit[ed] a higher profile” and should be subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny.

Does the Barnett Formula work for rural areas? The Independent Commission on Funding & Finance for Wales demonstrated how a needs-based formula was achievable. They set out three types of need with seven indicators: 

  1. Demographics: a higher prevalence of school age, older people and certain minority ethnic groups will generate a higher need for public services. Indicator 1: under 16 dependency ratio. Indicator 2: retired persons dependency ratio. Indicator 3: percentage of population that is from a minority ethnic group.
  2. Deprivation: individuals who are disadvantaged in various ways will have a greater need to access public services. Indicator 4: percentage of the population claiming income-related benefits. Indicator 5: percentage of the population with a long-term limiting illness.   
  3. Costs: the cost of delivering public services tends to be greater in areas where the population is relatively sparse. Indicator 6: proportion of people living outside of settlements of 10,000 people or more. Indicator 7: inner London weighting. 

The Commission recognised it would be ‘necessary to decide how much importance should be attributed to each indicator’ and how ‘real funding decisions are based on assessments of need that have thrashed out over the years and reflect decisions that are the responsibility of elected officials’ (page 26). 

In May 2023, the Northern Ireland Fiscal Council provided an estimate of relative need for public spending in Northern Ireland. They also highlighted differences in population characteristics and socio-economic conditions such as sparsity and replicated the Holtham Commission’s work to show how minor changes in inputs can affect the overall estimate of relative need, concluding that the relative need for public spending in Northern Ireland is around one-fifth to one-quarter higher than in England. 

The population proportion (mid-year estimates) and comparability percentage (the extent to which services are devolved) in the Barnett Formula do not take account of sparsity, the unavoidable costs of providing services in rural areas, or the public services needs of rural dwellers. 

In relation to farm and fisheries support payments, the UK Government decided to make above Barnett Formula allocations to the devolved administrations to replace EU funding. For agriculture this includes providing £3.7 billion to support farmers and land managers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This includes £85 million for the Scottish Government and Welsh Government as part of the recommendations of the Bew Review.  Known as the Intra-UK Allocations Review, it was chaired by Lord Paul Bew of Donegore, supported by a team of advisory panel members appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with the devolved administrations. The Review were asked to make recommendations on the allocation of farm support ‘convergence’ funding between different parts of the UK for the financial years 2020-2021 and 2021-2022. 

Stakeholders responding to the Bew Review argued that population size and distribution across the UK should not have any influence over the allocation of farm support funding – indicating that agri-food products are processed and consumed in different parts of the UK. For the 2020-2022 period, the Review proposed modest changes in the allocation of funding to benefit those farmers challenged by difficult terrain which coincided with areas recognised by the EU’s external convergence formula. In a UK context these areas are predominantly in Scotland. For the period 2020-2022 they therefore recommended that the convergence funding budget be split according to the proportion of low per-hectare land in each part of the UK. The Review concluded that this would offer a means of retaining a link to the formula whilst also enabling the UK Government to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by leaving the EU. 

An extra £51.4 million was allocated to Scottish farmers for 2020-22 (on top of the one-off historic convergence uplift). The Government also said that to implement Lord Bew’s recommendations while making sure that funding allocations for farmers in England and Northern Ireland were unchanged, the UK Government would commit over £56 million of new money. This included over £5 million for farmers in Wales. The Direct Payment to farmers (Legislative Continuity) Act 2020 enabled the UK Government to implement this decision allowing Ministers to increase the overall budget for direct payments.

Because the Barnett Formula is HM Treasury policy and not part of any legislature, it can be changed or omitted at any time. While the broad framework has been in place since 1978, and some fiddling has taken place since 2015-2016 in a Welsh context, it is in relation to farm support payments that above Barnett funding has been allocated. This has led to wider calls for the Barnett Formula to be reformed to take greater account of socio-economic needs. When asked back in February 2023 whether it would review the Barnett Formula, the UK government said it recognised that the system was not perfect but argued that it was “simple and efficient”, provided the devolved administrations with a “clear and certain outcome” and that it has “stood the test of time”. Do we need to better understand what the Barnett Formula allocations mean for rural areas? And what are the implications of the Holtham Commission and Bew Review in shaping future formulae?     

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Jessica is a researcher/project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently supporting the National Federation of Young Farmers’ Clubs and Lantra to gather the views of young people on what the future of farming should look like, and what they want to see in new agricultural and environmental policies. Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

How should we develop common frameworks across the UK? 

How should we develop common frameworks across the UK? 

Common frameworks are non-binding agreements between the UK Government and Devolved Administrations setting out how they will work together on a range of policy areas. Why are common frameworks needed, and what do they do? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

What are common frameworks? Back in 2017, a subcommittee of the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) provided the following definition: ‘As the UK leaves the European Union, the government of the United Kingdom and the devolved administrations agree to work together to establish common approaches in some areas that are currently governed by EU law, but that are otherwise within areas of competence of the devolved administrations or legislatures. A framework will set out a common UK, or GB, approach and how it will be operated and governed. This may consist of common goals, minimum or maximum standards, harmonisation, limits on action, or mutual recognition, depending on the policy area and the objectives being pursued.’

All UK Common Frameworks are non-statutory intergovernmental arrangements. While some Frameworks have associated primary or secondary legislation, others can take the form of an executive action, memorandums of understanding and other means.   

Why are common frameworks needed? When the Brexit transition period ended on 31 December 2020, a number of EU powers returned to the UK. Some of these powers relate to matters in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Under these circumstances, common frameworks are intended to ensure devolved Governments take a consistent approach to policy areas previously conducted at a European level. Three principles have been applied in the development of common frameworks in the UK:   

Firstly, common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to: 

  • Enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence. 
  • Ensure compliance with international obligations. 
  • Ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into, and implement new trade agreements and international treaties. 
  • Enable the management of common resources. 
  • Administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element. 
  • Safeguard the security of the UK.

Secondly, common frameworks shall respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability of the devolved legislatures. They will therefore be based on:

  • Established conventions and practices, including that the competence of the devolved institutions will not normally be adjusted without their consent. 
  • Maintaining, as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific needs of each territory as is afforded by the EU. 
  • A significant increase in decision-making powers for devolved administrations. 

Thirdly, common frameworks are intended to ensure recognition of the economic and social linkages between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and that Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK that shares a land frontier with the EU. Common frameworks will also adhere to the Belfast Agreement, also known as the Good Friday Agreement. 

Since 2018, the UK Government has been publishing a breakdown of areas of EU law that intersect with devolved competence in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  The latest publication of this frameworks analysis, in November 2021, for 152 areas of EU law, identified whether each policy area required a framework or not and/or any associated primary legislation. The analysis sets out: 

  • 120 policy areas where no framework is required, and the UK Government and Devolved Administrations will continue to cooperate. 
  • 29 policy areas where common rules and ways of working are, or will, be implemented through a non-legislative Common Framework agreement. 
  • 3 policy areas where new primary legislation will be introduced, working alongside a non-legislative Framework agreement. 
  • 32 policy areas require Frameworks. In some instances, these policy areas include a mix of reserved and devolved competence, including where technical standards derived from EU law are relevant. 

How are common frameworks being developed and implemented? In September 2020, a House of Lords Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee was appointed. In October 2020, the Committee launched an inquiry into how the common frameworks programme would operate and relate to other initiatives, and the role for parliamentary scrutiny across the UK.

The Committee published its first report in March 2021. While the Committee acknowledged how the UK, Scottish and Welsh Government all recognised the need for common frameworks to achieve regulatory consistency; at the end of the transition period just 3 provisional frameworks had been published and none had completed scrutiny in legislatures. The Committee called for more stakeholder engagement and parliamentary scrutiny of common frameworks, and the need to clarify the relationship with the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland.   

The Committee published its second report in July 2022. Noting its earlier report, the Committee had scrutinised 17 common frameworks since. The Committee described how “common frameworks have unique potential to strengthen the union and are innovative mechanisms for developing UK-wide policy by collaboration and consensus.” The Committee highlighted how the frameworks they had reviewed focused on agreeing processes and ways of working between administrations. The Committee highlighted three key risks: 

  1. The UK Internal Market Act 2020 and the Subsidy Control Act 2022 had challenged the consensus approach taken in common frameworks. 
  2. The lack of an Executive in Northern Ireland had made cooperation across all four UK administrations difficult, and the introduction of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill could further contribute to uncertainty and instability in Northern Ireland. 
  3. The transfer of the common frameworks programme out of the Cabinet Office and into the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) may affect the profile, coordination, coherence and delivery of the programme. 

To address these risks the Committee made a number of recommendations. This included the need for the Government to ensure that the legislation it brings forward does not conflict with relevant common frameworks; that the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive be kept updated on legislation that will apply there and that frameworks with cross-border implications on the island of Ireland should recognise the Irish Government as a stakeholder to be consulted; and that a process for the ongoing reporting of the operation of common frameworks should be developed. 

The Government responded to both reports – emphasising how the common frameworks programme is “an important part of how the UK Government and Devolved Administrations work together to deliver for people and communities across the UK”. The Government noted the Committee’s recommendations across 6 areas: strategy, UK Internal Market Act, regulatory divergence, framework operation, Cabinet Office, quality assurance and transparency; and how it accepted or partially accepted the majority of the Committee’s recommendations. 

In December 2022 the Cabinet Office and DLUHC published its latest intergovernmental relations quarterly report. This provides information from all UK Government departments on their participation in intergovernmental meetings and a summary of engagement that has taken place. For example, during Quarter 3 of 2022 there were some 50 intergovernmental meetings, and 5 meetings between the UK Government and Devolved Administrations. The Quarter 3 report contains 2 case studies relating to the Commemoration of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and The Thomas Commission; and details the formation of the Islands Forum including a meeting held in Orkney to consider the potential for islands to support net zero commitments and renewable energy projects.  

In February 2023, the Prime Minister and President of the European Commission announced a new agreement had been reached to change the way the Northern Ireland Protocol operates. Known as The Windsor Framework, it provides for:

  • A new system of checks on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland; with goods destined to stay in Northern Ireland going through a ‘green lane’ and other goods subject to full checks and protocols to protect the EU’s single market. 
  • A reduction in checks and controls on agri-food goods such as dairy and meat; and the removal of the prohibition on certain chilled meats from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. 
  • The Northern Ireland Assembly will be able to object to the adoption of new EU rules on goods where they are ‘significantly different from existing rules’, using the Petition of Concern mechanism. This is part of a new emergency brake mechanism, known as the Stormont brake. 
  • There will be no dual regulatory system for medicines in Northern Ireland. 

The Government has stated that the Windsor Framework will mean the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill will no longer be needed, and that the Framework will be implemented through a series of legal instruments. On 22 March 2023 the Government motion to approve the deal made with the EU was carried, with 515 votes for and 29 votes against. However, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) voted against the Framework in arguing that it does not deal with the fundamental issue which is the imposition of EU law by the Protocol. 

How do common frameworks apply to rural areas? A Frameworks Analysis in 2021 set out a breakdown of areas previously governed by EU law as they intersect with Devolved Administrations and Government departments. In relation to Defra, the analysis contains information about previous EU law, devolution interest and associated primary legislation (e.g. agricultural support); policy areas where common rules and ways of working would be implemented through a non-legislative agreement (e.g. organic production, fertiliser regulations); as well as areas where no framework is required (e.g. water resources). 

In April 2022 the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee held a call for evidence, seeking views on the provisional draft common frameworks covering these Defra areas. Written submissions were invited on how to ensure consistency and divergence, the extent to which the frameworks allow each Government of the UK to support their food and farming sector, practical challenges and how these frameworks might be scrutinised. Unlike other parliamentary committees which had looked at common frameworks from technical or operational perspectives, the Select Committee focused on the practical implications for stakeholders. In June 2022 the Select Committee published the written evidence it had received. The Chair also wrote a letter to the Secretary of State. The letter highlighted two stakeholder concerns: (a) managing divergence and (b) transparency and stakeholder engagement. 

The main concern raised by stakeholders was around the scope for policy divergence that is permitted within common frameworks, particularly in relation to animal welfare and agricultural support. While there were a range of views on how much divergency was desirable, stakeholders felt there was not enough information provided about what would trigger a dispute, leading to a lack of clarity about how much divergence would be permitted. The Select Committee queried Defra’s assessment of the risks of different approaches across the UK, particularly in agricultural support, and the potential for this to cause level playing field disagreements. Several submissions further highlighted concerns regarding communication and engagement in the UK context compared to the level of engagement they had seen under the previous EU system. Stakeholders requested that they be involved early in the decision-making process, and emphasised the importance of at least maintaining, but ideally increasing, the level of transparency that existed when the UK was a member of the EU (e.g., making available schedules of meetings, agendas, and minutes). 

In Quarter 3 2022 Defra held 1 meeting with the Welsh Government, 1 meeting with the Northern Ireland Executive and 1 meeting with the Scottish Government. This compares to 4 meetings with the Scottish Government, 3 meetings with the Welsh Government and 1 meeting with the Northern Ireland Executive in Quarter 2 2022. In addition to providing a quarterly framework summary, some stakeholders may find it useful to see a more detailed breakdown of meetings and the policy areas covered – including any stakeholder consultation underway or carried out, and any matters of divergence identified or addressed.  

As of January 2023, Defra had produced 13 policy papers on the provisional common frameworks in place that it had been jointly working with Devolved Administrations on.  

Since 2017, the UK Government has been working with the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government, and the Northern Ireland Executive to develop UK common frameworks. There are advantages and disadvantages to having the same or different rules as other places. For the 32 policy areas requiring a common framework, how will Government’s balance being responsive to local needs with tackling issues that are transboundary; the balance between focussing on the process (technical aspects) with content (stakeholder perspectives) – and, ultimately, what will these common frameworks deliver for rural areas? Watch this space. 

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Jessica is a researcher/project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently supporting the National Federation of Young Farmers’ Clubs and Lantra to gather the views of young people on what the future of farming should look like, and what they want to see in new agricultural and environmental policies. Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

What does the future public service workforce look like?

What does the future public service workforce look like?

Back in July 2022 the House of Lords Public Services Committee published its report ‘Fit for the future? Rethinking the public services workforce’. This identified how public sector staffing was “facing a crisis” due to a “vicious circle” of increasing demand, staff shortages, low morale and recruitment issues. What does this crisis mean for rural areas, and what can be done to secure a public services workforce for the future? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

How many people work in the public sector? 

According to the Institute for Government (IfG), the public sector ‘consists of all workers employed by the state – whether UK Government departments, devolved Governments, Local Authorities or other Government agencies and public bodies’. The Census collects data on public sector personnel. This comprises people employed in central and local government, and public corporations, including people with second jobs in the public sector. The House of Lords Select Committee on Public Services, however, considers public services in a broader sense – including the role of community-level initiatives and private, voluntary and charitable sectors. All of these definitions exclude organisations such as museums or universities – which despite receiving taxpayer funding in some instances – are defined as private sector organisations. Indeed, some private sector bodies have found themselves reclassified as public sector bodies and vice versa. For example: Royal Bank of Scotland (included as a public sector body since Q4 2008), further education and sixth form college corporations (private sector since Q1 2012); Royal Mail (private since Q3 2013) and English Housing Associations (private since Q4 2017). 

A statistical bulletin published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in December 2022 estimated that there 5.77 million employees were working in the public sector in September 2022 – 28,000 (or 0.5%) more than in June 2022 and 73,000 (1.3%) more compared to September 2021. It attributes the increase to the impact of COVID-19 on the NHS and Civil Service, and to Local Authority schools becoming academies:  

  • Employment in Central Government was estimated at 3.57 million in September 2022, a rise of 22,000 (0.6%) compared with June 2022, and 74,000 (2.1%) compared with September 2021.   
  • The NHS employed an estimated 1.90 million people in September 2022, an increase of 12,000 (0.6%) compared with June 2022 and an increase of 47,000 (2.5%) compared with September 2021. 
  • Employment in Local Government was estimated at 2.00 million in September 2022, an increase of 3,000 (0.2%) since June 2022, but a decrease of 3,000 (0.1%) since September 2021. 
  • There were 513,000 employees in the Civil Service in September 2022, up 1,000 (0.2%) compared with June 2022, and up 8,000 (1.6%) compared with September 2021.
  • Private sector employment was at estimated at 27.00 million in September 2022, slightly lower than for June 2022 (by 1,000) but higher than in September 2021 (by 117,000).

According to its definition, the IfG estimates 5.6 million people were employed by the public sector in Q1 2022. While the number of people employed by the public sector reduced between 2009 and 2016, the impact of Brexit and COVID-19 have seen numbers increase – there are now just 1% fewer employees in 2022 compared to 2009. It is estimated that the public sector now makes up 17.5% of total employment. 

What skills do we need (now and in the future) in the public sector? 

In 2021, the OECD published its report on the future of public services. This looked at the factors affecting the work of civil service leaders from OECD countries, and the employment policies needed to support their work. The report highlights how: ‘in the short to medium term, public servants will be called upon not only to help manage the health, social and economic impacts of the [COVID-19] crisis, but to also find innovative solutions to help rebalance budget deficits in the immediate aftermath of recessions. The opportunity and policy challenge is to find a way to use budgetary pressure and high expectations from citizens to spark transformation in the public sector rather than making short-term cuts that freeze renewal and stunt progress, as was often the experience resulting from the 2008 financial crisis’. Leaders participating in the study generally agreed that: 

  • The promise of new technology to improve government service delivery will only be achieved with a commensurate investment in the capabilities of civil servants.
  • Change is not new but is happening at a pace that requires constant reconsideration of what civil servants know, and how they learn and acquire new knowledge.
  • Civil services need to become more flexible, agile and responsive in the way they organise, reward and employ.
  • There are important new possibilities to focus people management on the experience of work, public service values, mission and the public good to attract and retain diverse employees.

In reflecting on the public service workforce that is needed to deliver post-pandemic policies today, and into the future to respond to the next set of crises, three overarching reflections were offered: 

  1. A forward-looking public service is one that is able to identify the emerging technical skills and competencies needed to ensure resilience in an increasingly uncertain future. This will require workforce planning methods that recognise uncertainty and prepare for the next shock.
  2. A flexible public service in the future will be one where different kinds of people work from more locations at different times, contributing their skills and experience to projects, across multi-disciplinary teams, and learning as they go. This will require flexibility, a culture of learning, better risk management and experimentation.
  3. The public service of the future will attract, retain and optimise the use of the skills it needs by providing fulfilling work experience to an increasingly diverse range of employees. This will require improved job design to increase autonomy and recognise employees as individuals.

In January 2022, the House of Lords Public Services Committee launched an inquiry on designing a public services workforce fit for the future. The Committee published its report in July 2022. This set out how the public services workforce was ‘facing a crisis’ and that employers were ‘not doing enough to make public service careers attractive to prospective staff’ leading to recruitment difficulties: 

‘The inescapable demographic fact is that demand for services will rise far faster than the working-age population. The proportion of the population with multiple and complex needs will rise further, even as the labour market available will be smaller. The challenge is substantial: the public sector will have to deliver the same or better outcomes with less labour available’ (page 3). 

The report contained five key findings: 

  1. Many public service workers face “intense pressure” and “suffering”, as well as unacceptable levels of discrimination. 
  2. The potential of many staff to deliver services is largely untapped, with a need to think imaginatively about how and where they could be better deployed.
  3. There are simple ways to enhance the “offer” of public service careers that should be taken.
  4. Traditional routes into public service careers are limiting and action must be taken to make them more accessible.
  5. The public sector needs to “train to retain” and must rethink its training and development offer to allow staff to meet their full potential. 

The Committee used the report to develop to develop an action strategy. The strategy includes taking steps to: 

  • Understand the problem by collecting and sharing workforce data. 
  • Get the most out of the workforce by empowering them and thinking imaginatively about where they could be deployed. 
  • Make services work for users through meaningful consultation. 
  • Use technology in the most productive and informative ways. 
  • Prioritise preventative services. 
  • End the culture problems driving people to leave. 
  • Make the offer of public service careers more attractive by fixing pensions and offering flexible working. 
  • Fix the broken brand of public service careers, and get an appealing message out. 
  • Create new and accessible entry routes, and properly use those that already exist. 
  • Train to retain: rethink development so that skills can be recognised and used more effectively across broad careers. 

In May 2022, the Local Government Association (LGA) published the Local Government Workforce Survey 2022. All heads of human resources [or in an equivalent position] in England were asked to complete an online survey between March and May 2022. Of the119 Councils that responded: 

  • 94% said they were experiencing recruitment and retention difficulties. In response to these difficulties, 81% said they provided market supplements for some posts – with 48% providing market supplements for children’s social workers, just over 25% for planning officers, and 18% for building control officers. 
  • Of those undertaking actions to help with recruitment and retention, over a quarter said they considered flexible working to be the most effective one. 
  • 62% said they were considering increasing apprenticeships in 2022-2023. 

In July 2022, the Government Skills and Curriculum Unit and Leadership College for Government published research looking at the future issues facing public service leaders. This identified future pressures around: (1) moving public services online; (2) the changing role of the state; (3) rising complexity; and (4) new expectations of leaders. There was agreement on the central importance of collaboration – including the need for a holistic systems approach that reaches across traditional sectors of public services. 

In November 2022 the Government responded to the House of Lords Public Services Committee’s report. It cited several areas where positive progress had been made. These include: the introduction of a public sector apprenticeship target to boost starts across the public sector; a commitment of £500 million to improve the recruitment, retention, progression and staff wellbeing of the adult social care workforce; issuing digital and data guidance setting out the required capabilities for all senior civil servants; and running a supporting families programme.  

In terms of horizon scanning, Deloitte describes the Government worker of 2035: 

‘The government workforce will likely consist of technologically advanced generations with different employment expectations. These new workers may be less attached to “career tenure” and will expect to work on short-term, specialized projects where they can apply their innovative technology skills. Future public service workers will likely be interested in performing meaningful work with tangible evidence of social responsibility and impact, and leaders should be prepared to respond’. 

In a context of increased uncertainty and disruption; how can we ensure we have a good grasp of the current workforce (and gaps), and that we can attract, retain and develop the public sector employees we need for the future?  

Navigating the transition 

To make public sector careers attractive and ensure there is a sustainable workforce for the future, the House of Lords Public Services Committee identified how action is needed around:

  • Workforce experience: a need to end the culture problems driving people to leave and ensuring the experiences of staff are broadly positive. 
  • Workforce development: a need to get the most out of staff by empowering them to think about where they could be deployed. 
  • Workforce recruitment: a need to fix the broken brand of public service careers by looking at the ‘offer’, including fixing pensions and offering flexible working. 
  • Routes into careers: a need to create new and accessible entry routes, including apprenticeships and local talent pools – including those who may not be able to afford to do a degree. 
  • Training: public sector employers must train to retrain and rethink development so that their skills can be used and recognised across broad careers. 

The Committee Chair, Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top said: “We need to reshape – and rebrand – public services to make then an attractive career choice. We can do that by empowering people, and providing innovative training with personal and professional development, so they feel valued and want to remain in these important careers. In addition, consultation with service users and those with lived experience will allow their input to be a real part of redesigning services to deliver exactly what is needed, when it is needed”. 

 Deloitte also highlighted mitigation strategies to support the transition to a sustainable workforce: 

  • Prepare an inventory of the regulatory changes needed to accommodate a largely “non-career” employee model. 
  • Conduct annual public service planning exercises using a more forward-looking approach comprised of employee predictive scenarios, and labour markets and technology trends as a way of mitigating a radical, disruptive shift to a new workforce model.
  • Rethink current staff performance management practices to enhance the focus on individual accountability for results and career mobility.
  • Collect and review success stories of interagency collaboration and public innovation projects.
  • Increase virtual collaboration and use of digital technologies.
  • Conduct periodic workforce studies and employee surveys to understand and map the expectations and preferences of a younger workforce.

More workers are economically inactivity now than before the COVID-19 pandemic. Labour market data has shown that older workers and those without a higher education continue to drive the increase in inactivity. However, increased retirement is a more important reason for their increase in movements from employment to inactivity rather than necessarily increases in ill health. At the same time, the number of people moving into low-paying occupations from inactivity has also fallen. Evidence also shows as inactivity has risen, existing recruitment difficulties have been exacerbated. The Government is currently exploring a range of options and reforms to encourage people back into the workforce – from changes to sickness and disability benefit legislation to a bigger tax allowance for people aged over 50. Alongside the Government’s approach to employment support, such as DWP’s network of 50PLUS champions, the Centre for Ageing Better is calling for a national programme aimed at those aged 50 plus, and bringing forward by a year the People and Skills element of the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) to deliver place-based and responsive support. In a rural context, for example, limited access to affordable and accessible transport and/or childcare prevents some employees from taking on additional hours or accessing the wider labour market. 

What more can be done to support workers to return to fill labour and skills shortages in the public sector short term – and will the actions and mitigations outlined above encourage others to enter it?   

How many public sector employees work in rural? 

While data is available on people employed in central and local government, including regional and diversity analyses, it is not possible to determine how many employees are involved in supporting rural communities. For example, as of September 2022, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) had a headcount of 12,790 employees, comprising 10,630 full-time staff and 2,160 part-time staff (table 8). While Defra provides a breakdown of resources allocated to different priority outcomes in its delivery plan, it is not possible to determine how many employees have rural communities as all or part of their remit. Indeed, Defra works with colleagues in other Government departments to ensure that the needs and opportunities presented by rural communities and businesses are reflected in Government priorities.  

In terms of sectors, staffing is a make or break issue for the NHS in England. Workforce recruitment and retention difficulties have a direct impact on patient care and staff experience. The Parliamentary Inquiry into Rural Health and Care and numerous other reports have all highlighted the unmet and growing health and care needs of people living in rural areas alongside growing staff shortages. In a rural context, the Parliamentary Inquiry identified how: 

  • There are workforce challenges due to high demand but low supply, with overall fewer NHS staff per head in rural areas compared to urban areas. 
  • High employment rates and lower rates of economic inactivity means rural labour markets are relatively tight. 
  • Individuals often develop their clinical career where they train and there is a need to enhance training and development opportunities in rural areas.  
  • There is a need to create more specialist generalists and other fluid and adaptable workforce positions in rural areas. 
  • The variety of roles and career development opportunities available in rural areas needs to be better promoted.  

The National Rural Crime Network (NRCN) has looked at the complex and varied demands on police officers and budgets in rural areas. Research commissioned from the University of Plymouth found: 

  • Fixed, non-staff costs are higher amongst rural forces which cannot benefit from economies of scale due to the need to serve more dispersed, low density populations. For example, this equates to £32.1 million across the 10 smallest forces (by population), the equivalent of over 600 officers. Given that rural forces generally have smaller workforces than urban forces, this has implications for service delivery.
  • Significantly higher round-trip distances are found in forces serving low-density populations, increasing costs. As rural forces have lower officer numbers, the burden per officer is also higher by up to 65%.
  • All forces experience seasonal variations, but the minimum-relative-to-maximum variation, especially for daily crime and Anti-Social Behaviour is far greater in rural forces, especially those with National Parks and coastal areas attracting holiday-makers.

While workforce issues are everywhere, these examples illustrate how they can be more pronounced in rural areas. Rural residents often have different (and greater) needs, are spatially dispersed, and require services from staff with different skillsets. This is not always reflected in Government funding support or in workforce planning and development.     

If we are to address rural workforce challenges now and into the future, there are three important questions we need to respond to: (1) how can we reduce demand? (2) How can we deliver services in a way that means we have a more sustainable workforce? (3) How can we ensure the current and future workforce are in tune with rural needs, circumstances and opportunities? 

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Jessica is a researcher/project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a support programme for patients waiting to receive NHS and local government services; and a Warm Hubs scheme. Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

 Exploring Rural Content in Public Service Media

 Exploring Rural Content in Public Service Media

Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) refers to broadcasting intended for public benefit rather than to serve purely commercial interests. Ofcom, the UK’s communications regulator, requires these broadcasters to fulfil certain requirements as part of their licence to broadcast. How do PSBs reflect rural communities and perspectives in their programming and outputs? Jessica Sellick investigates. ………………………………………………………………………………………………..

What is public service broadcasting? According to Ofcom, public service broadcasters (PSBs) in the UK include the BBC, those providing Channel 3 services [ITV in England and Wales, STV in Scotland and UTV in Northern Ireland], Channel 4, Channel 5 and the Welsh language service S4C. PSBs must comply with a range of programme and output quotas that set minimum levels of the types of programmes that they must show. These obligations originate in the Communications Act 2003 and/or in European legislation. 

Section 264(4) of the Communications Act 2003 specifies the purposes of PSBs in the UK:

(a) the provision of relevant television services which secure that programmes dealing with a wide range of subject-matters are made available for viewing;

(b) the provision of relevant television services in a manner which (having regard to the days on which they are shown and the times of day at which they are shown) is likely to meet the needs and satisfy the interests of as many different audiences as practicable;

(c) the provision of relevant television services which (taken together and having regard to the same matters) are properly balanced, so far as their nature and subject-matters are concerned, for meeting the needs and satisfying the interests of the available audiences; and

(d) the provision of relevant television services which (taken together) maintain high general standards with respect to the programmes included in them, and, in particular with respect to—

(i) the contents of the programmes;

(ii) the quality of the programme making; and

(iii) the professional skill and editorial integrity applied in the making of the programmes.

Section 264(6) states the objectives of PSBs, which are to:

  • Inform, educate, and entertain.
  • Reflect and support cultural activity in the UK, such as drama, comedy, and music.
  • Facilitate civic understanding and fair and well-informed debate on news and current affairs.
  • Satisfy a wide range of different sporting and other leisure interests.
  • Include a suitable quantity and range of educational programmes and programmes dealing with science, religion and other beliefs, social issues, matters of international significance or interest and matters of specialist interest.
  • Include a suitable quantity and range of high-quality and original programmes for children and young people.
  • Reflect the lives and concerns of different communities and cultural interests and traditions within the UK and locally in different parts of the UK and include programmes made outside the M25.

Individual PSBs have further specific obligations placed on them. For example, section 265 of the Communications Act 2003 sets out the public service remits for Channel 3, 4 and 5 services. The BBC’s Royal Charter sets out its object, mission, and purposes.

The House of Commons Digital, Culture Media and Sport Committee identified three core principles for all PSBs: 

  1. Universality of access: there is an expectation that public service content is widely available and free at the point of access. The content is expected to represent the diversity of the UK, and the range of genres covered should reflect this.
  2. Accuracy and impartiality: news and current affairs content made by PSBs should be accurate, reliable, and impartial.
  3. Independence: PSBs should be able to function “free from government interference or political pressure.”

How is PSB changing? Back in November 2019, the House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee published its report: ‘Public service broadcasting: As vital as ever’. The Committee found PSBs faced competition from “hundreds of other channels and online services”, with almost half of UK households subscribed to a video-on-demand service. The Committee found PSB to be “as important as ever to our democracy and culture” and that other media could not “bring the nation together” in a way that PSB could. However, the Committee found PSBs struggling to serve all audiences because of increased competition and changing viewing habits – and were not serving younger people and people from Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds well enough. 

COVID-19 has had a significant impact on broadcasting – with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport describing it as one of unprecedented challenges…[causing] significant financial and practical impacts across the entire industry. “The public service broadcasters have a vital role to play in supplying information to the public and bringing together the nation in these unprecedented circumstances. They have been an important source of news and in countering misinformation”. Ofcom research found that while the UK population’s engagement with TV, radio, online news and other home media has grown since the Covid-19 crisis, and that the appetite for news about the pandemic has boosted engagement with news across a number of sources; weekly reach is in decline. PSBs also experienced  a significant decline in advertising revenue, as well as considerable challenges in producing programming in line with social distancing restrictions. Ofcom published notes to broadcasters providing guidance on broadcast content relating to the coronavirus as well as the outcomes of investigations it carried out on specific programmes thought to have breached its broadcasting rules. 

The Government suggested these changes would likely accelerate some pressures on PSBs and the wider system and would need careful consideration by the Government, Ofcom and the sector itself going forward. 

In November 2020, the Government announced the creation of an expert panel to advise on the future of public service broadcasting. The panel would provide independent expertise and advice as part of the Government’s strategic review of public service broadcasting. In March 2022, the Government confirmed the panel had met six times, but was not expected to meet further, and that the Government would publish the conclusions of its strategic review in due course.

In May 2022, the Government launched the mid-term review of the BBC to “focus on impartiality and ‘levelling up’ job opportunities”. The Royal Charter includes a requirement for a mid-term review between 2022 and 2024 “focusing on the governance and regulatory arrangements for the BBC”. The Government stated that the updates included commitments for the BBC to:

  • More fully reflect and represent people and perspectives in the UK that currently are under-represented in the BBC’s content.
  • Increase investment outside of London, with 60% of radio and 50% of television programme production expenditure to be outside London by the end of 2027.
  • Deliver 1,000 apprenticeships per year by the end of 2025.
  • Make progress on workforce accessibility targets, including the new target for 25% of staff to be from low socio-economic backgrounds.
  • Report on how the BBC’s commercial activities increase the UK’s cultural and economic impact abroad. 

Is the legislation underpinning PSBs in need of reform? The House of Commons Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport report found the Communications Act 2003 to be pre-dated in light of streaming platforms. The Committee identified four key areas for reform:

  • New primary legislation to replace the 2003 act. The Committee highlighted a need to reform rules around prominence “to ensure that the PSB compact is sustainable within the new, increasingly internet-based audio-visual landscape.”
  • The remit of the digital markets unit should be expanded to “consider whether the dominance of online platforms gives them undue influence over the distribution of, and access to, PSB content”.
  • Requirements for diversity reporting should be extended to streaming services.
  • If PSBs are expected to maintain linear broadcasting as well as expand their on-demand services, they need sufficient funding.

The Government responded to the Committee in June 2021, stating that it would consider if changes were needed “to ensure that PSBs continue to deliver these benefits in light of broader industry and economic trends”. This was followed, in April 2022, by the publication of a white paper on the future of broadcasting, and the announcement of a media bill in the May 2022. This is intended to act as a legislative vehicle for several of the Government’s policies in the area of PSB. The Government is using the Bill to make changes to legislation around PSBs to:

  • Ensure that public service content is prominent, available, and easily accessible across a range of platforms.
  • Update the public broadcasting framework to better facilitate the delivery of public service broadcasting through digital platforms and promote the production and distribution of distinctively British content.
  • Give Ofcom new regulatory powers to draft and enforce a video-on-demand code to make sure services which target and profit from UK audiences are subject to stricter rules protecting UK audiences from harmful material.
  • Allow for the conversion of Channel 4 from a statutory corporation to a new corporate structure that could be sold, and other changes concerning Channel 4’s obligations and remit to ensure the sustainability of the broadcaster.
  • Update the public service remit of S4C to include digital and online services.
  • Remove the current geographical broadcasting restrictions so that S4C can broaden its reach and offer its content on a range of new platforms in the UK and beyond.
  • Repeal Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which would force new publishers to pay the costs of any court judgment if they were not a member of the approved regulator, regardless of the outcome of the court judgment.

The appointment of Liz Truss as Prime Minister in September 2022, led the Government to indicate that it would be reassessing the Channel 4 privatisation policy. In an answer to a written question on 24 October 2022, the Government stated that it would introduce the bill when parliamentary time allowed. Following the appointment of Rishi Sunak as Prime Minister on 25 October 2022, the Government restated that it would be  carefully considering the business case for a sale of Channel 4 and would set out further details in due course. On 5 January 2023, the Government announced instead of a sale, reforms to help Channel 4 grow and better compete in the age of streaming giants would be agreed. 

How much of PSB’s programming and output quota rural? Back in March 2014, the BBC Trust published qualitative research on BBC coverage of rural areas in the UK. This considered how rural affairs in the UK were being covered by the BBC in its television, radio and online output. The Trust found, overall, that the BBCs coverage was impartial, strong, and that network factual programmes which focus on rural matters, such as Countryfile and Farming Today, were highly regarded and broadcast a wide range of opinions and analysis. However, audience feedback also suggested some people believed news coverage to be too simplistic (focusing on protests rather than their underlying issues), that the BBC had a metropolitan bias and that a small number of organisations and charities were having a disproportionate influence on rural affairs coverage. Concerns around an apparent deficit in the coverage of rural affairs in England were also noted. The report contained 7 recommendations:

  1. Re-establish the post of Rural Affairs Correspondent. 
  2. Identify a senior figure to take an editorial oversight role and champion rural affairs across the network. 
  3. Accelerate measures to make it easier for local and regional journalists to deliver news content at the network level. 
  4. Gather together BBC journalists and programme makers at least annually to share ideas, experiences and contacts. 
  5. Involve senior network news and commissioning editors to ensure they are kept abreast of rural affairs. 
  6. Consider holding an off-the-record discussion on rural policy with a wider mix of institutional and local voices. 
  7. Revitalise the BBC’s rural contacts list across a wide range of expertise. 

In 2015 the Trust published an update on these areas. This found that three senior journalists already working in the English regions would be charged with taking on specific network responsibilities in this area. Measures to improve links between different programmes and output areas were also committed to, including a day for staff working in this area to connect with each other. Furthermore, network news teams were found to have covered stories to convey a more nuanced picture of rural issues. 

More recently, in 2022, Ofcom commissioned research to explore audience attitudes towards the due impartiality of BBC services in the context of the wider news landscape. While fieldwork was conducted across rural and urban locations across the UK; there were no notable rural specific findings in the subsequent report – with the exception of one audience reference to Countryfile being aimed more at older people.    

Also in 2022, the Countryside Alliance ran a survey asking people living in rural areas for their views on the BBC and its rural programming. 3,400 people responded to the survey which revealed: 

  • 77% of those taking part said that the licence fee was not value for money – with 68% suggesting it should be scrapped altogether. This follows an announcement from the Government, in January 2022, that the licence fee settlement which applies until the end of the charter period in 2027 would include a freeze in the licence fee for two years, from 2022-2023, followed by a rise in line with consumer price index inflation until 31 March 2028.
  • Almost half of those taking part were over the age of 65 years, and 80% watched the BBC on TV. 
  • Springwatch and Autumnwatch were deemed to be amongst the worst shows for representing rural issues – with more than 90% of respondents saying that they did not do so adequately. 
  • 92% of respondents said the BBC’s national news was failing to represent rural issues. This was closely followed by Countryfile, of which 89% of those surveyed said it did not ‘adequately’ cover the issues that matter to them. 
  • Radio 4’s The Archers was deemed not to reflect country life properly by 79% of respondents. 
  • Just under half of respondents believed Radio 4’s Farming Today properly covered the issues that matter to them. 

Tim Boner, chief executive of the Countryside Alliance described how “the BBC must appreciate that the minority rural audience does not feel fully represented. Rural programming should not only take into account what urban viewers may find of interest and it needs to showcase the value of important rural activities like farming, shooting, hunting and angling”. 

The survey was in response to the BBC announcing it would undertake an impartiality review to see if Countryfile meets its editorial standards. This is an internal content review which according to the BBC: will assess editorial standards and culture including impartiality, freedom of expression, diversity of voices, accuracy, fairness and trust. The programmes chosen – BBC Breakfast, Countryfile and the English language morning radio news programmes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – represent a range of output, across different BBC Divisions. The BBC confirmed these selections were not made because of particular impartiality concerns. 

Other PSBs have not undertaken a comprehensive review of rural broadcasts – referencing rural programming instead: from coverage of the Royal Welsh Show by S4C, or specific programmes such as Young Black Farmers or Sarah Beeny’s New Life in the Country (both channel 4), or City Life to Country Life (channel 5). 

Where next? While audiences clearly have an appetite for rural programmes, to what extent current PSB highlight the ups and downs of growing up, living and working in the countryside continue to cause debate. If we want PSBs to reflect the lives and perspectives of different communities, what rural programming would rural residents and businesses like to see going forward? ………………………

Jessica is a researcher/project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a support programme for patients waiting to receive NHS and local government services; and a Warm Hubs scheme. Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

justice

What does the unification of probation services mean for rural areas? 

More than 200,000 are people under the supervision of probation services at any one time. Back in 2019 the Secretary of State for Justice announced a new model for probation services in England and Wales. Since June 2021, all sentence management for low, medium and high-risk offenders has been carried out by a national Probation Service. Where does this model come from, and what does it mean for rural communities? Jessica Sellick investigates. 

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What is the Probation Service? The origins of the Probation Service can be traced back to Frederic Rainer, a volunteer with the Church of England Temperance Society (CETS) whom, in the late nineteenth century, wrote to the Society of his concerns about the lack of help for those who came before the courts. He sent a donation of five shillings towards a fund for practical rescue work in the police courts. In response, the CETS appointed two missionaries to work from Southwark Court with the initial aim of reclaiming drunkards. This funding informed the development of the London Police Courts Mission (LPCM) whose missionaries worked with magistrates to develop a system of releasing offenders on the condition that they kept in touch with a missionary and accepted guidance from them. 

While the Probation of First Time Offenders Act, passed in 1886, allowed courts around the country to follow the LPCM model; it was the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 that gave these missionaries the status of ‘officers of the court’ and latterly probation officers. Under the 1907 Act Magistrates Courts were able to appoint probation officers, paid for by Local Authorities. Probation officers were given a duty to ‘advise, assist and befriend’ offenders whom the courts did not believe fitted imprisonment on account of their age, character or antecedents. 

In 1909 the Departmental Committee of the Home Office reviewed the probation system created by the Act. The Committee described how the new system was dependent upon the person and character of the probation officer: ‘It is clear that personality is everything. The probation officer must be a picked man or woman, endowed not only with intelligence and zeal, but in a high degree, with sympathy, tact and firmness…Probation is what the officer makes it’ (paragraph 28). 

A Departmental Committee looking at the conditions of service of probation officers in 1922 highlighted the prominent role some probation officers were playing in the court system in some areas, and how other areas had taken no such steps to appoint probation officers. This led to the Criminal Justice Act 1925, which retained a local basis to probation but also allowed for the formation of larger units of administration known as Combined Probation Areas.

During the First World War juvenile crime increased and the Home Office decided that probation work should move from philanthropic bodies and local magistrates to the state. Indeed, a Departmental Committee report in 1936 indicated how the Probation Service was rapidly developing and called for the Home office to accept greater responsibility for the general administration, supervision and direction of the probation service. A further Departmental Committee [known as the Morison Committee] looked at the recruitment and training, organisation, administration, and the duties of probation officers as well as their pay and conditions of service. On the one hand, the Committee recognised the professional standing of the probation service and the consolidation of probation areas that had taken place. On the other hand, the Committee highlighted the rapid growth in the size of the probation service and the need to ensure minimum standards and training for all entrants. 

In 1938 the Home Office officially assumed control of the Probation Service and sought about reforming probation work. Since then, the Probation Service has undergone numerous reforms. The Criminal Justice and Court Services 2000 Act renamed the probation service as the ‘National Probation Service for England and Wales’ and saw the Home Office provide all of the funding for the Service and the creation of 42 Local Probation Boards.  The Criminal Justice Act 2003 defined the purposes of sentencing as being around punishment, crime reduction, reform and rehabilitation and protection of the public. The publication of Reducing Crime – Changing Lives led to the establishment of the National Offender Management Service and the introduction of more commissioning and competition in the provision of probation services. 

A new model for probation services? Back in 2010 the Government said it would introduce a ‘rehabilitation revolution that will pay independent providers to reduce reoffending’. This led to a series of reforms under ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ which invited providers from the private and voluntary and community sectors to bid to deliver rehabilitation services. In 2014, these reforms led the National Probation Service to be divided into two: (1) The National Probation Service – which dealt with the most serious offenders and provided advice to the courts across 7 geographic areas; and (2) twenty-one Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) run by private, voluntary or community sector organisations that were contracted to deliver community sentences for lower risk offenders. CRCs operated under a Payment by Results (PbR) scheme which meant their payments were determined by the reductions in reoffending they achieved. CRCs had to provide ‘Through the Gate’ services, providing offenders with continuous support from custody into the community. 

HM Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP) produced five reports evaluating the implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation. Overall, inspectors found CRCs were performing below expectations, with particular concerns raised around joint working between the NPS and CRCs; court work, staff training and morale; probation services for women; poor decision making in relation to community orders, suspended sentence supervision orders and post-sentence supervision; and how some CRCs were monitoring offenders by telephone. In 2018, the Justice Committee’s report into Transforming Rehabilitation concluded that it was “unconvinced that the TR model can ever deliver an effective or viable probation service”.  This was followed by reports from the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee in 2019 which flagged the rushed implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation and how it lacked value for money.    

In July 2018, the Government announced that probation contracts with CRCs would end 14-months early. It also released a consultation document on the future model of probation services. The Government published its response to the consultation in May 2019, which included an announcement that the supervision of all offenders would come back under a national probation service. The response also proposed the creation of an ‘Innovation Partner’ from the private or voluntary sector that would be responsible for the provision of unpaid work and accredited programmes. Provision was also made for voluntary sector organisations to be able to compete to deliver resettlement and rehabilitation interventions.

HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) published a Draft Target Operating Model for Probation in March 2020. This confirmed that all responsibility for sentence management would move to the national probation service, which would be divided into 11 regions across England each with its own Regional Probation Director. The Innovation Partner component was removed from the model, with these services instead to be led by the national probation service. 

Known as the unification of probation services, the transition to this new operating model wherein 21 different models and ways of working were transferred into a national probation service has taken place amid COVID-19. HM Inspectorate of Probation (HMI Probation) carried out a thematic review in May 2021. This confirmed the unification was well underway but flagged the length of time it would take trainee probation officers to complete their training and reach full capacity; and how attracting suppliers for some services and regions was difficult with a risk that some specialist services would not be in place in time. 

In February 2021, the Ministry of Justice published the final version of the Target Operating Model and a set of National Standards to support the transition to a unified model. A Dynamic Framework will be used by the national probation service to commission services for individuals on community orders and those supervised on licence in the community. These services cover areas such as accommodation, education, employment, finance and wellbeing. In May 2021, the Government announced it had made an initial investment of £195 million to 26 organisations across England and Wales to provide support services. The Ministry of Justice also announced the replacement of Through the Gate (TTG) resettlement delivered by CRCs with an Enhanced TTG model (ETTG). The new resettlement model is intended to reduce the number of people who become involved in a prisoner’s journey and sees the introduction of prison based probation teams that specialise in short sentences.   

The unification approach was broadly welcomed by stakeholders – including HMI Probation which found enthusiasm and buy-in to the new delivery model from probation staff at all grades.  

The Probation Service we have today was created on 26 June 2021 and is part of HM Prison & Probation Service (HMPPS), part of the Ministry of Justice. The Probation Service is a statutory criminal justice service that supervises offenders released into the community, while protecting the public. The Probation Service is responsible for sentence management in England and Wales, along with Accredited Programmes, Unpaid Work, and Structured Interventions. It has an overall priority ‘to protect the public by the effective rehabilitation of offenders, by reducing the causes which contribute to offending and enabling offenders to turn their lives around’. The Probation Service is organised under a regional structure, with 12 regions in England and Wales each overseen by a Regional Probation Director. 

What does this model mean for rural communities? Prior to unificationHMI Probation drew attention to a ‘two-tier and fragmented’ service under Transforming Rehabilitation: ‘Most CRCs are struggling…Delivering probation services is more difficult than first appears, particularly in prisons and rural areas. There have been serious setbacks…[In a rural area] the new CRC aimed to adopt a more decentralised model, to better engage those under supervision, but it quickly proved unaffordable…[with] services were being delivered from cavernous but sparsely-occupied offices’. 

The new Target Operating Model for probation services includes ‘an aspiration that travel time for supervised individuals to attend a contact meeting should not exceed 60 minutes each way. Research has shown that individuals are more likely to attend and comply when their journey time is reasonable and not costly…It is recognised that 60 minutes will be challenging in some rural areas and that achievement of this ambition is unlikely for all’ (page 64).  

HMI Probation collects data on caseloads, workloads and staffing levels in probation services. The 2021-2022 research & analysis bulletin highlighted probation staff abilities to manage caseloads, including when ‘covering large rural areas’ (page 22). 

Reducing Reoffending Plans describe the public facing activities that HMPPS is prioritising to reduce reoffending. For the period 2022-2025, while the South West, West Midlands and Yorkshire & Humber all describe having a mix of urban and rural communities, it is only the  East of England Plan that highlights ‘opportunities to invest further in meeting the specific needs of its probation cohort’, including ‘supporting those in rural locations’ (page14). 

In policy terms, it is clear that rural probation work has received little attention. There is also limited academic literature. One study highlighted the autonomy and responsibility that probation staff enjoy in rural work, how there are more opportunities to get involved in community organisations but also a lack of anonymity with probation staff often find themselves working alone. In Northern Ireland, a study looking at how COVID-19 impacted upon probation practice, highlighted how offenders in rural areas reported difficulties in accessing local services and in some cases the only contact they received on any given day was from probation. Probation officers further reported having the added responsibility of trying to ensure that vulnerable service users had basic necessities during the immediacy of the pandemic. 

Probation services should be accessible to all – regardless of whether someone lives in a rural or an urban area. While the accessibility of services in rural areas has featured heavily in some public policy areas (e.g. health, economy); in the context of probation services, rurality has often been overlooked. The Target Operating Model indicates how parity of accessibility in rural areas is ambitious, while at a regional level rural provision can be deemed unaffordable. The reality is that offenders in rural areas may receive less face-to-face support, and that opportunities to enhance public protection in rural communities can be lost. Accessibility is not just about geography, but also factors such as quality, availability and choice. It is also linked to wider policy arenas such as digital connectivity, public transport, housing, training and skills and health. 

As far back as 1909 the pivotal role of probation officers in supervising offenders and supporting communities was recognised. Today, many probation staff working in rural areas go above and beyond.  How can the unification of services and interventions better meet the needs of offenders in rural places and better protect rural communities?  

Where next? In April 2022 a radio 4 documentary revealed how, since 2014, more than 500 serious further offences have been committed by a person subject to probation supervision. While many of the harrowing examples shared during the programme took place under Transforming Rehabilitation, it has reignited a debate about ensuring the Probation Service has the capacity to protect the public. Indeed,    Napo, the trade union and professional association representing workers in the Probation Service and Family Courts, has been calling for proper investment in the Probation Service; addressing staff shortages, excessive workloads and paying its staff a proper rate for the work they undertake to keep the public safe. This is part of wider calls not only for the probation system to be properly funded, but for unification to remain in place for decades rather than being subjected to reform every few months or years.  

And yet, at his Lord Chancellor swearing-in speech on 29 September 2022, Brandon Lewis MP said “I also want to explore options for reforming the Probation Service, which is vital in steering prison leavers towards better futures. And I am determined to make public protection the overriding factor in parole decisions…I look forward to working with you all as we each play our part in the justice system – to cherish and protect the ideals on which it was built and to carry on building it around the people who are using it every day”.  What does this mean for the unification of probation services and current operating model in rural areas? Watch this space. 

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Jessica is a researcher/project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently evaluating a support programme for patients waiting to receive NHS and local government services; and a Warm Hubs scheme. Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

money

How will the UK National Infrastructure Bank benefit rural areas? 

Back in 2018, the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) recommended setting up a UK national infrastructure bank to replace the functions of the European Investment Bank (EIB) after Brexit. The bank launched in June 2021 and since then has been operating on an interim basis. With Government wanting to put it on a statutory footing, how will its investments benefit rural areas? Jessica Sellick investigates. 

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Why set up a National Infrastructure Bank? The National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) was established in 2015 and is an executive agency sponsored by HM Treasury. It is charged with providing Government with ‘impartial, expert advice on major long-term infrastructure challenges.’ Every 5-years the NIC is tasked with producing a National Infrastructure Assessment (NIA) which analyses the UK’s infrastructure needs including a strategic vision and recommendations for the next 30-years. The NIA published in 2018 contained a recommendation that ‘Government should maintain access to the European Investment Bank if possible. If access is lost, a new, operationally independent, UK infrastructure finance institution should be established by 2021. To enable this, Government should consult on a proposed design of the new institution by Spring 2019’ (page 118). 

This recommendation was picked up in March 2019, when HM Treasury and the Infrastructure and Ports Authority (IPA) launched a consultation on infrastructure financing in the UK. This explained the role the European Investment Bank (EIB) had played in financing long-term investments in UK infrastructure. The EIB was established in 1958 and is the lending arm of the European Union (EU). It is one of the largest multilateral financial institutions globally, having invested over a trillion euros since then.

With the UK leaving the EIB when it ceased membership of the EU, the consultation looked at how the UK would be ready to ensure infrastructure projects could continue to access the finance they need. The consultation asked respondents to assess the EIB’s roles both in addressing market failure, and in providing additionality – and the extent to which the private sector could fill the gap in infrastructure finance when the UK ceased membership of the EIB. 

In November 2020, HM Treasury published a summary of the consultation feedback. Respondents identified several benefits to the EIB’s presence in the UK, including competitive rates with flexible terms, and the capacity to step in during economic downturns by offering additional liquidity in the event of insufficient private sector appetite to finance infrastructure projects. The EIB’s independence from Governments was also identified as a key benefit. Respondents also noted the EIB’s support for new technologies and green investments, and its ability to act as a catalyst to bring in additional funding for higher risk projects. Some respondents suggested the private sector would be able to fill some of the lending gap left by the EIB, however, they further highlighted how the private sector would find it difficult to fill certain gaps such as new technologies, where a long-term UK replacement would be required. HM Treasury stated there was support for a ‘new, enduring body to deliver infrastructure finance support tools’ (page 10) and set out the Government’s commitment to establishing ‘a major new national infrastructure bank… [with a] high degree of operational independence [but within a mandate set by Government]’ (page 12). 

In Spending Review 2020, the then Chancellor Rishi Sunak announced ‘plans to create a new infrastructure bank to catalyse private investment in infrastructure projects across the UK’. The National Infrastructure Strategy (NIS) was published alongside the Spending Review and set out plans to level up the country, strengthen the Union and achieve net zero emissions by 2050. In the foreword, the then Prime Minister Boris Johnson indicated how the national infrastructure bank would be a co-investment with private sector partners, available to mayors and Local Authorities, with its HQ based in the North of England. The proposed bank was a means of marking the Government’s commitment to ‘end the stop-start pattern of investment that has been common in the UK in the past…Public investment is only part of the story. Private infrastructure investment will be crucial for the UK’s economic recovery from the pandemic…the Government will support private sector investment, including through a new infrastructure bank for the UK which will co-invest with the private sector’ (page 10). 

Within the NIS, the UK infrastructure bank was described as acting as a ‘cornerstone investor’ that would seek to release investment from pension funders and insurers – which the Government estimated could provide £150-£190 billion for infrastructure over 10-years. The NIS stated co-investors might include banks, institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds and global infrastructure investors. The Government also stated that while the new bank would replace ‘some of the activities’ of the EIB its investments would be ‘more targeted’ than those of the EIB, and ‘better aligned with the UK Government’s objectives.’ 

When and how was the UK National Investment Bank established? The Spring 2021 Budget contained information on establishing the UK Infrastructure Bank: 

  • The Bank would be provided with £12 billion of equity and debt capital to deploy to finance Local Authority and private sector infrastructure projects across the UK. 
  • The Bank would be able to issue up to £10 billion of guarantees. 
  • The Bank would be able to offer a range of financing tools including debt, hybrid products, equity and guarantees to support private infrastructure projects. 
  • The Bank would be able to offer loans to Local Authorities at a rate of gilts + 60 basis points for strategic infrastructure projects. 
  • The Bank would establish an advisory function to help with the development and delivery of projects. 

Also in March 2021, HM Treasury published a policy design document setting out the Bank’s strategic objectives and operating principles. The Bank’s operating principles included how it should (i) generate a financial return while also contributing to the Government’s priorities such as climate policy and levelling up; (ii) prioritise investment where private sector finance is lacking and ‘crowd in’ private sector investment; and (iii) take a long-term approach to provide the market with confidence and clear direction. 

In June 2021, the Government published a further document setting out the principles underpinning the relationship between it and the Bank. This Framework document set out the governance and accountability arrangements and the parameters within which the Bank would be expected to operate. While the Bank would be expected to operate across a range of sectors, the Framework asked it to prioritise clean energy, transport, digital, water and waste. The document also confirmed that HM Treasury would be the sole shareholder of the Bank, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have ministerial responsibility for it. 

On 17 June 2021, the Bank was launched in an interim form from its headquarters in Leeds. At the launch event, the then Chancellor Rishi Sunak described how the Bank will “accelerate our ambitions for tackling climate change and levelling up, while creating new opportunities across the UK as part of our Plan for Jobs…Through the Bank, we are investing billions of pounds in world class infrastructure that will support people, businesses and communities in every corner of the UK”.     

What has it delivered so far? Since launch, HM Treasury and the Bank have focused on setting up the Bank’s structures – with the interim Board, chief executive, chief operating officer and non-executive director being filled with permanent appointments between September 2021 and June 2022. 

In November 2021, HM Treasury and the Bank agreed a Financial Framework, providing more detail on HM Treasury’s requirements of, and expectations of, the Bank. These details: 

  • Confirmed the Bank’s financial resources – its transaction delegations and limits. The Bank was given delegated authority up to £5 million with thresholds ranging from £125 million for equity deals to £500 million for Local Authority lending. 
  • Contained details about managing public money – setting out the Bank’s responsibilities and the principles within which it should operate. 
  • Required the Bank to develop sound financial and risk management structures and processes. 
  • Specified an annual financial performance (return on equity) target of 2.5%-4% before tax by the end of a 5-year period. 

HM Treasury requested the Bank produce its first strategic plan within 12-months of launch. To do this, the Chancellor provided additional guidance to the Bank on the Government’s policy priorities for the Bank and its mandate. 

In January 2022, the Bank published a discussion paper on ‘private sector opportunities in priority sectors’. This document set out the Bank’s offer to the private sector and public sector, what distinguishes it from other lenders, and the progress it had made since its launch. The discussion paper informed the Bank’s Strategic Plan. This confirmed the Bank’s focus on ‘increasing infrastructure investment across the United Kingdom’ in pursuit of two strategic objectives’: 

  • To help tackle climate change, particularly meeting the Government’s net zero emissions target by 2050. 
  • To support regional and local economic growth through better connectedness, opportunities for new jobs and higher levels of productivity. 

The Strategic Plan contained four principles against it will assess investments: 

  1. Investments must support the Bank’s objectives to drive regional and local economic growth or support tackling climate change. 
  2. Be in infrastructure assets or networks, or in new infrastructure technology. This principle reaffirms the Bank’s commitment to operate across a range of sectors but to prioritise clean energy, transport, digital, water and waste. 
  3. Be intended to deliver a positive financial return. 
  4. Be expected to crowd in significant private capital over time. 

Private sector projects must meet all four of these investment principles, and Local Authority projects must meet the first three. The Strategic Plan further explained how the Bank is developing KPIs to measure the impact of its investments. Organisations representing business, finance, trade unions, academia and civil society have provided feedback on the development of KPIs – calling on the Bank to take a broad interpretation of return (i.e., not just financial but also social, climatic and environmental); to implement Do Not Harm Standards and ensure all investments contribute to a nature positive economy; and to recognise the links between KPIs and transparency. The Bank is in the process of developing an ESG policy and framework. 

In March 2022 the Government set out its ‘strategic steer’ to the Bank. It asked the Bank to prioritise the energy security sector in sharing its concerns about energy security and energy prices following recovery from COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. This means investments in nuclear energy, retrofitting energy efficiency measures into homes and greenhouse gas removals have increased in prominence within the Bank’s investment scope. On regional and local growth, the strategic steer referenced prioritising projects that fit with the missions contained in the Levelling Up White Paper, in particular, improving employment and productivity, transport infrastructure and digital connectivity. The Government also highlighted the role the Bank would take over in running the UK Guarantees Scheme. 

Between its launch date and June 2022, the Bank made five deals amounting to some £311.5 million. They comprise: South Bank Quay (£107 million), Gigaclear (£100 million), NextEnergy (£44.5 million), A45 Sprint Bus Route (£10 million) and Fibrus (£50 million). All of these deals are loans, and many came from existing proposals being considered elsewhere in Government and/or from existing initiatives underway. By April 2022, the Bank had a project pipeline of some 44 potential deals with a total value of approximately £5 billion. As well as existing contacts, the pipeline is also the result of enquiries through the Bank’s website and market engagement with potential customers. 24 of these pipeline projects are seeking to help tackle climate change, 9 relate to regional and local economic growth, and 11 projects cover both of these priorities. 

Why put it on a statutory footing? The Bank was set up in June 2021 as a company under the Companies Act 2006 and wholly owned by HM Treasury. At the outset the Bank began by operating under existing legislation through the Infrastructure (Financial Assistance) Act 2012 and the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020. 

In May 2022, HM Treasury published the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill. The Bill seeks to provide a specific parliamentary mandate for the Bank, placing its objectives into legislation and creating statutory forms of transparency, accountability, and governance. It is also intended remove legal obstacles to the Bank’s capacity to lend directly to Local Authorities and the Northern Ireland Executive for infrastructure purposes, and to give the Treasury financial assistance powers specific to the Bank. The Bill further provides flexibility for future changes should the Government wish to adjust the scope and/or focus of the Bank’s mandate. John Glen, then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, described how the Bill “sets out the Bank’s long-term purposes as an enduring institution…helping tackle climate change and support levelling up.” 

The Bill consists of eleven clauses – these reference the Policy Design Document and Framework Document in setting out the objectives and activities of the Bank; the Government’s strategic steer in supporting the Bank to set strategic priorities and plans; Treasury arrangements for money to be paid out of the National Loans Fund; and the need for the Bank to publish its first review of its effectiveness and impact with 10-years. It also confirms the financial capacity with the £22 billion provided to the Bank comprising £5 billion as equity from the Treasury, £7 billion in debt that it can borrow from the Treasury, and £10 billion in guarantees that can be issued by the Bank as part of the UK Guarantee Scheme. The Bank can also borrow from private markets and grow through recycling and retaining return on investments. 

How will the Bank benefit rural areas? The Bank’s strategic plan contains five references to rural. These include:  

  • How the UK is one of the most geographically unequal developed economies and opportunity is not spread equally across the country – with complex rural-urban disparities (page 41). 
  • Fast, reliable, digital connectivity drives regional and local economic growth, particularly in rural communities as it helps businesses grow, innovate, and create jobs (page 54). 
  • The Government has a goal of delivering 4G mobile coverage across 95% of the UK landmass by 2025. We do not see a role for the Bank because existing investment will be sufficient to reach this target, and the Shared Rural Network will support roll-out in the remaining harder-to-reach areas (page 55).

Back in December 2021, the Bank announced a £100 million investment in the internet provider Gigaclear. The Bank also facilitated £90 million of private sector investment from five other lenders: ABN Amro, ING, Lloyds Bank, Natwest and NIBC. The overall investment is for Gigaclear to deliver broadband to a further 250,000 properties in the south west, midlands and south east of England, with 90% of these in hard-to-reach rural properties currently underserved by the commercial market. In April 2022, the Bank provided a £50 million loan to Fibrus to support ‘full fibre broadband connections to approximately 220,000 properties in rural areas and market towns in Northern Ireland’. More recently, in August 2022, the Bank announced it was investing £100 million in the Digital Infrastructure Investment Fund (DIIF) to accelerate the digital roll out of ultrafast broadband to rural homes across the UK. 

There are circumstances where markets do not meet all of a rural population’s needs and must be supplemented either by the state or by civil society. In its strategic plan, the Bank indicates its focus on ‘where there is an undersupply of private sector financing…by reducing barriers to investment and market failures’ (page 71) and how it ‘will be judged over time on whether we have accelerated infrastructure investments, helped shape markets, addressed market failures’ (page 73). While financing to benefit rural residents and businesses through the Bank’s digital priority sector is welcome, other priority sectors within its portfolio (e.g., transport, energy, water) are also important to rural communities – how and when will these be picked up through investment opportunities? While the Bank acknowledges spatial disparities, how is (or will) it ensure that rural areas are taken into account in its decision making processes and investments?    

Unlike other financial facilities operated by or on behalf of HM Treasury (e.g., UK Debt Management Office), the Bank works on a single project basis. In a rural context, this means propositions could not necessarily group several projects up into one application or package thus discouraging potential customers from approaching the Bank. 

Where next? Successive Governments have sought to address market failures. Back in October 2012 the Government established the UK Green Investment Bank plc (GIB) – selling it off to Macquaries in August 2017 for £2.3 billion. According to a report published by the National Audit Office (NAO), while the GIB was set up with a clear rationale, mission and objectives to help the Government achieve its commitments on climate change; the Government lacked clear criteria or evidence to show that it had achieved its intended green impact. The sale of GIB was at the lower end of the expected valuation range and Macquarie has no legal obligation to ensure GIB will keep focusing on green objectives nor to keep the institution going in the long term. In relation to the UK Investment Bank, these findings suggest the need to set clear KPIs or metrics to measure the Bank’s impact; and the need to put the Bank on a legal standing to ensure it can fund, borrow, and reinvest in the longer-term. 

The NIC’s next major assessment of the UK’s long term infrastructure priorities is due to be published in 2023. In November 2021 the NIC published a baseline report surveying the state of national systems of digital, energy, flood resilience, water and wastewater, waste and transport.  For rural areas, the baseline report highlights instances of lower levels of productivity, variations in digital connectivity and the need to invest in rural fibre. The NIC will be framing its next assessment around three strategic themes: (i) reaching net zero; (ii) reducing environmental impacts and building resilience to climate change; and (iii) helping level up communities across the UK.

On 23 September the chancellor, Kwasi Kwarteng delivered his Growth Plan 2022 speech. In the speech he highlighted the need for an ambitious agenda which will look at the planning system, agricultural productivity, and digital infrastructure. He further described how ‘an essential foundation of this growth is infrastructure.’ The Government is now intending to bring forward new legislation to make it quicker to plan and build new roads, speed up the deployment of energy infrastructure like offshore wind farms and streamline environmental assessments and regulations. The Government is also in discussions with 38 Local Authority areas to establish investment zones in England.  

 The NIC recognised the need for a new financial institution for infrastructure investment. What will Growth Plan 2022, the Bank’s investments and the next NIC assessment all mean for rural communities? Watch this space… 

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Jessica is a researcher/project manager at Rose Regeneration and a senior research fellow at The National Centre for Rural Health and Care (NCRHC). She is currently supporting a Community Renewal Fund project; and evaluating employability schemes and a veterans programme. Jessica also sits on the board of a Housing Association that supports older people and a charity supporting Cambridgeshire’s rural communities. 

She can be contacted by email jessica.sellick@roseregeneration.co.uk. 

Website: http://roseregeneration.co.uk/https://www.ncrhc.org/ 

Blog: http://ruralwords.co.uk/ 

Twitter: @RoseRegen 

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